                                                            Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


                                                                 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect


                                                        Computer Standards & Interfaces
                                                          journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/csi




MExpm: Fair computation offloading for batch modular exponentiation with
improved privacy and checkability in IoV
                                                   ∗,1
Sipeng Shen 1 , Qiang Wang                             , Fucai Zhou, Jian Xu         , Mingxing Jin
Software College, Northeastern University, China



ARTICLE                INFO                              ABSTRACT

Keywords:                                                Modular exponentiation is a fundamental cryptographic operation extensively applied in the Internet of
Internet of Vehicles                                     Vehicles (IoV). However, its computational intensity imposes significant resource and time demands on
Modular exponentiation                                   intelligent vehicles. Offloading such computations to Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers has emerged as
Computation offloading
                                                         a promising approach. Nonetheless, existing schemes are generally impractical, as they either fail to ensure
Smart contract
                                                         fairness between intelligent vehicles and MEC servers, lack privacy protection for the bases and exponents,
                                                         or cannot guarantee the correctness of results with overwhelming probability due to potential misbehavior by
                                                         MEC servers. To address these limitations, we propose MExpm, a fair and efficient computation offloading
                                                         scheme for batch modular exponentiation under a single untrusted server model. Our scheme leverages
                                                         blockchain technology to ensure fairness through publicly verifiable results. Furthermore, MExpm achieves
                                                         high checkability, offering a near-perfect probability of checkability. To enhance privacy, we introduce secure
                                                         obfuscation and logical split techniques, effectively protecting both the bases and the exponents. Extensive
                                                         theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our scheme is not only efficient in terms of
                                                         computation, communication, and storage overheads but also significantly improves privacy protection and
                                                         checkability.



1. Introduction                                                                          requirements of intelligent vehicles [10,11]. Despite these benefits, it
                                                                                         still suffers from some security challenges. Once the computation tasks
1.1. Motivation                                                                          are offloaded, it will lose control over them. As a result, the MEC
                                                                                         server may forge the outcome of the computation. To address this issue,
    Batch modular exponentiation, a fundamental mathematical opera-                      verifiable CO was first proposed by [12] to ensure the integrity of the
                  ∏     𝑎
tion, denoted as 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 𝑖 mod 𝑁, which is widely used in the Internet                   results. A fundamental requirement for verifiable CO is that the total
of Vehicles (IoV) (i.e., key exchange, digital signatures, and identity                  time invested in the verification process should be less than the time
authentication) and is assumed as one of the most resource-intensive                     spent performing the computation by himself. Otherwise, the intelligent
operations. Considering limited computation resources in intelligent                     vehicle would not prefer to offload its computation.
vehicles, locally executing the above task is unviable, which cannot
meet both computation resources and time latency requirements [1].
                                                                                         1.2. Limitations of prior art
To tackle this challenge, computation offloading (CO) is proposed to
undertake resource-intensive computation tasks for intelligent vehi-
                                                                                             In this paper, we mainly focus on verifiable computation offloading
cles [2]. However, current cloud computation paradigm for modular
                                                                                         for batch modular exponentiation with MEC servers. However, to the
exponentiation offloading in [3–8] fails to meet the requirements of low
                                                                                         best of our knowledge, none of the existing prior schemes are practical
latency, location awareness, and mobility support [9], since the cloud
                                                                                         enough, as demonstrated in Fig. 1. They suffer from the following
servers are far from the vehicles, it is a challenge for network transfer
latency. To overcome the limitations of cloud computation, offloading                    challenges.
computational tasks from intelligent vehicles to MEC servers, being                          Fairness. Most verifiable CO schemes for batch modular exponen-
closer to intelligent vehicles than cloud servers, can provide adequate                  tiation make sure the results are correct for the client before paying
computation resources for offloaded tasks while meeting the latency                      but often disregard the cloud’s interests. As a result, the client might


  ∗ Corresponding author.
      E-mail address: wangqiang1@mail.neu.edu.cn (Q. Wang).
  1
      Equal contribution.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2025.104107
Received 3 June 2025; Received in revised form 12 August 2025; Accepted 28 November 2025
Available online 3 December 2025
0920-5489/© 2025 Elsevier B.V. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
S. Shen et al.                                                                                                            Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107




Fig. 1. Limitations of Prior Art and Our Defenses: Scenario 1: Previous works adopt private verification algorithm. Under this assumption, the greedy intelligent
vehicle may reject the correct computation results and refuse to pay for the MEC server’s work. Scenario 2: Previous works with low checkability fail to detect
MEC server’s misbehavior. Scenario 3: Previous works with plaintext offloading strategy fail to protect the confidentiality of inputs and outputs.


refuse to pay by deliberately claiming that the MEC server returns                  Table 1
an incorrect result even when executed faithfully. Furthermore, the                 Comparison of properties.
cloud may intentionally manipulate the computation outcome for some                  Scheme           Batch size    Privacy   Checkability rate      Verification   Fairness
                                                                                                                               119
economic incentives. When a dispute occurs between them, a fully                     MExp [3]         1             ×          120
                                                                                                                                                     Private        ×
                                                                                                                               119
trusted third party (TTP), such as a judge, has to be involved to deduce             SMCExp [4]       1             ×          120
                                                                                                                                                     Private        ×
                                                                                                                               119
which party is wrong. As an ex-post measure, the dispute can be finally              SoRSA [6]        1             ×          120
                                                                                                                                                     Private        ×
handled, but it is unfriendly for time-sensitive IoV applications [13].              EPExp [7]        1             ×         0                      Private        ×
                                                                                     MExpm(ours)      1             ✓         ≈1                     Public         ✓
Therefore, it is essential to find an immediate resolution without TTP to                                                                2

guarantee fairness between the MEC server and the intelligent vehicle.               MExp [3]         n             ×         1 − 10(4𝑛2𝑛+6𝑛+2)      Private        ×
                                                                                                                                         2

Due to transparency, accountability, and immutability, blockchain can                SMCExp [4]       n             ×         1 − 10(4𝑛2𝑛+6𝑛+2)      Private        ×
                                                                                                                               1
be used to establish trust among untrusted parties. A naive solution is to           GExp [5]         n             ×         𝑛+1
                                                                                                                                                     Private        ×
                                                                                                                                           𝑛2
delegate the entire computation to the blockchain. It is inefficient and             MExpm(ours)      n             ✓         1 − (4𝑛2 +6𝑛+2)(𝑁−2)   Public         ✓

imposes financial burdens on intelligent vehicles, such as significant gas          Batch Size: The number of bases in one offloading;
fees for modular exponentiation in Ethereum. Besides, this approach                 Privacy: Whether it can protect privacy of bases and exponents;
seriously deviates from the original intent of computation offloading.              Checkability Rate: The Checkability of Offloading scheme;
                                                                                    Verification: Verification method for offloading;
    Checkability Rate. The existing schemes employ verification mech-               Fairness: The fairness for both service provider and intelligent vehicles;
anisms to ensure computation correctness against malicious MEC                      ✓: means the scheme achieves this property; ×: means it does not.
servers [14]. However, the achieved checkability rate often falls short
of expectations, failing to reach 100%. For example, in [3,4], the
checkability rate is only 97.5% when the batch size 𝑛 = 1000. In
                                                                                    a fair computation offloading task, the verification algorithm should
other words, intelligent vehicles may fail to detect misbehavior by
                                                                                    be public. To tackle this challenge, a straightforward approach is to
malicious MEC servers with a 2.5% probability. Besides, the intelligent
                                                                                    process the computation using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
vehicle may make misjudgments even if the MEC servers return correct                Specifically, the bases 𝑢𝑖 are encrypted using the data owner’s public
results. When disputes arise between the intelligent vehicle and the                key and outsourced to the MEC server. The intelligent vehicle encodes
MEC servers, as previously mentioned, a complex procedure involving                 the queries 𝑎𝑖 under the same public key. To recover the final result
TTP is imperative. This ex-post measure is valid, but it is unsuitable for          returned by the MEC server, the private key of the data owner should
IoV time-sensitive applications. Furthermore, there is no such a fully              be shared with the intelligent vehicle. If the private key is leaked, it
trusted entity in the real world.                                                   will cause serious privacy issues [15,16]. Furthermore, the intelligent
    Privacy. Most of the existing schemes offload modular exponenti-
        ∏    𝑎                                                                      vehicle cannot afford this heavy computation owing to the limitation
ation 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 𝑖 mod 𝑁 in a plaintext way [6,7]. If we directly apply                of resources.
them into IoV, this inevitably comes with the privacy concern. Modular                  Compared with existing works in Table 1, MExpm supports privacy
exponentiation plays a critical role in secure cryptography algorithms              and fairness both for service providers and intelligent vehicles. Our
(i.e., key exchange, digital signatures, identity authentication). In this          contributions can be summarized as follows.
case, the MEC server knows the base 𝑢𝑖 , exponent 𝑎𝑖 , and output which
is the result of 𝑢𝑎 ( mod 𝑁), so it will increase the risks of privacy                  1. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to attempt fair
leakage and attacks. From this point, it is essential to protect the                       computation offloading of batch modular exponentiation under
privacy of the bases, exponents, and results. To tackle this challenge,                    a single untrusted server model, which is more appropriate for
some researchers [3–5] utilize the logical split technique to protect                      practical applications.
privacy. The security relies on a strong assumption that the auxiliary                  2. We integrate smart contracts into the verification process to en-
information cannot be known by the malicious adversary. Therefore,                         sure fairness and correctness. Compared with existing schemes,
the verification algorithm can only be executed by the data owner. For                     our approach incurs lower gas consumption.

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S. Shen et al.                                                                                                   Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


    3. We employ a logical split method and secure obfuscation tech-
       niques to conceal the bases, exponents, and modulus before
       offloading computation. Consequently, MExpm achieves near-
       perfect checkability rate.


2. Related work


2.1. Computation offloading


    Intelligent vehicles, with limited computation resources and an
increasing number of in-car applications, struggle to efficiently execute
computation-intensive tasks. To address the challenges faced by intel-
ligent vehicles, computation offloading has been proposed. It transfers
communication, computation, and storage tasks to MEC servers situ-
ated around intelligent vehicles [17]. Existing computation offloading
schemes mainly focus on computation efficiency [17–19], resource allo-
cation [20,21], or decision-making optimization [11] task. While these
schemes lay the foundation for offloading computationally intensive
tasks to MEC servers, they often lack adequate security considerations,                          Fig. 2. The architecture of system model.
leading to a gap in verifiable computation offloading for batch modular
exponentiation.
                                                                                3. Fair computation offloading for batch modular exponentiation
2.2. Secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation                    scheme in IoV

                                                                                3.1. System model
   The secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation can
be categorized into single and dual-server models. Dual-server model
                                                                                     As illustrated in Fig. 2, the fair computation offloading for batch
assumes that there is no complicity risk between cloud servers [22–25].
                                                                                modular exponentiation in IoV mainly comprises four entities: Service
This assumption, complex to implement in real-world applications, is
                                                                                Agency (SA), Intelligent Vehicle (IV), Roadside Unit (RSU), and MEC
vulnerable to collusion attacks between servers. Therefore, we mainly           Server.
consider the single-server model, which is first proposed in 2006 by                 SA: It is an honest entity. It provides the intelligent vehicle with the
Dijk et al. [26]. Recently, numerous algorithms have been proposed to           initialized bases 𝑢𝑖 and modulus 𝑁 of the batch modular exponentiation
improve checkability rate [5,27,28]. In 2016, Ding et al. [3] proposed                 ∏       𝑎
                                                                                task 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 𝑖 mod 𝑁, and its communication with intelligent vehicles
a modular exponentiation outsourcing scheme with checkability rate              is based on secure channels.
close to 119
          120
              , especially when batch size 𝑛 = 1, which is rather higher             IV: It is a resource-limited entity. It does not trust the MEC server,
than before. Thereafter, Su et al. [4], in 2020, expanded Ding’s method,        but it wants to offload some requests 𝑎𝑖 to the MEC server, where
optimized the logical split, and changed the modulus of the algorithm           𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. Furthermore, it may try to get the result without paying
to a composite number. Recent schemes including SoRSA [6] and EP-               by intentionally saying that the cloud’s computation result is wrong.
Exp [7] assume that bases in computation tasks are ciphertext and lack               RSU: It is an untrusted entity, which serves as a full node of the
the consideration of security of bases. The checkability rate of these          blockchain. It provides verifiable services to guarantee the integrity of
methods is still far from 1, and it can result in certain security risks.       the result.
Meanwhile, many of these schemes concurrently present outsourcing                    MEC Server: It is a powerful entity deployed at the network’s
algorithms for 𝑢𝑎 . Nevertheless, a single modular exponentiation out-          edge with adequate computation resources, which is responsible for
sourcing algorithm represents a specific instance of batch modular              performing the computation offloading tasks for the intelligent vehicle.
exponentiation outsourcing with batch size 𝑛 = 1.                               Similar to the intelligent vehicle, it is also a profit-driven entity. It
                                                                                would like to get the reward from the intelligent vehicle without
                                                                                performing the computation.
2.3. Fair computation                                                                A fair computation offloading for batch modular exponentiation
                                                                                (MExpm) in IoV consists of the following algorithms.
    Recently, blockchain and smart contracts have been proposed to                   (𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠, 𝑅𝐾) ← 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝(1𝜆 , 𝑢1 , … , 𝑢𝑛 , 𝑁). Given a security parameter
                                                                                𝜆, the bases 𝑢1 , … , 𝑢𝑛 and 𝑁, SA invokes this algorithm to generate the
address these fairness issues [29]. Smart contracts can provide a secure
                                                                                public parameters 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 and the recovery key 𝑅𝐾, where 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑁
solution for participants to execute contracts on Ethereum, essentially
                                                                                are the base and modulus for modular exponentiation tasks.
being executable code with correctness, transparency, and immutabil-
                                                                                     (𝑇 𝐾, 𝑉 𝐾, 𝐴𝑢𝑥) ← 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛(𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑛 , 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠). On inputting the ex-
ity [30]. Although there are some studies utilizing smart contract to
                                                                                ponents 𝑎1 , … , 𝑎𝑛 and the public parameters 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠, IV runs this
fulfill fair computation, they either rely on the assumption that the
                                                                                algorithm to generate the evaluation key 𝑇 𝐾 for performing the compu-
client and the cloud are honest [31], or utilize smart contract con-            tation task, witness generation key 𝑉 𝐾 and auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥.
ducting complex computation tasks [29,32,33]. However, in standard              It is worth noting that this algorithm can be carried out entirely offline
blockchain systems such as Ethereum, users are typically charged gas            before the online phase, so it does not introduce additional latency
fees based on the complexity of the computational task running in the           during computation outsourcing. The input 𝑎𝑖 is the exponent of 𝑢𝑖 ,
smart contract. The gas fees for smart contracts are recorded in the            where 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}.
fee table EIP150 [34]. Generally, the cost of Ethereum is high, and                  (𝜎E , 𝜋𝐸 ) ← 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒(𝑇 𝐾, 𝑉 𝐾). On inputting the evaluation key
considering that modular exponentiation is an expensive computation             𝑇 𝐾 and witness generation key 𝑉 𝐾, the MEC server performs this
task, Existing schemes may increase the financial burden on users.              algorithm to produce the encoding result 𝜎E and witness 𝜋𝐸 .

                                                                            3
S. Shen et al.                                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


Table 2                                                                                         𝟐. 𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑮𝒆𝒏(𝒂1 , … , 𝒂𝒏 , 𝑷 𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒎𝒔) ∶ This algorithm is executed by the
Notations.                                                                                  IV to construct the evaluation key 𝑇 𝐾 for performing the computation
 Symbols                                  Descriptions                                      task, the witness generation key 𝑉 𝐾, and auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥.
 {𝑢1 , 𝑢2 , … , 𝑢𝑛 }                      Computation bases                                 Notably, the IV can execute this procedure in an offline manner, thereby
 𝜆                                        Security Parameter
                                                                                            avoiding additional delays in the online authentication or verification
 𝑝                                        512-bit prime integer
 𝑁                                        512-bit prime integer                             phase. This algorithm works as follows:
 𝐿                                        A composite integer 𝐿 = 𝑝𝑁                            (a) IV parses 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 as {𝐿, 𝑦𝑖 } and the input exponents 𝑎𝑖 ∈ Z∗𝜙(𝐿) .
 𝑘                                        A random integer
                                                                                                (b) IV runs RandN program [35] four times to generate four blinding
 𝜏                                        A composite integer 𝜏 = 𝑘𝑁
 {𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , … , 𝑦𝑛 }                      Bases after secure obfuscation                    pairs (𝑘1 , 𝑔 𝑘1 ), (𝑘2 , 𝑔 𝑘2 ), (𝑘3 , 𝑔 𝑘3 ), (𝑘4 , 𝑔 𝑘4 ) and sets:
 (𝑘𝑖 , 𝑔 𝑘𝑖 ), 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}           Random pairs generated by RandN algorithm
 {𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑛 }                      Computation exponents
                                                                                            𝑣1 = 𝑔 𝑘1 mod 𝐿, 𝑣2 = 𝑔 𝑘2 mod 𝐿,
                                                                                                                                                                                 (2)
 𝜙(⋅)                                     Euler’s function                                  𝑣3 = 𝑔 𝑘3 mod 𝐿, 𝑣4 = 𝑔 𝑘4 mod 𝐿.
 {𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧1 , 𝛿1 , 𝑚𝑖 }, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}     Computation tasks after logical division
 𝑟 ∈ {2, … , 𝑁}                           Random integer                                    where 𝑔 ∈ Z∗𝐿 and its order is 𝜙(𝐿).
 𝜉 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}                           Random index                                        (c) IV performs logical split to compute 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧1 , 𝛿1 , and 𝑚𝑖 such that
 𝑑                                        Modular Multiplicative Inverse of 𝑎𝜉
 {𝑤′𝑖 , 𝑧2 , 𝛿2 , 𝑚′𝑖 }, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}   Verification tasks after logical division
 {𝜎𝐸 , 𝜋𝐸 }                               Computation results returned by MEC server                    𝑤𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 ∕𝑣1 (mod 𝐿),
                                                                                              (                 )
                                                                                            𝑘1 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑘3 + 𝛿1 𝑧1 (mod 𝜙(𝐿)),                                         (3)
                                                                                                     𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿1 𝑧1 + 𝑚𝑖 (mod 𝜙(𝐿)).
    {0∕1, 𝜎E } ← 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦(𝜎E , 𝜋𝐸 , 𝐴𝑢𝑥). On inputting the encoding result                     (d) IV chooses two random integers 𝑟 ∈ {2, … , 𝑁} and 𝜉 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}
𝜎E , the witness 𝜋𝐸 and auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥, the RSU runs this                        and computes 𝑑, where 𝑎𝜉 𝑑 ≡ 1 (mod 𝜙(𝐿)).
algorithm to check whether the MEC server returns a correct result
                                                                                               (e) IV computes 𝑤′𝑖 , 𝑧2 , 𝛿2 , and 𝑚′𝑖 such that
utilizing smart contract. If not, it outputs 0, 1 and 𝜎E otherwise.
    𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦(𝜎E , 𝑅𝐾). On inputting 𝜎E and recovery key 𝑅𝐾,                                    𝑤′𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 ∕𝑣2 (mod 𝐿),
the intelligent vehicle runs this algorithm to decode the true result                         (                  )
                                                                                            𝑘2 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑘4 + 𝛿2 𝑧2 (mod 𝜙(𝐿)),                                         (4)
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡.
                                                                                                        𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿2 𝑧2 + 𝑚′𝑖 (mod 𝜙(𝐿)).

3.2. Overview of construction and notations                                                 Especially when 𝑖 = 𝜉, we have 𝑦′𝜉 = 𝑦𝜉 𝑟𝑑 ( mod 𝐿) and 𝑤′𝜉 = 𝑦′𝜉 ∕𝑣2 ( mod
                                                                                            𝐿), where 𝜉 ∈ [1, 𝑛] is a random integer.
                                                                                                                                                  ∏
    Similar to [3], the bases and exponents are protected using logical                          (f)    IV      sets   𝑇𝐾             =        {(𝑔 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧1 ), (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] },
                                                                                                          ∏𝑛
split. A recovery algorithm is also involved to protect the confidentiality                 𝑉 𝐾 = {(𝑔 𝑖=1 𝑤′𝑖 , 𝑧2 ), (𝑤′𝑖 , 𝑚′𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] } and 𝐴𝑢𝑥 = {𝑟𝑣3 , 𝑣4 , 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 }, where
of the final result. At the setup phase, we utilize the secure obfuscation                  𝛿1 , 𝛿2 ∈ Z∗𝜙(𝐿) . The pseudo code of the key generation procedure can be
technique to hide the modulus 𝑁 and bases 𝑢𝑖 . In 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝 step (a), only                      found in Algorithm 1.
the masked modulus 𝐿 = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑁 is sent to MEC server, so the MEC
server cannot get any information about 𝑁 without the mask factor
                                                                                            Algorithm 1: KeyGen Algorithm
𝑝 chosen and kept privately by the User. To prevent the MEC server
from learning the original bases 𝑢𝑖 , we apply a modular obfuscation                           Input: Exponents 𝑎1 , ⋯ , 𝑎𝑛 ∈ Z∗𝜙(𝐿) , public parameters
technique by embedding each base into a larger modular space (i.e., Eq.                                  𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 = {𝐿, 𝑦𝑖 }
(1)) in 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝 step (b). Since 𝑘 and 𝑝 are sampled uniformly, the                               Output: Evaluation key 𝑇 𝐾, verification key 𝑉 𝐾, auxiliary info
adversarial MEC server cannot recover them. The original computation                                        𝐴𝑢𝑥
                  ∏𝑛        𝑎𝑖 mod 𝑁 is converted into ∏𝑛 𝑦 𝑎𝑖 mod 𝐿.                        1 Parse 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 as {𝐿, 𝑦𝑖 } ;                                         // Step (a)
offloading task      𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖                                  𝑖=1 𝑖
                                                                                             2 Run RandN algorithm four times to get
The privacy of the exponent 𝑎𝑖 is ensured by the logical split, where
𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿1 ⋅ 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 mod 𝜙(𝐿). Since the standard integer factorization                            (𝑘1 , 𝑔 𝑘1 ), (𝑘2 , 𝑔 𝑘2 ), (𝑘3 , 𝑔 𝑘3 ), (𝑘4 , 𝑔 𝑘4 );            // Step (b)
                                                                                                                       𝑘                         𝑘
                                                                                             3 Compute 𝑣1 = 𝑔 1 mod 𝐿, 𝑣2 = 𝑔 2 mod 𝐿, 𝑣3 = 𝑔 3 mod 𝐿,
                                                                                                                                                                 𝑘
assumption holds, the adversary cannot derive their factors 𝑝 and 𝑁
from 𝐿. Without factors 𝑝 and 𝑁, it is infeasible to compute 𝜙(𝐿) =                             𝑣4 = 𝑔 𝑘4 mod 𝐿;                                        // Compute Equation 2
                                                                                             4 Compute 𝑘1 (𝑎1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛 ) = 𝑘3 + 𝛿1 𝑧1 mod 𝜙(𝐿) ; // Equation
(𝑝 − 1)(𝑁 − 1).𝜙(𝐿) = (𝑝 − 1) ⋅ (𝑁 − 1). As a result, the reduction modulo
𝜙(𝐿) effectively hides the underlying value, which makes it infeasible                            3
                                                                                             5 for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
to recover 𝑎𝑖 from 𝛿1 ⋅ 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 mod 𝜙(𝐿). Furthermore, the malicious
adversary learns nothing about the final computation result without the
                                                                                             6     Compute 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 ∕𝑣1 mod 𝐿 ;                  // Equation 3
recovery key. A detailed description of the notations used in MExpm
                                                                                             7     Compute 𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿1 𝑧1 + 𝑚𝑖 mod 𝜙(𝐿);            // Equation 3
can be found in Table 2.                                                                     8 Sample 𝑟 ∈ {2, ⋯ , 𝑁} and 𝜉 ∈ {1, ⋯ , 𝑛} randomly ;     // Step
                                                                                                (d)
                                                                                             9 Compute 𝑑 = 𝑎
                                                                                                              −1 mod 𝜙(𝐿);                         // Step (d)
3.3. Detailed construction                                                                                    𝜉
                                                                                            10 Compute 𝑘2 (𝑎1 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛 ) = 𝑘4 + 𝛿2 𝑧2 mod 𝜙(𝐿); // Equation 3

    𝟏. 𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑(𝟏𝝀 , 𝒖1 , … , 𝒖𝒏 , 𝑵) ∶ This algorithm is run by SA. Given                     11 for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
a security parameter 𝜆 and a 512-bit prime integer 𝑁, SA works as                           12     Compute 𝑤′𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 ∕𝑣2 mod 𝐿 ;                           // Equation 3
follows:                                                                                    13     Compute 𝑎𝑖 = 𝛿2 𝑧2 + 𝑚′𝑖 mod 𝜙(𝐿);                     // Equation 3
    (a) SA generates a 512-bit prime integer 𝑝, and computes 𝐿 = 𝑝𝑁.                        14   Randomly Select 𝜉 ∈ [1, 𝑛], and Update 𝑦′𝜉 = 𝑦𝜉 ⋅ 𝑟𝑑 mod 𝐿,
    (b) SA uniformly chooses 𝑘 from 𝑍𝑁 and computes 𝜏 = 𝑘𝑁. For any                             𝑤′𝜉 = 𝑦′𝜉 ∕𝑣2 mod 𝐿 ;                                        // Step (e)
𝑖 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛}, SA sets 𝑦𝑖 as follows:                                                                      ∏
                                                                                            15 Set 𝑇 𝐾 = {(𝑔 ⋅ 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧1 ), (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] };            // Step (f)
                                                                                                               ∏𝑛         ′        ′    ′
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜏 mod 𝐿                                                                 (1)       16 Set 𝑉 𝐾 = {(𝑔 ⋅
                                                                                                                  𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧2 ), (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] };          // Step (f)
                                                                                            17 Set 𝐴𝑢𝑥 = {𝑟𝑣3 , 𝑣4 , 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 };                              // Step (f)
   (c) SA sets 𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 = {𝐿, 𝑦𝑖 } and 𝑅𝐾 = {𝑁}, where 𝑅𝐾 is                                 18 return 𝑇 𝐾, 𝑉 𝐾, 𝐴𝑢𝑥;
transmitted via a secure channel between SA and IV.

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S. Shen et al.                                                                                                                      Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


                                                                                                1. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝: Generate two distinct secure primes 𝑝 = 13, 𝑁 = 11.
                                                                                                   Compute 𝐿 = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑁 = 143. Then generate 𝑢 = 128, 𝑎 = 79.
    𝟑. 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒆(𝑻 𝑲, 𝑽 𝑲) ∶ This algorithm is run by MEC server to                               2. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒: Locally compute result 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 12879 mod 43 = 8.
generate encoding result 𝜎𝐸 and witness result 𝜋𝐸 . The MEC server
works as follows:                                                                               The proposed MExpm consists of the following procedures.
                                              ∏
    (a) MEC server parses 𝑇 𝐾 as {(𝑔 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧1 ), (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] } and 𝑉 𝐾
       ∏𝑛                                                                            ′
as {(𝑔 𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 , 𝑧2 ), (𝑤𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] }, and then sets 𝛾𝑖 = (𝑤𝑖 )𝑚𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖′ = (𝑤′𝑖 )𝑚𝑖
              ′          ′   ′                                                                  1. 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝: SA generates 𝑝 = 13, 𝑁 = 11 and computes 𝐿 = 𝑝⋅𝑁 = 143.
for any 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}, respectively.                                                              Then SA generates base 𝑢 = 128 and utilizes random integer
                                     ( ∏        )𝑧              ( ∏         )𝑧
    (b) MEC server sets 𝑄0 = 𝑔 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 1 and 𝑄1 = 𝑔 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤′𝑖 2 .                                   𝑘 = 5 to compute 𝑦 = 𝑢 + 𝑘 ⋅ 𝑁 mod 𝐿 = 40.
    (c) MEC server sets 𝜎𝐸 = {𝑄0 , (𝛾𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] } and 𝜋𝐸 = {𝑄1 , (𝛾𝑖′ )𝑖∈[𝑛] }.                   2. 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛: Intelligent Vehicle runs 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁 algorithm to obtain
𝟒. 𝑽 𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒇 𝒚(𝝈 𝑬 , 𝝅 𝑬 , 𝑨𝒖𝒙) ∶ The algorithm is run by RSU to check the                            (63, 125), (42, 25), (52, 113), (82, 69), 𝑔 = 71 and compute 𝑣1 −1 =
correctness of the result returned by the MEC. The RSU works as                                    125−1 mod 𝐿 = 135, 𝑣2 −1 = 25−1 mod 𝐿 = 103. Then it gener-
follows:                                                                                           ates a computation task 𝑎 = 79. Thereafter, intelligent vehicle
    (a) Upon receiving the encoding result 𝜎𝐸 and witness 𝜋𝐸 , it first                            generate random integers 𝛿1 = 11, 𝛿2 = 109, 𝑟 = 7 and compute
parses them as {𝑄0 , (𝛾𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] } and {𝑄1 , (𝛾𝑖′ )𝑖∈[𝑛] }, respectively. (b) it                    𝑑 = 𝑎−1 mod 𝜙(𝐿) = 79, 𝑟𝑑 mod 𝐿 = 19. Finally, intelligent
parses auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥 as {𝑟𝑣3 , 𝑣4 , 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 }.                                         vehicle utilizes Eqs. (3) and (4) to conduct logical split, then
                                                                 ( )𝛿
    (c) RSU utilizes smart contract to compute 𝜂 = 𝑄0 1 and then                                   obtain 𝑤 = 109, 𝑔𝑤 = 17, 𝑤′ = 59, 𝑔𝑤′ = 42, 𝛿1 𝑧1 = 57, 𝑧1 =
check whether the following equation holds:                                                        55, 𝛿2 𝑧2 = 78, 𝑧2 = 44, 𝑚 = 74, 𝑚′ = 83, 𝑟𝑣3 = 76.
            ∏
            𝑛
                           ( )𝛿 ∏  𝑛                                                            3. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒: MEC server receives the offloading tasks and com-
𝑟𝑣3 ⋅ 𝜂 ⋅         𝛾𝑖 = 𝑣4 ⋅ 𝑄1 2 ⋅   𝛾𝑖′ (mod 𝐿)                                   (5)             pute (𝑔𝑤)𝑧1 = 5955 mod 143 = 43, (𝑔𝑤′ )𝑧2 = 4244 mod 143 =
                                                                                                                       ′
            𝑖=1                                𝑖=1                                                 126, 𝑤𝑚 = 12, 𝑤′ 𝑚 = 119.
   If not, the smart contract outputs 0 and aborts. Otherwise, outputs 1
                    ∏                                                                           4. 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦: Smart contract is called to verify 𝐿𝑒𝑓 𝑡 = 76 ⋅ 12 ⋅ 4311
and sets 𝜎𝐸 = {𝑟𝑣3 𝜂 𝑛𝑖=1 𝛾𝑖 }. The verification logic of the smart contract
                                                                                                   mod 143 = 111 and 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 69 ⋅ 126109 ⋅ 119 mod 143 = 111.
can be found in Algorithm 2.
                                                                                                5. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦: Intelligent Vehicle computes 𝑟−1 mod 𝐿 = 41, then
                                                                                                   obtain 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 111 ⋅ 41 mod 11 = 8.
Algorithm 2: Verification Logic of Smart Contract
  Input:
    𝑄0 , 𝑄1 ∈ Z𝐿 ; (𝛾𝑖 )𝑖∈[𝑛] , (𝛾𝑖′ )𝑖∈[𝑛] ∈ Z𝐿                                             4. Theoretical analysis
    Scalars: 𝑟𝑣3 , 𝑣4 , 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 ∈ Z𝐿
  Output: Boolean flag indicating verification result                                        4.1. Correctness
         𝛿1
1 𝜂 ←𝑄
         0
            mod 𝐿 ;                                // Compute 𝜂
2 prodGamma ← 1;
                                                                                                 To prove the correctness, we need to argue that the returned results
3 for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
                                                                                             by the MEC server can pass the verification algorithm and the intel-
4     prodGamma ← prodGamma ⋅ 𝛾𝑖 mod 𝐿; // Accumulate
                                                                                             ligent vehicle can recover the final result if all entities involved are
        product of 𝛾𝑖
                                                                                             honest.
5    prodGammaPrime ← 1;
                                                                                                For the first part, we mainly argue it based on Eq. (5). That is, we
6    for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
                                                                                             prove that the 𝜎𝐸 and 𝜋𝐸 can pass the 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦 algorithm when MEC
 7    prodGammaPrime ← prodGammaPrime                               ⋅ 𝛾𝑖′ mod 𝐿;
                                                                                             server is honest and follows all algorithms mentioned above.
        // Accumulate product of proofs                             𝛾𝑖′
                                                                                                Based on Eq. (4), the right-hand side (𝑅𝐻𝑆) of Eq. (5) can be
 8 lhs ← 𝑟𝑣3 ⋅ 𝜂 ⋅ prodGamma mod 𝐿; // Left-hand side of
                                                                                             expressed as:
    the equality
                𝛿2
 9 rhs ← 𝑣4 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ prodGammaPrime mod 𝐿;    // Right-hand                                               ( )𝛿 ∏  𝑛
                1                                                                            𝑅𝐻𝑆 = 𝑣4 ⋅ 𝑄1 2 ⋅   𝛾𝑖′ (mod 𝐿)
    side of the equality                                                                                                  𝑖=1
10 return (lhs == rhs); // Return true if verification                                                    (                )𝑧2 𝛿2 𝑛
                                                                                                               ∏
                                                                                                               𝑛                   ∏ 𝑚′
    passes                                                                                         = 𝑔 𝑘4 𝑔            𝑤′𝑖               𝑤′𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                                                                                                                  𝑖=1              𝑖=1
                                                                                                                   ( 𝑛         )𝑧2 𝛿 2 𝑛
                                                                                                                      ∏                 ∏ 𝑚′
   𝟓. 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚(𝝈 𝑬 , 𝑹𝑲) ∶ The algorithm is run by IV to recover the                               = 𝑔 𝑘4 +𝑧2 𝛿2           𝑤′𝑖              𝑤′𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
encoding result 𝜎𝐸 to the true result 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡.                                                                         𝑖=1               𝑖=1
                                                 ∏                                                                          )∏ 𝑛
   (a) IV parses 𝑅𝐾 as {𝑁} and 𝜎𝐸 as {𝑟𝑣3 𝜂 𝑛𝑖=1 𝛾𝑖 }, where 𝜂 =                                          (                              ′
( ∏𝑛      )𝑧1 𝛿1                                                                                   = 𝑔 𝑘2 𝑎1 +𝑎2 +···+𝑎𝑛           𝑤′𝑖 𝑚𝑖 +𝛿2 𝑧2 (mod 𝐿)
 𝑔 𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖        .                                                                                                            𝑖=1
   (b) IV recovers the final computation result 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 as follows:                                        (                 )∏ 𝑛
                                                                                                       𝑘2 𝑎1 +𝑎2 +···+𝑎𝑛
                                                                                                   =𝑔                              𝑤′𝑖 𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝐿)                               (7)
                    ∏
                    𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑟𝑣3 𝜂             𝛾𝑖 ⋅ 𝑟−1 (mod 𝐿)                                                                                   𝑖=1
                    𝑖=1                                                                              ∏𝑛
                   (                  )𝑧1 𝛿1                                       (6)             =       𝑔 𝑘2 𝑎𝑖 𝑤′𝑖 𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                           ∏
                           𝑛                   ∏
                                               𝑛
                                                      𝑚                                              𝑖=1
         = 𝑔 𝑘3        𝑔         𝑤𝑖                  𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)
                           𝑖=1                 𝑖=1
                                                                                                     ∏𝑛
                                                                                                             𝑎
                                                                                                   =       𝑣2𝑖 𝑤′𝑖 𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                                                                                                     𝑖=1
3.4. An illustrative                                                                                 ∏𝑛
                                                                                                   =       𝑦′𝑖 𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                                                                                                     𝑖=1
    We now provide a toy example to further illustrate MExpm. MExpm
performs the following procedures. The original modular exponentia-                                  ∏
                                                                                                     𝜉−1
                                                                                                             𝑎                 ∏ 𝑛
                                                                                                                                        𝑎
                                                                                                   =       𝑦𝑖 𝑖 ⋅ 𝑦′𝜉 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝜉 ⋅         𝑦𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
tion performs the following procedures.                                                              𝑖=1                      𝑖=𝜉+1


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S. Shen et al.                                                                                                                      Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


Since 𝑎𝜉 𝑑 ≡ 1( mod 𝜙(𝐿)), we always have 𝑦′𝜉 𝑟𝑑𝑎𝜉 = 𝑟𝑦𝜉 mod 𝐿. Based on
Eq. (3), we can get:
             ∏
             𝑛
                𝑎
𝑅𝐻𝑆 = 𝑟        𝑦𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
             𝑖=1
             ∏
             𝑛
                                     𝑎
        =𝑟             𝑔 𝑘1 𝑎𝑖 𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
             𝑖=1
                   (                        )∏
                                             𝑛
                                                      𝑚 +𝛿1 𝑧1
        = 𝑟𝑔 𝑘1 𝑎1 +𝑎2 +···+𝑎𝑛                      𝑤𝑖 𝑖          (mod 𝐿)
                                              𝑖=1
                                ( 𝑛            )𝑧1 𝛿1
                                 ∏                        ∏
                                                          𝑛
                                                                 𝑚
               𝑘3 +𝑧1 𝛿1
        = 𝑟𝑔                               𝑤𝑖                   𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)   (8)
                                     𝑖=1                  𝑖=1
                   (                       )𝑧1 𝛿1
                               ∏
                               𝑛                    ∏
                                                    𝑛
                                                            𝑚
        = 𝑟𝑔 𝑘3            𝑔         𝑤𝑖                    𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝐿)                                           Fig. 3. Comparison of checkability rate.
                               𝑖=1                  𝑖=1
             ( )𝛿                    ∏
                                     𝑛
        = 𝑟𝑣3 𝑄0 1                         𝛾𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                                     𝑖=1                                                 Proof. If the malicious MEC server deceives the intelligent vehicle IV
                               ∏
                               𝑛
                                                                                         successfully, the following equation will hold.
        = 𝑟𝑣3 ⋅ 𝜂 ⋅                  𝛾𝑖 (mod 𝐿)
                               𝑖=1                                                                   ∏
                                                                                                     𝑛
                                                                                                                      ( )𝛿 ∏𝑛
                                                                                         𝑡 ⋅ 𝑟𝑣3 𝜂         𝛾𝑖 = 𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣4 𝑄1 2   𝛾𝑖′                                             (10)
Obviously, according to Eq. (8), if the MEC server and intelligent                                   𝑖=1                      𝑖=1
vehicle IV are honest and follow all procedures described above, the
                                                                                         The corresponding encoding result will be decoded by IV as follows:
encoding result 𝜎𝐸 and witness result 𝜋𝐸 can always pass the 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦
algorithm.                                                                                                     ∏
                                                                                                               𝑛
                                                                                         𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑡 ⋅ 𝑣3 𝜂            𝛾𝑖 (mod 𝑁)                                              (11)
    Second, we will argue that the encoding result 𝜎𝐸 can be decoded
                                                                                                                𝑖=1
to the actual result 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡. In this section, we mainly rely on Eq. (1),                     Since the MEC server could not gain access to the values of 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 ,
Eq. (2), Eq. (3) and (6). The 𝜎𝐸 can be parsed and computed as follows:                                                                      ( )𝛿
                                                                                         it cannot obtain the correct values of 𝜂 and 𝑄1 2 . Therefore, the MEC
                                                                                         server can only turn to other 𝑛 pairs to cheat the intelligent vehicle,
                       ∏
                       𝑛
                                                                                         then it needs to determine the correct meanings of 2𝑛 + 2 sub-tasks to
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑟𝑣3 𝜂                  𝛾𝑖 ⋅ 𝑟−1 (mod 𝑁)
                                                                                         obtain pairs: (𝑤ℎ , 𝑚ℎ ) and (𝑤′𝑗 , 𝑚′𝑗 ). Since the sending order of these 2𝑛+
                       𝑖=1
                   (                       )𝑧1 𝛿1                                        2 pairs is random, the MEC server is unaware of the specific meanings
                               ∏
                               𝑛                    ∏
                                                    𝑛
         = 𝑔 𝑘3         𝑔            𝑤𝑖
                                                            𝑚
                                                          𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)                   of each pair. Therefore, it needs to find (𝑤ℎ , 𝑚ℎ ) and (𝑤′𝑗 , 𝑚′𝑗 ) among the
                                                                                                                                                   𝑛    𝑛
                               𝑖=1                  𝑖=1                                  2𝑛 + 2 pairs. The probability of this operation is 2𝑛+2      2𝑛+1
                                                                                                                                                           . Additionally,
                                ( 𝑛             )𝑧1 𝛿 1                                  for successful deception, the MEC server needs to determine the value
                                 ∏                        ∏
                                                          𝑛
                                                                 𝑚
         = 𝑔 𝑘3 +𝑧1 𝛿1                     𝑤𝑖                   𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)             of 𝑟, where 𝑟 ∈ {2, … , 𝑁}. Thus, the probability of finding the correct 𝑟
                                     𝑖=1                  𝑖=1                                 1
                                                                                         is 𝑁−2 . Subsequently, the MEC server generates a random number 𝑡 and
                   (                        )∏
                                             𝑛
                                                                                                           𝑚             𝑚′
         = 𝑔 𝑘1 𝑎1 +𝑎2 +···+𝑎𝑛
                                                     𝑚 +𝛿 𝑧
                                                    𝑤𝑖 𝑖 1 1 (mod 𝑁)                     returns 𝑡𝑤ℎ ℎ and 𝑡𝑤′𝑗 𝑗 . We denote the malicious server successfully
                                             𝑖=1                               (9)       determining the correct meaning of (𝑤ℎ , 𝑚ℎ ) and (𝑤′𝑗 , 𝑚′𝑗 ) as event 𝐸1 ,
             ∏
             𝑛
                                 𝑎                                                       and denote the determining the value of 𝑟 as event 𝐸2 . We have:
                       𝑘1 𝑎 𝑖
         =         𝑔            𝑤𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)                                                         𝑛    𝑛                    1
                                                                                         Pr(𝐸1 ) = 2𝑛+2 2𝑛+1
                                                                                                             and Pr(𝐸2 ) = 𝑁−2    .
             𝑖=1
             ∏𝑛                                                                              Therefore, the probability of the intelligent vehicle being deceived
                       𝑎                                                                                                              𝑛2
         =         𝑦𝑖 𝑖 (mod𝑁)                                                           is: Pr(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2 ) = Pr(𝐸1 ) Pr(𝐸2 ) = (4𝑛2 +6𝑛+2)(𝑁−2) . Therefore, the checka-
             𝑖=1                                                                                                                                  𝑛                2
                                                                                         bility rate of our proposed scheme MExpm is: 1 − (4𝑛2 +6𝑛+2)(𝑁−2) .
             ∏𝑛
                   (       )𝑎
         =          𝑢𝑖 + 𝑘𝑁 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)
             𝑖=1
           ∏
           𝑛                                                                             5. Simulation
              𝑎
         =   𝑢𝑖 𝑖 (mod 𝑁)
             𝑖=1
                                                                                             In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme
Obviously, when Eq. (9) holds, the correctness of the algorithm
                                                                                         MExpm by comparing it with the most advanced and representative
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 is guaranteed and the proof is completed.
                                                                                         modular exponentiation offloading schemes reported in recent litera-
                                                                                         ture. Specifically, we consider MExp [3] and SMCExp [4] for secure
4.2. Security analysis                                                                   batch modular exponentiation, as well as SoRSA [6] and EPExp [7]
                                                                                         for single modular exponentiation. These schemes reflect the latest
     In this section, we demonstrate the privacy for computation of-                     advancements in both batch-oriented and single-operation settings and
                                                     ∏
floading results. In MExpm, we firstly convert 𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 𝑎𝑖 (mod 𝑁) into                   are widely recognized as benchmarks in the field. Notably, all of these
∏𝑛       𝑎
   𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖 (mod 𝐿), then the exponents 𝑎𝑖 are transformed into 𝛿1 𝑧1 +
           𝑖                                                                             algorithms are incorporated as baselines in our experimental evalua-
𝑚𝑖,𝑖∈[𝑛] and 𝛿2 𝑧2 + 𝑚′𝑖,𝑖∈[𝑛] . The public information in our scheme are                tion, covering key performance indicators such as local computation
{𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠, 𝑇 𝐾, 𝑉 𝐾, 𝐴𝑢𝑥, 𝜎𝐸 , 𝜋𝐸 }, and the adversaries cannot obtain any                time, end-to-end execution latency, communication overhead, and gas
information about secret information {𝑢𝑖,𝑖∈[𝑛] , 𝑎𝑖,𝑖∈[𝑛] , 𝑅𝐾, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡}.                 consumption. Since MExpm is designed for batch modular exponenti-
                                                                                         ation, while SoRSA and EPExp are designed solely for single modular
Theorem 1. When the MEC server cheats the client, the misbehavior can                    exponentiation, for fairness, we also conduct the comparison for the
                                               𝑛2
be detected with checkability rate 1 − (4𝑛2 +6𝑛+2)(𝑁−2) .                                case where the batch size 𝑛 = 1.

                                                                                     6
S. Shen et al.                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107




                                                      Fig. 4. Comparsion of time cost in 𝑢𝑎 mod 𝑁.




                                                                                        ∏𝑛
                                                   Fig. 5. Comparison of time cost in    𝑖=1
                                                                                               𝑢𝑖 𝑎𝑖 mod 𝑁.




                 Fig. 6. Comparison of communication cost.                                             Fig. 7. Comparison of storage cost.


                                                                            7
S. Shen et al.                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


                                                                                 usage, communication overhead, and storage overhead. We quantify
                                                                                 privacy using the checkability rate. Computation cost is measured by
                                                                                 the execution time (in milliseconds), where longer runtimes correspond
                                                                                 to higher resource consumption. We assess blockchain resource usage
                                                                                 on the Ethereum simulation platform, Remix, using gas consumption
                                                                                 as the metric. Communication overhead is defined as the total data
                                                                                 transmitted during offloading. Storage overhead is quantified by the
                                                                                 additional storage required on both the client and server sides.


                                                                                 5.3. Checkability


                                                                                     The details of checkability rate comparison of these four schemes
                                                                                 are shown in Fig. 3. As 𝑛 increases, our proposed scheme MExpm
                                                                                 always maintains a high checkability rate close to 1, while the other
                                                                                 three schemes gradually decrease. When 𝑛 = 1000, the checkability
                                                                                                          1
                                                                                 rate of GExp is only 1001   . It means that a forged result can pass
                                                                                 the verification algorithm with the probability 1000
                                                                                                                                  1001
                                                                                                                                       . Both MExp and
                                                                                 SMCExp have the same checkability rate. However, when 𝑛 = 5000, the
Fig. 8. Comparison of Gas Consumption in Verify Algorithm when the size of       checkability rate for these two schemes is only 0.975. Since MExpm
𝑟 is larger than 32 bits.                                                        uses a prime number 𝑁 with size 512, its checkability rate is higher
                                                                                 than 0.999.


                                                                                 5.4. Computation cost


                                                                                 5.4.1. Single modular exponentiation offloading
                                                                                     The comparsion results of single modular exponentiation offloading
                                                                                 could be found in Fig. 4. Compared with MExp and SMCExp, MExpm
                                                                                 demonstrates better performance either in 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 algorithm or in
                                                                                 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝 algorithm. Particularly in 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦 algorithm, MExpm outperforms
                                                                                 these competitors. When it comes to SoRSA and EPExp, whose security
                                                                                 assumption is rather simple and cannot applied in real-world scenarios,
                                                                                 it seems unfair to compare them with schemes for batch modular
                                                                                 exponentiation with higher security standard.


                                                                                 5.4.2. Batch modular exponentiation offloading
                                                                                     Fig. 5 compares the computational cost of batch modular exponen-
                                                                                 tiation offloading. MExpm consistently requires fewer resources than
                                                                                 MExp across all phases. Although MExpm adds a recovery phase, it
             Fig. 9. The relative saving ratio of MExp and MExpm.                consists of a single modular inversion—incurring a fixed and negligible
                                                                                 overhead.


                                                                                 5.5. Communication and storage cost
5.1. Experimental setting

    We implemented MExpm and MExp for batch modular exponentia-                     To simulate a low-bandwidth network environment, we set the
tion offloading, MExp, SMCExp, EPExp, SoRSA and MExpm for single                 transmission rate to 1 Kbps. Fig. 6 shows the communication cost of
modular exponentiation offloading using Python 3.8, along with the Py-           the all competitors and MExpm in terms of the time cost of trans-
Cryptodome and GNU Multiple Precision (gmpy2 version 2.1.5) library.             mission. For fair comparison, all schemes employ 1024-bit modulus.
All simulation experiments were conducted on the same Windows ma-                For EPExp and SoRSA, whose authors assume that they only offload
chine equipped with an Intel Core TM i9-13900HX processor (running               ciphertext to servers and do not need to take security of bases into
at 2.20 GHz) and 16 GB of memory. We perform each algorithm 100                  consideration, and thus, they have lower communication cost com-
times and then computed the mean of its time cost. The size of prime             pared with other schemes. Compared with MExp and SMCExp, MExpm
numbers selected in MExpm are all 512 bits, meaning the number 𝐿                 shares the same communication cost in 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 and 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦 algorithm.
is 1024 bits. For MExp and methods without offloading, we randomly               SMCExp shows the least communication cost in 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 and 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝
generate a pair of 1024-bit prime numbers. In our simulation, ‘MExpm             algorithm. The results in Fig. 6 demonstrate that MExpm can deploy
w/o obfuscation’ denotes MExpm without the secure obfuscation oper-
                                                                                 a more secure offloading strategy while with similar communication
ation and ‘w/o offloading’ indicates the local execution of the modular
                                                                                 cost compared with other competitors. Fig. 7 shows the storage cost
exponentiation operation.
                                                                                 among all schemes, SoRSA needs to store 𝑛, 𝑞, 𝑝, 𝐶, 𝑘, 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 to conduct
5.2. Evaluation metrics                                                          verification and recovery, leading to the most demanding storage cost.
                                                                                 EPExp demonstrates the best storage performance, while it lacks a
   To comprehensively evaluate MExpm, we assess its performance                  consideration of a malicious MEC server. Among MExp and SMCExp,
across five dimensions: privacy, computation cost, blockchain resource           MExpm demonstrates the best performance in storage performance.

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S. Shen et al.                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


5.6. Gas consumption                                                                • Witness Tampering: The MEC server alters or forges witnesses
                                                                                      with the objective of deceiving the verifier and illegitimately
    The results of the gas consumption comparison are demonstrated in                 passing the verification process.
Fig. 8. It can be observed that as 𝑟 increases, the gas consumption for
                                                                                     In our simulation, the Intelligent Vehicle (IV) executes the KeyGen
both MExpm and MExp grows steadily. However, the gap between them
                                                                                 algorithm entirely offline to generate the evaluation key 𝑇 𝐾, witness
widens significantly. For instance, when 𝑛 = 5, the gas fee difference
                                                                                 generation key 𝑉 𝐾, and auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥. The 𝑇 𝐾 and 𝑉 𝐾
rises from 7,504 gas at 𝑟 = 32 bits to 58,981 gas at 𝑟 = 256 bits.
                                                                                 are then transmitted to the MEC server and the Roadside Unit (RSU),
Furthermore, the gas cost of MExpm’s 𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓 𝑦 algorithm scales linearly
                                                                                 respectively. The RSU, acting as a lightweight verifier, executes the
with 𝑛 and is largely unaffected by 𝑟, whereas MExp’s verification cost
                                                                                 verification algorithm upon receiving computation results from the
increases with both 𝑟 and 𝑛. This highlights MExpm’s superior efficiency
                                                                                 MEC server.
in reducing computational and financial burdens for intelligent vehi-                Experimental results demonstrate that our verification mechanism
cles, especially at larger scales. To provide a normalized view of these         achieves a 100% detection rate for all injected malicious behaviors,
savings, we evaluate the relative saving ratio (SR) defined as                   with zero false positives under benign conditions. This confirms that
         𝑛,𝑟     𝑛,𝑟
        𝐺MExp − 𝐺MExpm                                                           the proposed scheme maintains strong security guarantees even in the
𝑆𝑅 =              𝑛,𝑟                                                            presence of malicious MEC servers, thereby reinforcing its practicality
                 𝐺MExp
                                                                                 for real-world V2X deployments.
         𝑛,𝑟     𝑛,𝑟
where 𝐺MExp   , 𝐺MExpm is the gas consumption of MExp and MExpm with
same 𝑛 and 𝑟 respectively. As illustrated in Fig. 9, MExpm consistently          5.9. Deployment feasibility in real-world V2X environments
achieves 𝑆𝑅 > 0 across all tested parameter, with observed savings
                                                                                     The proposed scheme is designed for secure computation outsourc-
ranging from approximately 30% to 70%. These results confirm that
                                                                                 ing in resource-constrained vehicular networks. In such scenarios, the
MExpm delivers substantial resource savings over MExp, reinforcing its
                                                                                 primary metric for evaluation is whether the total computational cost
scalability and economic advantages.
                                                                                 incurred locally after outsourcing is significantly lower than that of
                                                                                 fully local execution. Therefore, as is common in the literature on com-
5.7. Economic analysis of gas savings
                                                                                 putation outsourcing, we perform all experiments — including the com-
                                                                                 putation algorithm, verification algorithm, and a non-outsourced base-
    To further assess the practical impact of our scheme in real-world           line — on the same hardware platform. This ensures a fair and repro-
deployments, we provide an economic estimation of gas savings                    ducible comparison under identical computational conditions, thereby
achieved by the proposed MExpm scheme compared with the represen-                directly demonstrating the benefits of outsourcing.
tative baseline MExp, particularly in the context of blockchain-based                In the proposed system, the Service Authority (SA) is responsible for
smart contract verification. As shown in Fig. 8, the gas cost of each            handling the bulk of initialization tasks, such as modulus generation,
offloaded batch modular exponentiation result increases with both the            base obfuscation, and parameter distribution. This design choice aligns
batch size 𝑛 and the bit length of the randomness parameter 𝑟. When 𝑛 =          with the practical division of labor in vehicular networks, reducing
1 and bit length of 𝑟 is 32 bits, MExp incurs 24,013 gas while MExpm             the computational burden on field devices. The Intelligent Vehicle (IV)
requires only 16,509 gas, leading to a difference of 7504 gas per                executes the KeyGen algorithm to generate the evaluation key 𝑇 𝐾,
verification. The average gas price is approximately 30 Gwei (1 Gwei =           witness generation key 𝑉 𝐾, and auxiliary information 𝐴𝑢𝑥. Crucially,
10−9 ETH), the ETH/USD exchange rate is approximately $4, 000, and 1             the KeyGen algorithm can be performed entirely offline before the
million gas cost approximately $120 on Ethereum networks. Therefore,             online phase, ensuring that no additional delay is introduced when
the savings can be translated as                                                 initiating the outsourced computation. Once 𝑇 𝐾 is generated, the IV
                                                                                 transmits 𝑇 𝐾 to the MEC server for performing the computation tasks.
Gas Savings = 7,504 gas × 0.03 USD∕1,000,000 ≈ 0.90 USD                              In real deployments, RSUs are lightweight verification devices typi-
Consider a practical usage scenario where each intelligent vehicle               cally deployed at traffic intersections or along highways, where power
offloads batch modular exponentiation tasks 10 times per day (e.g., for          supply and network connectivity can be unstable. To emulate these
authentication, key negotiation, digital signatures, etc.), the annual           constraints, we configure the RSU role on a lightweight laptop and
number of invocations is 10 (tasks/day)×365 (days/year) = 3,650 tasks/           limit the network transmission rate to 1 Kbps, thereby simulating a
year. Thus, the total annual gas cost saving per vehicle is: 0.90                realistic low-bandwidth vehicular environment. Meanwhile, the Service
                                                                                 Authority (SA) undertakes the bulk of initialization tasks, ensuring that
 USD/task × 3,650 tasks/year ≈ 𝟑𝟐𝟖𝟓𝐔𝐒𝐃∕𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫. This estimation high-
                                                                                 RSUs and IVs remain computationally efficient during the online phase.
lights the substantial economic benefits of MExpm when deployed at
                                                                                     This deployment-oriented design, together with our simulation set-
scale in large IoV systems. For a fleet of 10,000 vehicles, the projected
                                                                                 tings, ensures that the evaluation faithfully reflects real-world lim-
gas savings could exceed 32.8 million USD annually.
                                                                                 itations while remaining reproducible. Consequently, the proposed
                                                                                 scheme is shown to be both practically feasible and robust for secure
5.8. Robustness evaluation against malicious MEC servers
                                                                                 computation outsourcing in V2X environments.

    To address potential security risks in practical deployments, we             6. Conclusion and future work
conducted robustness experiments simulating malicious Mobile Edge
Computing (MEC) servers that deviate from the prescribed computation                 In this paper, we propose MExpm, a secure and efficient computa-
protocol. Such adversarial behaviors may include, but are not limited            tion offloading scheme for batch modular exponentiation in Vehicle-
to:                                                                              to-Everything (V2X) communications. Our proposed scheme addresses
                                                                                 critical challenges in V2X systems, such as computational burden,
     • Forged Results: The MEC server deliberately returns computa-              latency, and privacy concerns, by leveraging Mobile Edge Computing
       tion results that deviate from the prescribed algorithm, thereby          (MEC) servers and blockchain technology. Our scheme achieves several
       attempting to mislead the verifier regarding the correctness of the       significant improvements over existing methods. It ensures fairness
       computation.                                                              in computation offloading by using smart contracts, provides high
     • Partial Omission or Manipulation: The MEC server selectively              checkability to detect any misbehavior by MEC servers, and enhances
       omits partial computation results or manipulates intermediate             privacy protection through secure obfuscation and logical split tech-
       values with the intent of reducing its own computational work-            niques. These features make MExpm particularly well-suited for various
       load.                                                                     real-time applications in V2X systems. These include

                                                                             9
S. Shen et al.                                                                                                                    Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104107


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                                                                                                  sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020025521006083.
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                                                                                                  Processing, WCSP, IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–6.
                                                                                             [19] S. Yang, A task offloading solution for internet of vehicles using combination
    The authors declare no competing interests.
                                                                                                  auction matching model based on mobile edge computing, IEEE Access 8 (2020)
                                                                                                  53261–53273.
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