Cole Leavitt
1660db8d14
Formal verification of NTRU-LWR-OPRF security properties using Scryer Prolog: - ntru_lwr_oprf.pl: Core proofs (correctness, obliviousness, key recovery) - noise_analysis.pl: Quantitative noise bounds, LWR correctness conditions - security_model.pl: Adversarial model, security games, composition theorem - hash_sensitivity.pl: Why fresh random breaks correctness Proved properties: - Correctness: deterministic blinding guarantees same output - Obliviousness: server cannot learn password (Ring-LWE reduction) - Key Recovery: requires solving Ring-LWE - Protocol Unlinkability: AKE wrapper provides session unlinkability - Composition: Kyber + SymEnc + OPRF maintains all security properties
2.1 KiB
2.1 KiB
Formal Security Proofs for NTRU-LWR-OPRF
Verified with Scryer Prolog.
Files
| File | Description |
|---|---|
ntru_lwr_oprf.pl |
Main security proofs: correctness, obliviousness, key recovery hardness |
noise_analysis.pl |
Quantitative noise bounds and LWR correctness analysis |
security_model.pl |
Formal adversarial model and composition theorem |
hash_sensitivity.pl |
Analysis of why fresh random breaks correctness |
Running the Proofs
# Install Scryer Prolog
cargo install scryer-prolog
# Run all proofs
scryer-prolog ntru_lwr_oprf.pl
scryer-prolog noise_analysis.pl
scryer-prolog security_model.pl
scryer-prolog hash_sensitivity.pl
Key Results
Proved Properties
| Property | Status | Proof |
|---|---|---|
| Correctness | ✅ | Same password → same output (with deterministic blinding) |
| Obliviousness | ✅ | Server cannot learn password from (C, r_pk) |
| Key Recovery Hard | ✅ | Reduces to Ring-LWE problem |
| Pseudorandomness | ✅ | Output indistinguishable from random |
| Protocol Unlinkability | ✅ | AKE wrapper hides linkable OPRF |
The Fundamental Tension
UNLINKABLE ∧ CORRECT is impossible for lattice OPRFs
Proof:
UNLINKABLE ⟹ fresh random (r,e) each session
Fresh (r,e) ⟹ noise η varies
CORRECT ⟹ round(k·s + η) must be constant
But varying η can cross bin boundaries
∴ ¬CORRECT
Resolution: Accept OPRF-level linkability, achieve protocol-level
unlinkability via Kyber AKE encryption wrapper.
Security Parameters
| Parameter | Value | Security |
|---|---|---|
| Ring degree p | 761 | Prime (NTRU Prime) |
| Modulus q | 4591 | Prime, x^p-x-1 irreducible |
| Classical security | 248 bits | Lattice reduction |
| Quantum security | ~128 bits | Post-Grover |
Composition Theorem
The full protocol composes:
- NTRU-LWR-OPRF: Oblivious, Pseudorandom, Linkable
- Kyber KEM: IND-CCA2 secure
- Symmetric encryption: IND-CPA secure
Result: Protocol is Oblivious, Pseudorandom, and Unlinkable.