                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


                                                                     Contents lists available at ScienceDirect


                                                           Computer Standards & Interfaces
                                                              journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/csi




Assessing the quantum readiness of cryptographic standards:
Recommendations toward quantum-era compliance
Vikas Chouhan a ,∗, Mohammed Aldarwbi a , Somayeh Sadeghi a , Ali Ghorbani a , Aaron Chow b ,
Robby Burko b
a
    Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC), University of New Brunswick, Canada
b Scotiabank, Toronto, Canada




ARTICLE                  INFO                               ABSTRACT

Keywords:                                                   Cryptography is fundamental to securing digital data and communications, yet established algorithms face
Cryptography                                                increasing risk from emerging quantum capabilities. With the progression of quantum computing, the urgency
Quantum computing                                           for cryptographic standards that remain secure in both classical and quantum settings has intensified, governed
Post-quantum computing
                                                            not only by cryptanalytic risk but also by compliance, interoperability, and country-specific regulatory
Quantum-readiness
                                                            frameworks. This paper presents a structured evaluation framework that depicts the hierarchy of crypto-
Standardization
Security
                                                            graphic standards, encompassing block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash and MAC functions, key establishment
                                                            mechanisms, digital signatures, lightweight cryptography, entity authentication, public key infrastructure,
                                                            and authentication and communication protocols. We define a standards-to-protocol recommendation flow
                                                            that propagates compliant guidance across layers, from foundational primitives to PKI/authentication and
                                                            hybridization, and extends to country-specific recommendations and protocols. Our contributions include
                                                            explicit decision criteria for assessing cryptographic primitives under classical and quantum threat models,
                                                            yielding both immediate and alternative deployment recommendations aligned with NIST-compliant guidelines.
                                                            We further analyze hybrid schemes to ensure backward compatibility and secure integration, quantifying
                                                            storage and network overheads for signatures, encryption, and key exchange to identify practical engineering
                                                            trade-offs. Consolidated results are presented in reference tables detailing standardization year, purpose, notes,
                                                            and migration recommendations for both classical and post-quantum contexts. Additionally, we examine the
                                                            security strength of cryptographic primitives that are currently classically secure or quantum-resistant. This
                                                            framework offers a reproducible, extensible path toward quantum-ready cryptographic systems.



1. Introduction                                                                              such as ensuring backward compatibility and balancing security with
                                                                                             performance requirements [3,7]. These gaps highlight the critical need
    The rapid evolution of quantum computing poses an imminent                               for systematic recommendations and hybrid approaches that facilitate
threat to the foundational security of cryptographic systems [1–3].                          a seamless transition while maintaining robust security for current
Traditional cryptographic algorithms, while robust against classical                         existing systems. This work is motivated by the pressing need to
adversaries, are rendered vulnerable in the presence of quantum adver-                       assess the ‘‘quantum readiness’’ of existing cryptographic standards. By
saries due to their reliance on computational problems that quantum
                                                                                             analyzing the efforts of standardization organizations and evaluating
computers can solve efficiently [1,3]. This emerging reality under-
                                                                                             cryptographic primitives in both symmetric and asymmetric algo-
scores the urgent need for the development and adoption of quantum-
                                                                                             rithms, this research provides actionable insights and recommendations
resistant cryptography to safeguard sensitive information and digital
communications in a post-quantum era. Despite notable progress in                            for achieving compliance in the quantum era. These insights are crucial
standardizing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms [4–6], a compre-                         for guiding researchers, policymakers, and practitioners in adopting
hensive analysis of existing cryptographic standards that cover both                         cryptographic systems that are resilient against classical and quantum
classical and post-quantum approaches is still lacking. Moreover, the                        adversaries. Furthermore, this work seeks to emphasize the importance
transition to quantum-resilient systems is fraught with challenges,


     ∗ Corresponding author.
     E-mail addresses: vikas.chouhan@unb.ca (V. Chouhan), m.aldarwbi@unb.ca (M. Aldarwbi), s.sadeghi@unb.ca (S. Sadeghi), ghorbani@unb.ca
(A. Ghorbani), aaron.chow@scotiabank.com (A. Chow), robby.burko@scotiabank.com (R. Burko).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2025.104114
Received 25 April 2025; Received in revised form 6 November 2025; Accepted 8 December 2025
Available online 17 December 2025
0920-5489/© 2025 Elsevier B.V. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                   Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


of continued innovation in quantum-resistant cryptography to ensure a            collaboratively across government, academia, and industry to address
secure digital future.                                                           evolving security demands, with a growing emphasis on post-quantum
    Standards serve as universal benchmarks for cryptographic algo-              cryptography and secure interoperability.
rithms and protocols, offer recommendations for secure computer sys-                 For a detailed overview, a summary of the relevant information is
tem design, and provide guidance on managing cryptographic infor-                provided in Table 1, with further elaboration available in Appendix A.
mation and services. Numerous organizations exist to develop and
establish standards, each with distinct origins and purposes. The British        1.2. Quantum-resistant cryptography
Standards Institution (BSI1 ) identifies eight advantages that companies
can obtain by adhering to standards. These benefits encompass a vari-                The impact of quantum computing on cryptography is a major con-
ety of areas, such as meeting customer expectations, being cost-effective        cern for the security community. The potential of quantum computers
and efficient in terms of time, conforming to legal requirements, en-            to quickly solve problems that classical computers cannot solve effi-
hancing management practices, exhibiting integrity and building trust,           ciently, such as factoring large numbers, threatens to compromise many
establishing a stronger brand image, and facilitating exportation while          of the currently employed cryptographic algorithms. To address this
maintaining credibility in the global arena. Trust, cost-effectiveness,          challenge, significant efforts are underway to develop Post-Quantum
and time-effectiveness are the main benefits obtained through the use            Cryptography (PQC) [8] that can resist attacks from quantum comput-
of cryptographic standards.                                                      ers. NIST has emphasized the importance of developing post-quantum
    Standardization involves the establishment and definition of tech-           cryptography to ensure the long-term security of digital communication
nical standards through the agreement and collaboration of different             and data. It has issued draft standards for the use of PQC algorithms
entities, which can include industry groups, interest groups, standards          in various applications, including key establishment, digital signatures,
organizations, and governmental bodies. In the following subsection,             and encryption. However, these standards are still under development
we will present an introduction to notable organizations engaged in              and subject to change. Since 2016, NIST has been conducting a project
standardization. This will be followed by an overview of quantum-                to evaluate and standardize PQC algorithms. The project aims to iden-
resistant cryptography, an analysis of standardization recommenda-               tify quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms that can replace the
tions, and a delineation of the contributions and organization of this           currently used algorithms that will become vulnerable to quantum
paper.                                                                           computer attacks.
                                                                                     NIST has published several rounds of evaluations and results. The
1.1. Standardization organizations                                               first round of submissions included 69 algorithms, which were nar-
                                                                                 rowed down to 26 candidates in the second round. In the third round,
    Standardization organizations are pivotal in shaping secure and              they chose 15 candidate algorithms, seven of which were designated
interoperable cryptographic systems by developing consistent global              as finalists and the remaining eight as alternatives. In 2022, NIST
or national standards. At the international level, major bodies like             announced that four candidates for standardization had been selected,
ISO,2 IEC,3 and ITU4 focus on cryptographic standards for information            including one KEM algorithm (CRYSTALS-KYBER) and three Signature
security, telecommunications, and electrical technologies. ISO and IEC           algorithms (CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+), with four
jointly manage cryptographic standards through JTC1, with subcom-                alternative KEM algorithms (Classic McEliece, HQC, BIKE, and SIKE)
mittees such as SC27 and SC17 covering IT security and personal                  continuing into the fourth round [6]. It is important to note that the
identification. The IETF5 and IANA6 play critical roles in Internet-             evaluation process is ongoing, and new algorithms may still be added,
related protocols and resource coordination, with the IETF producing             or existing algorithms may be modified based on further analysis and
widely respected RFCs. National organizations, including NIST7 (USA),            feedback from the research community.
ANSI,8 and BSI9 (UK), contribute by tailoring standards to their domes-              Beyond algorithm development, NIST has also addressed the broader
tic needs while aligning with international efforts, NIST notably leads          challenges of migration. Its recent white paper, Mappings of Migration
the standardization of post-quantum cryptography.                                to PQC Project Capabilities to Risk Framework Documents [9], outlines
    In the industrial sector, entities such as IEEE,10 ETSI,11 3GPP,12 and       how organizations can align post-quantum transition activities, such as
consortia like PKCS (RSA Laboratories), SECG,13 and the CA/Browser               cryptographic discovery, inventory, and interoperability testing, with
Forum14 contribute to specialized cryptographic standards in wireless            established risk management frameworks (e.g., CSF 2.0 and SP 800-
networks, ECC, SSL/TLS, and public-key systems. Emerging coalitions              53). In parallel, Executive Order (EO) 14144 (January 16, 2025) directs
like the PQC Alliance15 and PQC Coalition16 have formed to promote               federal agencies to prepare for PQC adoption, including maintaining a
and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives, ensuring             CISA-maintained list of product categories where PQC-capable prod-
preparedness for future quantum threats. These organizations work                ucts are widely available and incorporating PQC support into federal
                                                                                 procurements [10].
                                                                                     As of 2023, NIST had published three draft Federal Information
  1
     https://www.bsigroup.com                                                    Processing Standards (FIPS) related to post-quantum cryptography al-
  2
     https://www.iso.org                                                         gorithms. On August 13, 2024, NIST released the final versions of the
  3
     https://www.iec.ch                                                          first three post-quantum cryptography standards: FIPS 203, FIPS 204,
  4
     https://www.itu.int                                                         and FIPS 205. These standards mark a transition from their original
  5
     https://www.ietf.org
  6
                                                                                 algorithm names to new official designations:
     https://www.ietf.org/process/iana
  7
     https://www.nist.gov
  8
                                                                                    (i) CRYSTALS-KYBER is now known as Module-Lattice-Based Key-
     http://www.ansi.org
  9                                                                                     Encapsulation Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM), covered under
     https://www.bsigroup.com
 10
     https://standards.ieee.org                                                         FIPS 203.17
 11
     http://www.etsi.org                                                           (ii) CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM has been renamed to Module-Lattice-
 12
     http://www.3gpp.org                                                                Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA), governed by FIPS
 13
     http://www.secg.org                                                                204.18
 14
     https://cabforum.org
 15
     https://pqca.org
 16                                                                               17
     www.mitre.org/news-insights/news-release/post-quantum-cryptography-               https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final
                                                                                  18
coalition-launches                                                                     https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final


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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 1
Overview of standardization organizations and their contributions.
 Organization Type           Organization                          Focus area(s) and contributions
                             ISO/IEC JTC1                          IT security, cryptography, biometrics. ISO 27001, ISO/IEC 8730, ISO/IEC TR 14516
                             ITU (ITU-T)                           Telecommunications, cryptographic network services. X series recommendations (PKI, cryptography)
 International
                             IETF/IRTF                             Internet protocols and cryptographic RFCs. RFCs (TLS, IPsec, etc.)
                             IANA                                  Internet resource management. DNS root zone, IP address space, protocol registries
                             NIST (USA)                            Federal standards, post-quantum cryptography. AES, FIPS series, PQC standardization
 National                    ANSI/X9 (USA)                         Financial cryptography. ANSI X9 standards, cooperation with ISO TC68
                             BSI (UK)                              Information security management systems. BS 7799-2 (basis of ISO 27001)
                             IEEE                                  Wireless and asymmetric cryptography. IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 1363 (asymmetric cryptography)
                             3GPP                                  Mobile communication security. Cryptographic standards for cellular networks
                             ETSI                                  Telecom interoperability. 3GPP collaboration, European telecom standards
                             SECG                                  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). SEC 1, SEC 2 (ECC standards)
 Industrial
                             PKCS (RSA Labs)                       Public key cryptography. PKCS #1 - #15: RSA, CMS, key management
                             CA/Browser Forum                      SSL/TLS certificate policies and PKI trust. Baseline Requirements, EV Guidelines
                             OASIS                                 Security standards, XML, cloud. SAML, ODF, open cybersecurity standards
                             PQC Alliance, PQC Coalition           Post-quantum cryptography standardization and awareness. Migration tools, open-source PQC libraries,
                                                                   collaboration across academia and industry

Details of standardization organizations and their contributions are presented in Appendix A.


                                                                                            strategies is provided in Section 7. We also examine global crypto-
                                                                                            graphic standards, considering how different nations are adapting their
                                                                                            policies in response to the growing capabilities of quantum computing.
                                                                                                We introduce a structured framework that illustrates the hierarchy
                                                                                            of cryptographic standards to define the order of recommendation
                                                                                            flow. This framework outlines a systematic migration approach, apply-
                                                                                            ing recommendations from the foundational primitives at the bottom
                                                                                            to the top-level protocols. The recommendation process begins with
                                                                                            foundational cryptographic primitives, such as symmetric encryption,
                                                                                            asymmetric encryption, hash functions, and digital signatures. These
                                                                                            primitives serve as the core building blocks for more complex security
                                                                                            systems. Once these basic primitives are standardized, the process
                                                                                            moves to the next layer, which addresses country-specific regulations
Fig. 1. A structured framework depicting the hierarchy of cryptographic
                                                                                            and the implementation of hybrid public key infrastructure (PKI) and
standards for defining the order of recommendation flow.
                                                                                            authentication mechanisms. This layer builds on the foundation laid
                                                                                            by the primitives, ensuring that cryptographic systems comply with
                                                                                            regional and regulatory requirements.
  (iii) SPHINCS is now referred to as Stateless Hash-Based Digital
                                                                                                The third layer of our analysis focuses on established protocols
        Signature Standard (SLH-DSA), defined under FIPS 205.19
                                                                                            for secure communication, including well-known protocols such as
These updates mark a significant milestone in adapting cryptographic                        TLS/SSL, SSH, and Kerberos. These protocols are essential to ensure
standards to mitigate the risks posed by quantum computing, ensuring                        secure data exchange over networks and rely on the cryptographic
robust security for digital communications and transactions. In addi-                       primitives and authentication mechanisms defined in the lower layers.
tion, NIST has announced that the code-based algorithm HQC will be                          As we move to the top layer, we consider specialized protocols such
standardized as a backup key-encapsulation mechanism.20                                     as SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) and OAuth, which
                                                                                            are commonly used for identity federation and authorization. These
1.3. Standardization and analysis of recommendations                                        higher-level protocols depend on the security established in the lower
                                                                                            layers and are critical for ensuring secure access control and identity
    In this subsection, we conduct a detailed analysis of cryptographic                     management in distributed systems.
standards and recommendations, focusing on various cryptographic                                Through this layered approach, we demonstrate how cryptographic
primitives and protocols that impact both classical and post-quantum                        primitives influence the design and security of more complex systems.
security. We examine a wide range of cryptographic functions, such                          To support the transition to quantum-resilient systems, we provide de-
as symmetric encryption (including block ciphers and stream ciphers),                       tailed recommendations for classical and post-quantum cryptographic
asymmetric encryption, hash functions, message authentication codes                         systems. These recommendations are intended to guide organizations
(MACs), digital signatures, key establishment mechanisms, lightweight                       and researchers in securing their cryptographic infrastructures against
cryptography, entity authentication, and public key infrastructure (PKI).                   both classical and quantum threats.
Furthermore, we evaluate widely used cryptographic protocols for
                                                                                                In this work, our analysis and recommendations are summarized
secure communication, including HTTPS, SSH, and others, to assess
                                                                                            in tables that provide guidance for quantum-resistant cryptography.
their robustness in both classical and quantum threat environments.
                                                                                            The tables include detailed columns for clarity: the ‘‘Algorithms/Pro-
    Beyond evaluating existing cryptographic standards, we briefly
                                                                                            tocols’’ column lists each cryptographic algorithm or protocol, the
highlight the emerging role of hybrid solutions as a transitional ap-
                                                                                            ‘‘Standards/RFC’’ column specifies the corresponding standard, the
proach toward quantum security. A detailed analysis of hybridization
                                                                                            ‘‘Year’’ column indicates when each standard was established, and
                                                                                            the ‘‘Purpose’’ column outlines its intended applications. The ‘‘Note’’
 19
     https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final                                              column provides additional details, while the final columns present
 20
     https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/03/nist-selects-hqc-fifth-                  quantum-safe (classical and post-quantum) recommendations for each
algorithm-post-quantum-encryption                                                           algorithm or protocol, based on the criteria defined in Section 1.4.

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


   To further illustrate the relationships and flow of cryptographic
standards, Fig. 1 presents a structured framework illustrating the hi-
erarchy of cryptographic standards for defining the order of the recom-
mendation flow. This figure visualizes a layered approach to analyzing
security standards. The base layer (layer 1) establishes standardized
recommendations for the fundamental building blocks of cryptography.
These primitives serve as the foundation for the higher layers of the
hierarchy, ensuring that cryptographic systems are secure and resilient
to both classical and quantum threats. Regarding recommendation
flow, in our structured framework, we refer to the foundational or
lower-level recommendations of primitives in the higher layers without
redefining them.
                                                                                Fig. 2. Mosca’s theorem illustrating the relationship between migration time,
1.4. Quantum readiness and evaluation criteria                                  data lifetime, and the estimated arrival of quantum computing capabili-
                                                                                ties [16].

    Quantum readiness refers to the preparedness of cryptographic
systems to withstand adversarial capability from quantum computers.
                                                                                ommendations. Our methodology unifies established standards into a
Quantum computers, due to their ability to solve certain mathematical
                                                                                migration-oriented evaluation framework. While NIST SP 800-57 Part
problems exponentially faster than classical computers, pose a threat
                                                                                1 Rev. 5 addresses classical key management and strength, and the
to widely used cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC (Elliptic
                                                                                PQC security categories cover quantum-resistant algorithms, neither
Curve Cryptography). A quantum-ready cryptographic system is one
                                                                                provides a combined workflow spanning both threat models with mi-
that is secure against quantum computational threats, either through
                                                                                gration guidance. Our criteria fill that gap by enabling reorganizations
the use of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, strong symmetric
                                                                                to assess primitives side-by-side, map systems from current classical
cryptography, or hybrid cryptographic solutions.
                                                                                compliance through transition to full PQ-readiness, and prioritize al-
    To evaluate cryptographic systems based on their readiness for
                                                                                gorithm selection, risk mitigation, and transition steps in a structured
the quantum era, our analysis considers both classical and quantum
                                                                                way.
adversarial models.

    1. Classical Recommendations: we assume adversaries are lim-                1.5. Motivations
       ited to classical computing capabilities. Under this assumption,
       we align with NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-57 Part
                                                                                   The motivation for this work stems from two converging pressures
       1 Rev. 5, which provides general key-management guidance
                                                                                on the cryptographic ecosystem:
       and classical key-strength recommendations [11]. Based on this
       guidance, we adopt a target of at least 128-bit classical security
                                                                                    1. The Quantum Threat: Mosca’s Theorem (Fig. 2) provides a
       (or equivalent as defined in Section 2, Table 3). This target is
                                                                                       simple but powerful framework to reason about urgency. It
       sufficient to meet the baseline security levels recommended by
                                                                                       states that if the time required to migrate to new cryptographic
       NIST for pre-quantum threat models.
                                                                                       standards (𝑥) plus the required confidentiality period of sensitive
    2. Post-Quantum (PQ) Recommendations: we assume adver-
                                                                                       data (𝑦) exceeds the estimated time to a cryptographically rele-
       saries may access or exploit quantum computing capabilities. In
                                                                                       vant quantum computer (𝑧), i.e., 𝑥+𝑦 ≥ 𝑧, then today’s encrypted
       this context, we adopt evaluation criteria aligned with NIST’s
                                                                                       information is already at risk. In other words, data protected
       PQC ‘‘Security Evaluation Criteria’’ guidance, which defines
                                                                                       with classical algorithms can be collected now and retroactively
       five broad security-strength categories (Levels 1–5) (see Sec-
                                                                                       broken once quantum capabilities arrive. x
       tion 2) [12]. Based on both key-strength recommendations [11]
                                                                                       According to the Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024 [16],
       and NIST’s higher security-strength levels [12], we adopt a
                                                                                       experts largely agree that while the next five years pose little
       target of 128-bit quantum-equivalent security (roughly 256-
                                                                                       immediate risk, the likelihood of a cryptographically relevant
       bit classical equivalent) as our migration benchmark and map
                                                                                       quantum computer (CRQC) increases significantly within 10 to
       that target to one of the appropriate NIST PQC levels. These
                                                                                       15 years. Within 30 years, nearly 90% of experts expect such
       recommendations are categorized into:
                                                                                       machines to exist, with most assigning probabilities above 70%.
            • Available Recommendations: PQC algorithms, protocols,                    Although the short-term danger is limited, the long-term threat
              and symmetric primitives whose security-strength equiv-                  is widely regarded as inevitable, making proactive preparation
              alence is considered under FIPS PQ standards (for ex-                    essential.
              ample, FIPS 203 for KEMs, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for                   2. The Compliance Threat: even before a CRQC materializes, or-
              signatures) [13–15].                                                     ganizations face regulatory and market pressures. Governments
            • Alternative Recommendations: Viable fallback or in-                      and agencies worldwide have issued clear PQC adoption time-
              terim options for scenarios where the primary PQ rec-                    lines, with many mandating exclusive PQC use by the early
              ommendations are impractical (for example, due to hard-                  2030s. Failure to comply not only increases technical exposure,
              ware or configuration constraints) but which still meet                  but also risks loss of market access and trust (see Table 2).
              equivalent security-strength targets.
                                                                                    In summary, both the inevitability of the quantum threat (as cap-
    The evaluation criteria for these quantum-resistant recommenda-             tured by Mosca’s Theorem and expert forecasts) and the accelerating
tions are critical for reorganizations planning a migration strategy            pace of compliance requirements underline the urgency of migrating
to PQ-secure systems. They guide the assessment of cryptographic                to post-quantum cryptography. Since such transitions are complex and
primitives under both classical and quantum threat models and were              multi-year in nature, action must begin well before the threat fully
applied in our structured framework to provide quantum-safe rec-                materializes.

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 2                                                                              key infrastructure and authentication protocols. Additional communi-
International guidelines on preferred and mandatory dates for the adoption of        cation protocols are discussed in Section 11. A synthesized discussion
PQC. Max lifetime (yrs) indicates the number of years a product is expected          in Section 12 draws connections between these findings, and the paper
to remain on the market.
                                                                                     concludes in Section 13.
 Guideline                PQC preferred      Only PQC       Max lifetime (yrs)
 ASD Australia [17]            2025             2030               5                 2. Security strength
 CNSA 2.0 (NSA) [18]           2025             2033               8
 EU NIS CG [19]                2025             2030               5
 NIST IR 8547 [20]             2026             2035               10                    The main factor to consider when evaluating a cryptographic scheme
 ANSSI (France) [21]           2025             2030               5                 is how secure it is. However, it is difficult to accurately assess the
 UK NCSC [22]                  2027             2035               10                security of post-quantum cryptosystems, as noted by NIST. This is
                                                                                     because there is a risk of discovering new quantum algorithms that
                                                                                     could be used to attack these systems, and it is difficult to predict the
1.6. Contributions                                                                   future capabilities of quantum computers in terms of cost, speed, and
                                                                                     memory size.
   This paper presents a systematic evaluation of global cryptographic                   NIST will create a set of broad security strength categories instead of
standards, encompassing symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hash                    quantifying the strength of a submitted method using specific estimates
functions, MACs, digital signatures, key establishment, and secure com-              of the amount of ‘‘bits of security’’. Each category will be defined by a
munication protocols such as TLS, SSH, SAML, and OAuth, with a                       very simple-to-analyze reference primitive, whose security will serve
focus on post-quantum readiness. By integrating classical and quantum                as a baseline for a wide range of metrics that NIST considers to be
threat models, it provides actionable guidance for the design and                    potentially relevant to practical security. To fit into multiple categories,
deployment of secure, future-proof cryptographic infrastructures. The                a cryptosystem might be implemented with distinct parameter sets. The
key contributions are:                                                               classification objectives are as follows:

    ∙ We develop a structured evaluation framework to analyze cryp-                     1. To make meaningful performance comparisons between the pro-
      tographic primitives and protocols under both classical and quan-                    vided methods easier, make sure that the parameter sets being
      tum adversaries. The framework aligns with NIST guidelines and                       compared are as secure as possible.
      is illustrated through a layered model that depicts the hierarchy of              2. To enable NIST to make informed judgments on when to switch
      cryptographic standards and defines the order of recommendation                      to longer keys in the future.
      flow.                                                                             3. To assist contributors in making consistent and rational decisions
    ∙ We present an integrated perspective that links foundational                         about the symmetric primitives to utilize in padding mechanisms
      primitives to higher-level architectures, regulatory compliance,                     or other symmetric cryptography-related components of their
      and protocol design. Hybrid approaches are examined to ensure                        schemes.
      backward compatibility while enabling smooth migration toward                     4. To get a better understanding of the security/performance trade-
      quantum-resilient systems.                                                           offs that a particular design style entails.
    ∙ We construct structured reference tables that consolidate key
                                                                                     NIST will base its classification on the range of security strengths
      attributes, including algorithm, standard, year, purpose, notes,
                                                                                     offered by existing NIST standards in symmetric cryptography, which
      and deployment recommendations. These tables serve as a prac-
                                                                                     NIST expects to offer significant resistance to quantum cryptanalysis,
      tical guide for migration planning and cryptographic infrastruc-
                                                                                     in accordance with the second and third goals above. NIST will create
      ture design, offering clear recommendations for both classical
                                                                                     a distinct category for each of the security standards listed below.
      and post-quantum contexts based on defined criteria that eval-
      uate quantum readiness by considering their respective security                   1. Any attack that breaks the applicable security criteria must
      strengths.                                                                           necessitate computing resources equal to or higher than those
                                                                                           required for key search on a 128-bit block cipher (e.g., AES128)
   Overall, this work bridges existing cryptographic standards with
                                                                                        2. Any attack that breaks the applicable security criteria must use
emerging post-quantum requirements, offering a reproducible and ex-
                                                                                           computational resources equal to or more than those necessary
tensible framework to support informed decision-making by researchers,
                                                                                           for collision search on a 256-bit hash function (e.g., SHA256/
policymakers, and practitioners.
                                                                                           SHA3-256).
                                                                                        3. Any attack that defies the applicable security criteria must ne-
1.7. Organization                                                                          cessitate computing resources equal to or higher than those
                                                                                           required for key search on a 192-bit block cipher (e.g., AES192)
    This research paper conducts a comprehensive investigation into                     4. Any attack that violates the applicable security requirement
cryptographic standards and recommendations across multiple do-                            must necessitate computing resources equal to or more than
mains. The structure of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2,                   those necessary for collision search on a 384-bit hash function
we review the NIST’s security strength framework to define security                        (e.g., SHA384 /SHA3-384)
levels. Section 3 delves into the realm of ciphers, exploring estab-                    5. Any attack that violates the applicable security criteria must
lished standards and recommended practices. Section 4 scrutinizes the                      necessitate computing resources equal to or higher than those
cryptographic standards and recommendations for hash and MAC func-                         required for key search on a 256-bit block cipher (e.g., AES 256)
tions, followed by Section 5, which focuses on cryptographic standards
and recommendations for digital signatures. The key establishment                        Computational resources may be quantified using a variety of mea-
algorithms are examined in Section 6, while Section 7 explores the                   sures in this case (e.g., number of classical elementary operations,
hybridization of cryptographic primitives, considering the prevailing                quantum circuit size, etc.). For a cryptosystem to meet one of the afore-
standards and recommendations. We survey the global landscape of                     mentioned security requirements, any attack must necessitate com-
cryptographic standards in Section 8, highlighting the variations across             puting resources equal to or greater than the specified threshold for
countries. Furthermore, Section 9 addresses lightweight cryptography,                all metrics considered by NIST to be potentially relevant to practical
and Section 10 delves into authentication standards, including public                security.

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                      Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


                      Table 3
                      NIST security levels with classical/quantum security and required gates.
                        Level     Algorithm               Classicalsecurity       Quantumsecurity    Classical gates        Quantum gates
                           I      AES 128:                    128bits                  64bits             2143              2157 /MAXDEPTH
                          II      SHA256/SHA3-256             128bits                  80bits             2146
                         III      AES192:                     192bits                  96bits             2207              2221 /MAXDEPTH
                         IV       SHA384/SHA3-384             192bits                 128bits             2210
                          V       AES256:                     256bits                 128bits             2272              2285 /MAXDEPTH



    NIST proposes restricting quantum attacks to a defined operating               3.1.1. Standards for modes of operation
period or circuit depth. This option is known as MAXDEPTH. This                        Organizations such as NIST, ISO, and ANSI have standardized modes
limitation results from the difficulties of performing extremely lengthy           of operation that are widely used in various cryptographic libraries and
serial calculations. Possible MAXDEPTH values range from 240 logical               applications. Several standards for modes of operation are available,
gates (the approximate number of gates that currently envisioned quan-             each providing different security features. Choosing the right mode of
tum computing architectures are expected to serially perform in a year)            operation is crucial since each mode has advantages and disadvantages.
to 264 logical gates (the approximate number of gates that current clas-           Therefore, evaluating the specific requirements of the application is
sical computing architectures can serially perform in a decade), with no           necessary before selecting an appropriate mode of operation [37].
more than 296 logical gates being possible (the approximate number of                  It is vital to employ a mode of operation when using a block
gates that atomic-scale qubits with the speed of light propagation times
                                                                                   cipher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which defines
could perform in a millennium) [23].
                                                                                   applying the cipher to plaintext. The modes of operation most fre-
    The complexity of quantum attacks might also be expressed as a
                                                                                   quently employed for AES block ciphers are Electronic Codebook (ECB),
function of the size of the circuit. These figures can be compared with
                                                                                   Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Counter (CTR), Cipher Feedback (CFB),
the resources needed to decrypt AES and SHA3. At the moment, NIST
estimates the classical and quantum gate counts for the optimum key                Output Feedback (OFB), XEX-based Tweaked Codebook with Ciphertext
recovery and collision attacks on AES and SHA3, respectively, when the             Stealing (XTS), Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), Cipher-based Message Au-
circuit depth is restricted to MAXDEPTH [24,25].                                   thentication Code (CMAC), and Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM). Several
    It is worth noting that levels I, III, and V are, for example, char-           modes are available for the 3DES cipher block, including TECB-I, TCBC-
acterized in terms of block ciphers that can be cracked using Grover’s             I, TCFB-I, and TOFB-I. However, it should be noted that these modes
technique with a quadratic quantum speedup. However, Grover’s ap-                  will no longer be allowed after 2023 [37,38].
proach necessitates a lengthy serial calculation, which is difficult to
apply in reality. In a genuine attack, numerous smaller instances of the           3.1.2. Modes of operation in quantum
algorithm must be performed in parallel, making the quantum speed-up                   Except for ECB and XTS, the stated modes of operation are recog-
less dramatic [23].                                                                nized to be secure against indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext
    We have explored the four main types of post-quantum cryptosys-                Attack (IND-CPA) in classical settings, provided that the block cipher
tems: code-based, lattice-based, supersingular elliptic curve isogeny,             used is a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). Although the security of XTS
and hash-based schemes [26,27]. They have been divided into two                    is uncertain, ECB is generally deemed insecure for many applications
main types: encryption candidates and signature candidates. For each               for different reasons. The security of ECB can be significantly impacted
type, we compare them based on the underlying problem, the claimed                 by the block size, which determines the amount of data that can be
classical security level, the claimed quantum security level, public key           safely encrypted using a single key. The ECB mode always generates
size, private key size, and signature size. The comparison of the KEM
                                                                                   the same ciphertext block for a given plaintext block encrypted with
schemes is shown in Table 4. The comparison of the signature-based
                                                                                   the same key. When the block size is small, patterns in the plaintext can
schemes is shown in Table 5. However, the practicality of Grover-based
                                                                                   be exposed in the ciphertext, thereby decreasing the overall security of
attacks remains debated, and recent studies highlight challenges such
                                                                                   the ECB [39].
as circuit depth, fault-tolerant overhead, and quantum decoherence,
all of which significantly limit real-world applicability [24,28]. Con-                Regarding quantum computing, two types of IND-CPA notions exist,
sequently, while symmetric schemes such as AES-256 and CMAC are                    namely ‘‘standard IND-CPA’’ and ‘‘IND-qCPA’’. The standard IND-CPA
often cited as post-quantum resistant under Grover’s model, such claims            security notion allows a quantum attacker to make classical encryption
should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.                                    queries. In the classical setting, it remains secure, assuming that the
    According to the NIST guidelines for classical systems up to 2030              underlying block cipher is a PRF. By contrast, IND-qCPA allows the
and beyond, as detailed in the NIST Recommendation for Key Man-                    attacker to make quantum encryption queries [39].
agement [11], we strongly recommend ensuring the security of all                       In addition, with IND-qCPA, security is ensured even when messages
cryptographic systems based on their equivalence to the security levels            are encrypted using the encryption key that is in a superposition state.
(refer to Table 3) of classical systems, as mentioned in Tables 4 and 5.           The security concept of IND-qCPA aims to offer a type of passive
                                                                                   protection by protecting against potential attackers who could gain
3. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for ciphers                         access to the encryption of specific plaintexts while in a superposition
                                                                                   state. In the context of quantum computing, there are two versions
3.1. Block ciphers standards and recommendations
                                                                                   of the classical Pseudo-Random Function (PRF): standard secure PRF
                                                                                   and quantum secure PRF. In the first version, the function appears to
    Block ciphers are a crucial building block in cryptography. They
                                                                                   be random when classical queries are made. In the second version,
are encryption algorithms that use a symmetric key to operate on
                                                                                   quantum queries that involve multiple superposition inputs cannot
fixed-length data blocks, usually 64 or 128 bits. When using a block
cipher to encrypt data bits or plaintext, it is recommended to follow              determine the function [39].
a specific mode of operation. Remember that a block cipher can only
encrypt a single n-bit string, not a complete message. Additionally,               3.1.3. Recommendations
when encrypting a string of data, it is essential to use a mode of                     As depicted in Table 6, current secure block ciphers offer a variety
operation to prevent information from leaking due to repeated patterns             of options for cryptographic operations, ensuring robust protection
in the data. These modes ensure the encrypted data’s confidentiality               for sensitive data. In Table 6, we present cryptographic standards for
and integrity. They also prevent specific attacks, such as replay attacks          block ciphers, detailing several key columns. For detailed guidelines on
and message modification attacks.                                                  table columns and cryptographic recommendations, including the basic

                                                                              6
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


                    Table 4
                    Security strength of NIST selected algorithms and 4th round KEM/ENC candidates.
                      Type                    Algorithm                           NIST Security level            Classical security (bits)           Quantum security (bits)
                                              CRYSTALS–Kyber-512                              1                             128                                107
                      Lattice-based           CRYSTALS–Kyber-768                              3                             182                                165
                                              CRYSTALS–Kyber-1024                             5                             256                                132
                                              BIKE-L1                                         1                             128                                 –
                                              BIKE-L3                                         3                             192                                 –
                                              BIKE-L5                                         5                             256                                 –
                                              HQC-128                                         1                             128                                64
                      Code-based              HQC-192                                         3                             192                                96
                                              HQC-256                                         5                             256                                128
                                              Classic-McEliece-348864                         1                             128                                 –
                                              Classic-McEliece-460896                         3                             192                                 –
                                              Classic-McEliece-8192128                        5                             256                                 –



                    Table 5
                    Security strength of NIST selected signature candidates.
                      Type                    Algorithm                          NIST security level             Classical security (bits)           Quantum security (bits)
                                              CRYSTALS–Dilithium2                         2                                123                                 112
                                              CRYSTALS–Dilithium3                         3                                182                                 165
                      Lattice-based           CRYSTALS–Dilithium5                         5                                252                                 229
                                              Falcon-512                                  1                                120                                 108
                                              Falcon-1024                                 5                                277                                 252
                                              SPHINCS+ −128                               1                                128                                 64
                      Hash-based              SPHINCS+ −192                               3                                192                                 96
                                              SPHINCS+ −256                               5                                256                                 128




Table 6
Standards for block cipher.
 Algorithm          Standards         Year              Purpose                               Note                                                  Recommendations

                                                                                                                                   Classical                                PQ

                                                                                                                             (till 2030 & beyond)           (Available)          (Alternatives)

                    FIPS PUB          2023a      Description of AES      There are three Rijndael family
                    197-1 [29]                   for block ciphers       members: AES-128/192/256. Each
                                                                         member converts data into 128-bit
                                                                         blocks, and the numeric suffix indicates
                                                                         the length of the cryptographic keys
                                                                         used.
 AES                                                                                                                   AES-128/192/256                      AES-256              Camellia-256
                    ISO/IEC           2020a      Encryption algorithms   Specifies 128-bit block ciphers: AES,
                    18033-3 [30]                 for block ciphers       Camellia, SEED

                    ISO/DIS           2017       Banking and related     Describes a method of transporting and
                    20038 [31]                   financial services –    storing cryptographic keys using the
                                                 Key wrap using AES      AES block cipher algorithm.

                    NIST SP           2017       Recommendation for      Determines the Triple Data Encryption
                    800-67r2 [32]                the Triple Data         Algorithm (TDEA) and its primary
                                                 Encryption Algorithm    component, the Data Encryption
                                                 (TDEA) Block Cipher     Algorithm (DEA).
 3DES                                                                                                                                    Disallowed after 2023 (By NIST [32])
                    ISO/IEC           2018a      Security requirements   Outlines the encryption systems (known
                    19790 [33]                   for cryptographic       as ciphers) that are used to maintain
                                                 modules                 data confidentiality.

                    RFC 3713          2004       A Description of the    Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher
                                                                                                                       Camellia-128/192/256
                    [34]                         Camellia Encryption                                                                                        Camellia -256
                                                 Algorithm

                    RFC 5529          2009       Modes of Operation      Explains how the Camellia block cipher
                    [35]                         for Camellia for use    algorithm is utilized in CTR and CCM          Camellia-CBC-128/192/256             Camellia-CBC-256
                                                 with IPsec              mode as additional,
                                                                         optional-to-implement IKEv2 and ESP                                                                     AES-256
 Camellia
                                                                         mechanisms

                    RFC 4312          2005       The Camellia Cipher     Explains how the Camellia block cipher
                    [36]                         Algorithm and its use   algorithm is utilized in CBC mode.            Camellia-CTR-128/192/256             Camellia-CTR-256
                                                 With IPsec

                    ISO/IEC           2020       Encryption algorithms   128-bit block ciphers: AES, Camellia,
                    18033-3:2010                 for block ciphers       SEED                                          Camellia-CCM-128/192/256             Camellia-CCM-256
                    [30]

a Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.




                                                                                                  7
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


criteria we follow, refer to Sections 1.3 and 1.4. Based on these stan-          3.3.1. Standardization
dards, for classical security, AES-128/192/256 and Camellia-128/256                  We reviewed classical and post-quantum encryption standards for
are recommended, while 3DES is disallowed. For post-quantum se-                  asymmetric cryptography in Table 8 and provided recommendations
curity, AES-256 and Camellia-256 are preferred, with Camellia-256                for each standard based on the criteria defined in Section 1.4.
serving as a viable alternative if AES-256 is impractical. Recommended               The RSA encryption algorithm is extensively used for secure data
                                                                                 transmission, digital signatures, and key exchange. The IETF has rec-
modes of operation include CBC, CTR, CFB, OFB, GCM, CCM, and
                                                                                 ommended guidelines for implementing public-key cryptography using
CMAC, while ECB and XTS are discouraged due to security weaknesses,
                                                                                 the RSA algorithm, which are standardized in RFC 8017.
particularly against quantum attacks.
                                                                                     In contrast, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) leverages the math-
                                                                                 ematics of elliptic curves to provide comparable security with signif-
3.2. Stream ciphers standards and recommendations                                icantly smaller key sizes. ECC has become widely adopted in modern
                                                                                 protocols such as SSH, PGP, and TLS. For example, the X25519 curve,
                                                                                 which is both efficient and secure, serves as the default key exchange
    A stream cipher is an encryption method that transforms plaintext            method in TLS 1.3 [57]. Furthermore, recent security initiatives have
into unreadable code byte by byte, using a proper key. This linear               investigated hybrid key-exchange mechanisms that combine classical
encryption technique uses the same key for both the encryption and the           ECC with post-quantum cryptography to ensure protection against both
decryption of messages. Although stream ciphers are not easily cracked,          classical and quantum adversaries. Real-world deployments include hy-
hackers have found ways to do so.                                                brid key exchange implementations in Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox,
                                                                                 and OpenSSL 3.0, where schemes such as X25519 together with Kyber
    ChaCha20 is a widely used symmetric cipher, but it does not provide
                                                                                 are tested in production to achieve a balance between performance and
resistance against post-quantum attacks. Under a quantum adversary
                                                                                 forward-looking security.
model, Grover’s algorithm yields a quadratic speedup for exhaustive
                                                                                     On the other hand, NIST is actively working on standardizing
key search (reducing a 256-bit key to 128-bit effective security), and           post-quantum algorithms and has conducted several rounds of eval-
concrete quantum resource estimates for applying Grover’s algorithm to           uations with their respective results. In 2022, NIST announced that
ChaCha20 have been published [40]. For more details on the relevant              the CRYSTALS-KYBER key encapsulation algorithm to be standardized,
standards, see Table 7.                                                          along with four alternative KEM algorithms (Classic McEliece, HQC,
    AES is inherently a block cipher with a fixed block size of 128 bits.        BIKE, and SIKE) [6].
However, several standardized modes of operation enable it to function
as a stream cipher. Specifically, CTR, OFB, and CFB modes transform              3.3.2. Recommendations
AES into a keystream generator, allowing bit- or byte-oriented encryp-               The asymmetric encryption standards and specifications are listed in
                                                                                 Table 8, including both classical and post-quantum algorithms. These
tion similar to conventional stream ciphers. Among these, CTR mode is
                                                                                 standards and specifications are crucial for securing communication
the most widely used due to its efficiency, parallelizable structure, and
                                                                                 applications, such as email and web security, as well as other en-
identical procedures for encryption and decryption. All three modes              cryption systems that require key exchange over public networks. By
(CTR, OFB, and CFB) are approved by NIST in SP 800-38 A, confirming              following these recommended standards and algorithms (as per the
their suitability for secure data encryption applications that require           criteria defined in Section 1.4), users can enhance the security of their
stream-like processing.                                                          cryptographic systems and protect against potential future threats.

                                                                                 3.3.3. Use-case: Phased RSA to kyber migration in financial systems
3.2.1. Recommendations                                                               A global bank aims to strengthen its public-facing TLS infrastruc-
   Stream ciphers are designed for fast, bytewise encryption and are             ture against prospective quantum threats by transitioning from clas-
well suited to low-latency applications (e.g., streaming media, VoIP,            sical RSA-2048 key exchange to hybrid RSA plus Kyber1024 hand-
and real-time data channels). Care must be taken to prevent key                  shake, in accordance with emerging IETF draft ciphersuites and NIST
or nonce reuse, as keystream compromise can catastrophically break               guidance [58].
confidentiality. Table 7 summarizes the relevant standards.                      1. Phased migration plan.
    Among stream-cipher-style constructions, we recommend AES-CTR/
OFB/CFB with a 256-bit key as the sole option to retain a conser-                   P1 Inventory and Compatibility. Identify all Internet-facing end-
vative security margin against quantum adversaries (via Grover-type                    points. Enable hybrid ciphersuites on pilot load balancers and
                                                                                       conduct TLS 1.3 interoperability tests with major browsers and
search), assuming proper nonce uniqueness and high-entropy keys.
                                                                                       HSM firmware.
Classical stream ciphers (e.g., ChaCha20, RC4, Trivium, Grain, Rabbit)
                                                                                    P2 Parallel Deployment. Serve dual RSA and Kyber key shares
do not provide post-quantum resistance and should be restricted to
                                                                                       during the handshake. Legacy clients utilize the RSA share, while
classical threat models. For confidentiality and integrity, pair AES-                  quantum-ready clients process the Kyber share.
CTR/OFB/CFB (256) with a strong MAC in an encrypt-then-MAC com-                     P3 Gradual Client Rollout. Employ feature flags and canary re-
position or use an AES-based AEAD where available.                                     leases to incrementally expand hybrid support. Monitor latency
                                                                                       and certificate-chain telemetry to ensure performance and sta-
                                                                                       bility.
3.3. Asymmetric ciphers standards and recommendations
                                                                                    P4 Legacy Retirement. Once at least 95% of sessions negotiate
                                                                                       the Kyber share, deprecate pure RSA ciphersuites and rotate
    Asymmetric ciphers provide a way to achieve secure communication                   remaining keys.
between two parties without sharing a secret key, making it easier
                                                                                 2. Performance & bandwidth impact. Recent evaluations show that Ky-
to establish secure communication between parties who have never
                                                                                 ber1024 introduces minimal computational overhead compared to clas-
communicated before. However, asymmetric ciphers, which require a                sical RSA operations on commodity servers, remaining within accept-
pair of keys for encryption and decryption, are generally slower and             able latency thresholds for time-sensitive applications such as online
less efficient than symmetric ciphers that use a single key. Additionally,       banking and trading [58]. Furthermore, hybrid Kyber+ RSA hand-
asymmetric ciphers require more computational power and resources,               shakes have comparable message sizes to traditional RSA-only profiles,
which can be a disadvantage in resource-limited environments.                    avoiding bandwidth penalties for mobile or low-power clients.

                                                                             8
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                        Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 7
Standards for stream cipher.
 Algorithm   Standard                     Year                Purpose                             Note                                           Recommendations

                                                                                                                             Classical                                 PQ

                                                                                                                       (till 2030 & beyond)        (Available)              (Alternatives)

             RFC 8439 [41]                2018    Defines the ChaCha20 stream       Describes the ChaCha20 stream
                                                  cipher as well as the use of      cipher and Poly1305
                                                  the Poly1305 authenticator        authenticator as stand-alone
                                                                                    algorithms or Authenticated
                                                                                    Encryption with Associated
                                                                                    Data (AEAD) algorithm.

 ChaCha20    RFC 8103 [42]                2017    Using ChaCha20-Poly1305           Outlines the guidelines for      ChaCha20                                      AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                                  Authenticated Encryption in       utilizing ChaCha20-Poly1305
                                                  the Cryptographic Message         Authenticated Encryption
                                                  Syntax (CMS)                      within the Cryptographic
                                                                                    Message Syntax (CMS).

             RFC 7905 [43]                2016    ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher          Explains how the ChaCha
                                                  Suites for Transport Layer        stream cipher and Poly1305
                                                  Security (TLS)                    authenticator are utilized in
                                                                                    the Transport Layer Security
                                                                                    (TLS) and Datagram Transport
                                                                                    Layer Security (DTLS)
                                                                                    protocols.

             RFC 7634 [44]                2015    ChaCha20, Poly1305, and           ChaCha20 stream cipher and
                                                  Their Use in the Internet Key     Poly1305 authenticator
                                                  Exchange Protocol (IKE) and       combined into AEAD algorithm
                                                  IPsec                             for IKEv2 and IPsec

             RFC 6229 [45]                2011    Vectors for the Stream Cipher     Includes test vectors designed
                                                  RC4                               for the RC4 stream cipher.

             ISO/IEC 18033-4:2011 [46]    2022a   IT - Security techniques -        Specifies how to combine a
 RC4                                              Encryption algorithms - Part 4:   keystream with plaintext and                              RC4 is not recommended
                                                  Stream ciphers                    provides keystream generators
                                                                                    for producing the keystream.

             IEEE 802.11i-2004 [47]       2004    Wireless LAN Medium Access        Defines MAC and PHY
                                                  Control (MAC) and Physical        specifications for wireless
                                                  Layer (PHY) specifications:       connectivity for STAs within a
                                                  Amendment 6: Medium Access        local area.
                                                  Control (MAC) Security
                                                  Enhancements

             ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012 [48]    2018a   IT - Security techniques -        Defines lightweight keystream
 Enocoro                                          Lightweight cryptography -        generators with 80 or 128-bit    Enocoro-128                                   AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                                  Part 3: Stream ciphers            key size for stream ciphers

             ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012 [48]    2018a   IT - Security techniques -        Two dedicated keystream
                                                  Lightweight cryptography -        generators are specified for
                                                  Part 3: Stream ciphers            lightweight stream ciphers:
 Trivium                                                                            Trivium, with a key size of 80   None                                          AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                                                                    bits

             NISTIR 8114 [49]             2018a   Presents a summary of NIST’s      Outlines proposals for the
                                                  lightweight cryptography          standardization of lightweight
                                                  project.                          cryptographic algorithms.

             ISO/IEC 29167-13:2015 [50]   2021a   Specifies the Crypto Suite for    ISO committees may refer to
                                                  Grain-128A for RFID devices       this common crypto suite for
                                                  based on the ISO/IEC 18000        RFID devices used in air
 Grain                                            air interface standards           interface and application        Grain-128AEAD                                 AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                                                                    standards.

             NISTIR 8369 [51]             2021    Select one or more AEAD           Authenticated Encryption with
                                                  schemes with optional hashing     Associated Data (AEAD)
                                                  for constrained environments.

                                                                                                                                                                   (continued on next page)

3. Key-management considerations. The referenced evaluation classi-                               path if post-quantum parameters or standards evolve, all without the
fies Kyber key material in the low-size category, meaning it already                              protocol-level upheaval sometimes necessary for larger post-quantum
fits within standard X.509 v3 extensions with no format changes re-                               key sets.
quired. Migration, therefore, focuses on light-touch updates, regis-
                                                                                                  4. Benefits. The approach delivers quantum resilience without disrupt-
tering new post-quantum OIDs in certificate transparency logs, and                                ing legacy ecosystems, satisfies payment-card and regulatory crypto-
enabling PQC-aware keywrap support in HSM s, rather than whole-                                   agility requirements, and aligns with the algorithm-selection frame-
sale PKI redesign. The operation of TLS in a hybrid RSA+ Kyber                                    work that identifies Kyber as the top-performing KEM for financial
keeps legacy clients working while providing an immediate rollback                                use-cases [58].

                                                                                            9
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                                       Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 7 (continued).
    Algorithm   Standard                       Year                   Purpose                              Note                                                    Recommendations

                                                                                                                                         Classical                                       PQ

                                                                                                                                   (till 2030 & beyond)              (Available)                (Alternatives)

                ISO/IEC 18033-4:2011 [46]      2022a    IT - Security techniques -           Specifies the functions that
                                                        Encryption algorithms - Part 4:      combine a keystream with
                                                        Stream ciphers                       plaintext, as well as the
    Rabbit                                                                                   keystream generators used to        Rabbit-128                                            AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                                                                             produce the keystream.

                RFC 4503 [52]                  2006     A Description of the Rabbit          Provides information for the
                                                        Stream Cipher Algorithm              Internet community. It does
                                                                                             not specify an Internet
                                                                                             standard of any kind

                RFC3686 [53]                   2018a    AES can act as a stream              Explains how to use AES             AES-                              AES-                AES-
    AES
                                                        cipher using CTR, OFB, or CFB        Counter Mode with an explicit       CTR/OFB/CFB                       CTR/OFB/CFB         CTR/OFB/CFB
                                                        modes. CTR mode is the most          initialization vector as an IPsec   (128, 192, 256)                   (256)               (256)
                                                        efficient.                           Encapsulating Security Payload
                                                                                             confidentiality method.

a
    Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.




Table 8
Encryption standards for asymmetric cryptography.
    Algorithm       Standards                   Year                       Purpose                                                                 Recommendations

                                                                                                                  Classical                                                  PQ

                                                                                                          (till 2030 & beyond)                       (Available)                               Alternatives

    RSA             IETF RFC 8017 [54]          2016           PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography                MS ≥ 3072                       ∙ NIST’s KEM PQC
                                                               (Specifications)                                                         ∙ Quantum-safe Hybrid PKE

    ECC             PKCS #13                    1998a          ECC Standard                             KS ≥ 256

    SM2             ISO/IEC 14888 [55]          2018           Provide secure digital                   KS ≥ 256
                                                               signatures and key exchange

    Kyber                                                                                               Kyber-512/768/1024              Kyber-768/1024                               McEliece-256, HQC-256,
                                                                                                                                                                                     BIKE-256
                    NISTb                       2022           Encapsulation
    McEliece                                                                                            McEliece-128/192/256            McEliece-256                                 Kyber-768/1024, HQC-256,
                                                                                                                                                                                     BIKE-256

    HQC                                                                                                 HQC-128/192/256                 HQC-256                                      Kyber-768/1024,
                                                                                                                                                                                     McEliece-256, BIKE-256

    BIKE                                                                                                BIKE-128/192/256                BIKE-256                                     Kyber-768/1024,
                                                                                                                                                                                     McEliece-256, HQC-256

    SIKE                                                                                                                                           Not Recommended

Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: KS: Key Size and MS: Modulus Size.
+   The Chinese national standard GM/T 0003-2012 was subsequently adopted and harmonized into the international standard ISO/IEC 14888.
a
    Apparently abandoned, only reference is a proposal from 1998.
b
    In 2022, NIST completed the 4th round of the PQC standardization process [56]. Later, on August 13, 2024, NIST released the final versions of the first three post-quantum cryptography standards:
FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205, including Kyber.



3.3.4. Use-case: PQC rollout aligned with EO 14144 for federal systems                                            transport, DNS resolvers), record current vendor/firmware and
    A Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency that operates                                               PQC capability status [10].
citizen-facing API gateways must comply with Executive Order 14144,                                            E2 Procurement Requirements. For any solicitation issued after
which (i) directs CISA to publish a list of product categories where                                              a category appears on CISA’s list, include a requirement that
post-quantum cryptography is widely available; (ii) requires agencies                                             products support PQC (with a 90-day window from listing) [10].
to include PQC-support in solicitations for any such product categories                                        E3 Enable PQC/Hybrid as Soon as Practicable. Where deployed
within 90 days; (iii) mandates implementation of PQC key establish-                                               products already provide support, enable PQC key establishment
ment or hybrid key establishment (including a PQC algorithm) as soon                                              (e.g., ML-KEM) or hybrid key establishment including a PQC al-
as practicable when supported by deployed network-security products;                                              gorithm on external and internal TLS 1.3 endpoints, prioritizing
and (iv) requires TLS 1.3 (or its successor) support by January 2,                                                public-facing API gateways and cross-agency interfaces [10].
2030 [10].                                                                                                     E4 TLS Baseline. Ensure agency systems support TLS 1.3 (or its
                                                                                                                  successor) no later than January 2, 2030 (OMB for non-NSS; DoD
1. Compliance-driven migration plan (per EO 14144).
                                                                                                                  for NSS), with configuration baselines updated accordingly [10].
      E1 Track PQC-Available Categories. Monitor CISA’s list of product                                        E5 Audit Evidence. Log negotiated key-exchange groups
         categories where PQC is widely available (due within 180 days                                            (e.g., X25519ML-KEM768), certificate OIDs/policies, and con-
         of the executive order). For each in-scope category already                                              figuration state to the SIEM to demonstrate conformance with
         deployed (e.g., TLS terminators, service-mesh gateways, email                                            EO timelines and solicitation clauses [10].

                                                                                                     10
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                 Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 9
Performance evidence supporting EO 14144 compliance: Observed PQC/hybrid impacts for TLS 1.3 show modest overhead, validating the practicability of near-
term federal deployment. TTLB: Time-To-Last-Byte. Handshake overhead from Chrome desktop rollout [59]; TTLB results from MADWeb’24 [60]; broader PQ-TLS
performance from CCS’23 [61].
 Context                  KEX/Auth                              Median Handshake Overhead        TTLB Overhead (typical)    Key/Msg Size (on-wire)       Source
 Web desktop (field)      X25519+ML-KEM-768 (hybrid), ECDSA     ∼4%                              –                          ClientHello split            [59]
 Stable high-bw nets      ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-44/65              –                                <5% TTLB                   ∼10 KB handshake             [60]
 Low-bw (50 KiB+ data)    ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-44/65              –                                <15% TTLB                  ∼11–14 KB auth               [60]
 Emulated Web envs        Kyber/HQC; Dilithium/Falcon           On par w/ classical              No hybrid drawback         Param-dependent              [61]


2. Performance & bandwidth impact. Published field measurements and               4.2. Message authentication codes standards
controlled studies report modest overheads for PQC and hybrid key ex-
changes in TLS 1.3. Chrome’s desktop rollout of hybrid Kyber reports a                The financial sector utilizes MACs to protect the integrity and
median ∼4% handshake-latency increase due to ClientHello size (packet             millions of daily banking communications, as well as to verify the
split), while broader studies show that overall time-to-last-byte (TTLB)          authenticity of mobile phones. In order for a MAC algorithm to be
impact diminishes as payload size grows [59–61] (see Table 9).                    effective, it must meet the specific requirements outlined in ISO/IEC
                                                                                  9797-1. This standard requires that a MAC algorithm demonstrate the
3. Key-management & protocol notes. EO 14144 allows agencies to adopt             following two properties:
hybrid key establishment including a PQC algorithm while existing au-
thentication remains classical, easing near-term deployment on current                • MAC generation from the plaintext message and a secret key must
PKI/HSM stacks. Agencies should prefer TLS 1.3 key-exchange groups                      be straightforward (usability).
that are listed by vendors as compliant with EO-aligned PQC categories                • It must be practically impossible to derive an MAC for a particular
(e.g., X25519+ML-KEM-768) and should record policy/OID usage for                        plaintext message without authorized access to the secret key,
auditing purposes [10].                                                                 even if the intruder has access to accurate MACs for various other
                                                                                        messages, including some that the attacker may choose (security).
4. Benefits. This plan directly satisfies EO 14144’s procurement trig-
gers and deployment timelines, achieves harvest-now/decrypt-later risk                ISO/IEC 9797 is an extensive collection of standardized MAC algo-
reduction via PQC/hybrid key establishment, and keeps latency within              rithms, divided into three parts. Part 1 comprises six distinct variants
measured bounds for public services [10,59,60].                                   of CBC-MAC. On the other hand, Part 2 and Part 3 encompass a range
                                                                                  of MAC techniques that rely on hash functions.
4. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for hash and
                                                                                  4.3. Hash and MAC functions recommendations
MAC functions

                                                                                      Tables 10 and 11 list the standards and specifications for the hash
   A hash function is a mathematical computational procedure that can             and MAC functions. Hash functions provide information on the relevant
accept inputs of any size and produce a consistent hash code of a prede-          standards and offer recommendations for their usage in applications
termined length that is hard to predict. In cryptography, hash functions          such as digital signatures, password storage, and data integrity checks
are peculiar in that they usually do not depend on secret keys, and               to ensure data integrity. However, MAC functions provide information
therefore their use is restricted to a limited range of security services.        on relevant standards and offer recommendations for their usage in
As a result, they are often used as a basis for other security systems. If        applications such as network communication protocols, payment sys-
a weak hash function is employed, the security of the overall scheme              tems, and digital rights management systems to ensure data integrity
is undermined. Hash functions are utilized to ensure data integrity               and authenticity. By adhering to the recommended algorithms and
in Message Authentication Codes (MACs), create message digests to                 standards for hash and MAC functions (as per the criteria defined
support digital signature schemes, and generate manipulation detection            in Section 1.4), users can enhance data protection and secure their
codes in key establishment and entity authentication procedures. In this          cryptographic systems against potential threats. Our assumption for
section, we reviewed Hash and MAC function standards in Tables 10                 hash functions is based on prioritizing the highest level of security in
and 11, and provided recommendations for specific standards based on              the context of potential quantum threats. We consider NIST Level 5
the criteria defined in Section 1.4 .                                             as the minimum requirement because it provides the strongest pro-
                                                                                  tection against both classical and quantum attacks. Level 5 ensures
4.1. Hash functions standards                                                     that cryptographic algorithms maintain their security even against
                                                                                  powerful quantum computers. Therefore, we do not classify SHA-384 as
                                                                                  quantum-resistant, as it does not meet the stringent security standards
    Three major organizations, ISO/IEC JTC1, NIST, and IETF, have
                                                                                  required for NIST Level 5. We view SHAKE256 as offering a degree
developed widely recognized hash function standards, indicating a
                                                                                  of quantum resistance when used with longer message digests, such
significant level of standardization in this area.
                                                                                  as 512 bits or more. Although SHAKE256 alone does not provide
    The NIST secure hash standard, also known as NIST FIPS Pub. 180,              complete quantum resistance, utilizing it with longer output lengths
has been amended many times, with the most recent version (NIST                   helps mitigate the impact of quantum attacks, including those posed
FIPS Pub. 180-4) released in 2015. This standard defines specialized              by Grover’s algorithm, which effectively reduces security levels.
hash functions such as SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
512. The length of the message digests can range from 160 to 512                  5. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for digital sig-
bits, depending on the algorithm used. The adoption of hash func-                 natures
tions has been standardized by the IETF. The SHA family is one of
their standardized hash functions and is widely used. However, it is                  Digital signatures have several important properties that make them
recommended to avoid using SHA-1 for such purposes, as it can no                  a powerful tool for ensuring the authenticity and integrity of digital
longer guarantee strong cryptographic security. Instead, more secure              documents and messages. These properties, such as security, efficiency,
and advanced hashing algorithms, such as SHA-256 or SHA-3, should                 integrity, and authentication, make it an essential tool to ensure the
be utilized to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data.        security and authenticity of digital transactions.

                                                                             11
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                   Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 10
Standards for hash functions.
 Algorithm          Standards                        Year                      Purpose                                         Recommendations
                                                                                                                   Classical                       PQ
                                                                                                              (till 2030 & beyond)    (Available) (Alternatives)
                    IETF RFC 3174 [62]               2001 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
 SHA-1                                                                                                              NIST deprecated the use of SHA-1
                                                            The USA Secure Hash Algorithms suite includes
                    IETF RFC 6234 [63]               2011
                                                            SHA, SHA-based HMAC, and HKDF
                                                 b
 SHA-1 and SHA-2 NIST FIPS Pub. 180-4 [64]           2015 Secure Hash Standard for both SHA-1 and
                                                          SHA-2
                                                            Permutation-based hash functions (SHA-3-224,
 SHA-3
                                                            SHA-3-256, SHA-3-384, SHA-3-512)
                    NIST FIPS Pub. 202 [65]          2015
                                                            Extendable-Output functions (SHAKE128 and                                              SHA-2/SHA-3
 SHAKE
                                                            SHAKE256)
                                                            Provides an explanation of the BLAKE2                  HL ≥ 256           HL ≥ 512
 BLAKE2             IETF RFC 7693 [66]               2015
                                                            cryptographic hash function
                                                          Provide a secure and efficient cryptographic
 SM3                draft-sca-cfrg-sm3-01 [67]       2018 hash function for data integrity verification and
                                                          digital signatures
                    ISO/IEC 101184: 1998 [68]        2022a Security techniques for Hash-functions (using
                                                           modular arithmetic)
 HASHc
                                                            Security techniques for dedicated hash
                    ISO/IEC 10118-3 [69]             2018
                                                            functions
Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: HL: Hash Length.
a
  Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.
b In 2023, NIST decided to revise FIPS 180-4.

c
  Comprises a set of security and cryptography standards designed explicitly for HASH.



    Several digital signature algorithms are widely used in practice. The                for creating and verifying digital signatures using the DSA. The
choice of digital signature algorithm depends on various factors, such as                DSA is a public key cryptography algorithm that is based on
security requirements, performance considerations, and compatibility                     the discrete logarithm problem. It uses a pair of keys, a private
with existing systems.                                                                   key and a public key, to sign and verify digital signatures. DSS
    The digital signature employs three primary algorithms: key gener-                   specifies the key sizes, hash algorithms, and other parameters
ation, signing, and verification algorithms. It is important to note that                required for creating and verifying DSA digital signatures. DSS-5,
the security of the digital signature system depends on the confidential-                the latest version of the DSS, specifies the DSA for creating and
ity of the private key. If the security of the private key is compromised,               verifying digital signatures.
malicious entities can generate fraudulent digital signatures that appear              • NIST SP 800-131 A Rev. 2 [87] is the revised version of NIST
legitimate. Therefore, strong cryptographic algorithms and the follow-                   SP 800-131 A. Includes updated guidelines for the use of cryp-
ing best practices for key management and storage are essential. In                      tographic algorithms and key sizes. Specifically, stronger elliptic
addition, it is crucial to update the keys to maintain system security                   curves and larger key sizes are now recommended for RSA and
periodically.                                                                            DSA. The updated guidelines also provide additional guidance on
    Various cryptographic algorithms are available to generate pub-                      using the SHA-256 and SHA-384 hash functions and recommend
lic and private keys within digital signature systems. Examples of
                                                                                         using validated entropy sources for random number generation.
algorithms that are frequently utilized to generate keys for digital
                                                                                         Finally, the guidance on the use of digital certificates has been
signatures include Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Digital Signature Al-
                                                                                         clarified and updated to include recommendations for the use of
gorithm (DSA), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
                                                                                         Certificate Transparency and Online Certificate Status Protocol
and Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).
                                                                                         (OCSP) to enhance certificate revocation checking. It also pro-
                                                                                         vides guidance on the transition to more secure cryptographic
5.1. Digital signature standards
                                                                                         algorithms and key sizes and best practices for key management,
                                                                                         digital signatures, and other security-related processes. It con-
    Digital signature standards are rules and criteria that specify how
                                                                                         tains a plan to phase out the use of the Triple Data Encryption
digital signatures should be created and verified to guarantee their
                                                                                         Algorithm (TDEA).
security and interoperability. Several organizations and governments
                                                                                       • ANSI X9.30.1 [88] is a standard published by the Accredited
around the world have developed different digital signature standards.
                                                                                         Standards Committee (ASC) X9 of the ANSI. The standard speci-
Some of the commonly used digital signature standards include the
following:                                                                               fies the requirements for financial institutions and payment pro-
                                                                                         cessors to securely exchange Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) data
    • Public Key Cryptography Standard#1 (PKCS#1) is a widely                            over public networks.
      used standard for RSA digital signatures. It defines the syntax and                The purpose of the standard is to ensure and maintain a high
      structure of digital signatures using RSA encryption.                              level of security for EFT transactions. It is widely used in the
    • Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is a US government standard                       financial industry for secure electronic payments and other types
      developed by NIST for DSA. The DSS specifies the requirements                      of financial transactions.

                                                                               12
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 11
Standards for symmetric digital signature and MAC.
    Algorithm                 Standards               Year                      Purpose                                              Recommendations
                                                                                                                    Classical                                 PQ
                                                                                                              (till 2030 & beyond)           (Available)           (Alternatives)
                      NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 1        2015
                      [70]
    CMAC-AES                                                                                                    AES-128,192,256                            AES-256
                      ISO/IEC 15946-5 [71]           2022a
                      ISO/IEC 19790 [72]             2018a                    Symmetric
                      ISO/IEC 24727 [73]             2021a
                      NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 1        2015
    CMAC-3DES         [70]                                                                                                        Disallowed after 2023
                      ISO/IEC 19790[72]              2018a
                      ISO/IEC 24727 [73]             2021a
                      ISO/IEC 29192-6:2019 [74]      2019      IT Lightweight cryptography for MACs
                                                               (Part 6)
    MACb
                      ISO/IEC 9797-3: 2011/Amd       2020      Security techniques for MACs (universal
                      1: 2020                                  hash-function)
                      ISO/IEC 9797-2: 2021 [75]      2021      Info. Security for MACs (dedicated
                                                               hash-function)
                      ISO/IEC 9797-1: 2011 [76]      2022a     Security techniques for MACs (using a
                                                               block cipher)
                      IETF RFC 2202 [77]             1997      Test cases for HMAC-MD5 and                   KS ≥ 128 and HL ≥ 256               KS ≥ 256 and HL ≥ 512
    HMAC                                                       HMAC-SHA-1
                      NIST FIPS 1981 [78]            2008      Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
                                                               Code (HMAC)
                      IETF RFC 6151 [79]             2011      Updated Security Considerations for the
                                                               HMAC-MD5
    cSHAKE,           NIST SP 800-185 [80]           2016      SHA-3 Derived Functions
    KMAC,
    TupleHash,
    and
    ParallelHash
    BLAKE2            IETF RFC 7693 [66]             2015      Provides an explanation of the BLAKE2
                                                               cryptographic hash function and
                                                               Message Authentication Code


    Poly1305          RFC 8439 [41]                  2018      Describes the utilization of the
                                                               Poly1305 authenticator

Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: KS: Key Size and HL: Hash Length.
a Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.

b
    It comprises a set of security and cryptography standards designed explicitly for MACs.


      • ANSI X9.62 [81] is a ANSI standard published by the ASC X9.                                      must be generated using a cryptographic random number
        The standard specifies the requirements for the ECDSA, a crypto-                                 generator. (ii) The key size for the private key should be at
        graphic algorithm for generating digital signatures. ANSI X9.62                                  least 160 bits. (iii) The key size for the public key depends
        defines the mathematical operations used in ECDSA and the                                        on the size of the elliptic curve domain parameters. For
        procedures for generating and verifying digital signatures. The                                  example, if the elliptic curve has a 160-bit prime field, the
        standard also specifies the parameters for elliptic curves that can                              public key should be at least 160 bits. (iv) The security level
        be used with ECDSA and the key generation and management                                         of the ECDSA algorithm is related to the size of the elliptic
        requirements. Overall, ANSI X9.62 provides a comprehensive                                       curve domain parameters. The standard recommends using
                                                                                                         elliptic curves with a security level equivalent to at least 112
        standard for the ECDSA and is widely used in the financial
                                                                                                         bits (the same level of security as a 3072-bit RSA key).
        industry and other applications where secure digital signatures
                                                                                                       – ISO/IEC 9796-3 [84] specifies digital signature schemes
        are required.
                                                                                                         that use a hash function, such as DSA and the RSA digital
      • IEEE 1363 [89] is a standard published by the IEEE for public
                                                                                                         signature algorithm.
        key cryptography. It specifies several digital signature algorithms,
                                                                                                       – ISO/IEC 15946-5 [71] is the latest version of ISO/IEC
        including the DSA and ECDSA.
                                                                                                         15946, a standard specifying digital signature schemes based
      • ISO/IEC JTC1 [90] is significant in developing international                                     on ECC. It defines multiple digital signature schemes that
        standards for digital signatures, ensuring that the algorithms and                               utilize elliptic curve cryptography, such as the ECDSA and
        protocols are secure, interoperable, and usable in a wide range                                  the EdDSA.
        of applications. It has developed several standards related to dig-                            – ISO/IEC 19790:2012 [33] can accommodate various cryp-
        ital signature, including ISO/IEC 14888, ISO/IEC 9796, ISO/IEC                                   tographic algorithms, such as symmetric-key cryptography,
        15946, ISO/IEC 19790, and ISO/IEC 24727.                                                         public-key cryptography, and elliptic curve cryptography.
                                                                                                         It is recommended to use keys with a minimum length
               – ISO/IEC 14888-3 [55] defines the ECDSA digital signature                                of 112 bits for symmetric encryption algorithms like AES
                 algorithm for use with elliptic curve cryptography. The                                 and a minimum of 2048 bits for public key cryptography
                 standard defines the key size requirements for the ECDSA al-                            algorithms such as RSA. This standard was last reviewed and
                 gorithm as follows: (i) The elliptic curve domain parameters                            confirmed in 2018.

                                                                                          13
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                    Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 12
Standards for asymmetric digital signature.
 Algorithm                   Standards                            Year            Purpose/Type                                          Recommendations

                                                                                                                  Classical                                     PQ

                                                                                                            (till 2030 & beyond)               (Available)              (Alternatives)

                             ANSI X9.62 [81]                      2023
 ECDSA                       IEEE 1363 (I) [82]                   2004                                            KS ≥ 256
                             FIPS 186-5 [83]                      2023

                             RFC 8017                             2016
                                                                                                                                                                      PQ Signature
                             ISO/IEC 9796-3 [84]                  2018a
 RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5                                                                 Asymmetric                                                                          (Dilithium
                             ISO/IEC 14888-1 [85]                 2019a                                                                      Not Quantum-
                                                                                                                                                                      3/5,
                             ISO/IEC 15946-5 [71]                 2022a                                                                      Resistant
                                                                                                                                                                      Falcon-1024,
                             RFC5756 [86]                         2010                                           MS ≥ 3072                                            SPHINCS-256)
                             ISO/IEC 24727 [73]                   2021a
 RSASSA-PSS
                             NIST-DSS(FIPS 186-5) [83]            2023
                             RFC 8017 [54]                        2016

                             IEEE 1363 [82]                       2004
 RSA-OAEP
                             RFC5756 [86]                         2010

 Dilithium                                                                                                Dilithium 2/3/5                    Dilithium 3/5            Falcon-1024,
                             NIST [56]                            2022b           Post-Quantum                                                                        SPHINCS-256

 Falcon                                                                                                   Falcon-512/1024                    Falcon-1024              Dilithium 3/5,
                                                                                                                                                                      SPHINCS-256

 SPHINCS+                                                                                                 SPHINCS-128/192/256                SPHINCS-256              Dilithium 3/5,
                                                                                                                                                                      Falcon-1024

(𝐼) Represents Inactive.
Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: KS: Key Size and MS: Modulus Size.
Note: RSASSA-PSS combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the EMSA-PSS encoding method. Similarly, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 combines the RSASP1 and RSAVP1 primitives with the
EMSAPKCS1-v1_5 encoding method.
a Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.

b Algorithms selected for standardization this year. Later in 2024, NIST finalized the first three post-quantum cryptography standards: FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205, which include

Dilithium and SPHINCS+.


             – ISO/IEC 24727-1:2014 It defines a common framework for                          of Symmetric, Hash-Based, Asymmetric, and Post-Quantum algorithms
               Identity Management (IdM) systems. This standard was last                       usable in the digital signature, with their properties, such as stan-
               reviewed and confirmed in 2021. Therefore, this version                         dardization body, last version publication date, type, and our rec-
               remains current.                                                                ommendations in terms of classical and post-quantum based on the
                                                                                               criteria defined in Section 1.4. As presented, asymmetric algorithms
    • FIPS 186 is a US government standard for digital signature al-                           such as RSA, DSA, and ECDSA are not quantum-resistant. In addition,
      gorithms. It specifies the requirements for creating and verifying                       symmetric algorithms will prohibit the use of 3DES after 2023.
      digital signatures using the DSA and the RSA algorithm.
      FIPS 186-4 [91] specifies several key sizes that can be used with                        5.2. Recommendations
      the DSA and the ECDSA. DSA is a widely used algorithm for
      generating digital signatures and is based on the difficulty of
                                                                                                   The different algorithms used in the digital signatures in Table
      solving the discrete logarithm problem. The standard specifies
                                                                                               12 ensure that authenticity and integrity are maintained securely and
      the following key sizes: 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. ECDSA is a
                                                                                               reliably. These algorithms also provide valuable information on the
      newer algorithm based on elliptic curve cryptography. It is known
                                                                                               standards that should be followed and offer recommendations on how
      for its efficiency and smaller key sizes; the standard specifies
                                                                                               they can be used in various applications, such as digital documents,
      the following key sizes: 224, 256, 384, and 521 bits. It will be
                                                                                               messages, and transactions. To ensure the authenticity and integrity of
      withdrawn on February 03, 2024.
                                                                                               the data, users can improve secure and reliable verification methods
      For financial applications, a key size of 3072 bits or higher is
                                                                                               by following the recommended algorithms and standards for digital
      recommended by some security experts. This provides a high level
                                                                                               signatures. Our recommendations for post-quantum algorithms (based
      of security against brute-force attacks and other types of attacks.
                                                                                               on the criteria defined in Section 1.4) are aligned with the NIST stan-
      However, it is important to note that the larger key sizes may also
                                                                                               dardized algorithms. Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ are considered
      impact the performance and scalability of the system.
                                                                                               secure in both classical and post-quantum contexts, with adjustments
      In addition to DSA and ECDSA, FIPS 186-5 [83] specifies several
      other cryptographic algorithms for key generation and encryp-                            to their security levels.
      tion. These include the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of
      hash functions, the AES for symmetric encryption, and the RSA                            6. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for key estab-
      algorithm for key exchange and digital signatures.                                       lishment
    • X.509 [11] is a standard for digital certificates that includes
                                                                                                  Key establishment is a critical aspect of cryptography, enabling
      digital signature specifications. It defines the format and structure
      of digital certificates used to verify the signer’s identity. They                       secure communication between two or more parties. It involves the
      are used to verify the identity of a party in a communication,                           process of generating, exchanging, and managing cryptographic keys.
      authenticate the parties involved, and ensure the confidentiality                        The Key establishment can be broadly categorized into three primary
      and integrity of the communication.                                                      techniques: key exchange, key transport, and post-quantum key encap-
                                                                                               sulation.
    Table 12 lists a comprehensive checklist of standards and speci-                              Key exchange is a method through which two or more parties
fications used for digital signatures. This table illustrates a summary                        can securely establish a shared secret key, which is then used for

                                                                                          14
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                           Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 13
Standards for key establishment algorithms: A comparison of standards and recommendations for key exchange, key transport, and post-quantum key encapsulation.
 Algorithm                 Standards                  Issue year   Purpose/type                                           Recommendations

                                                                                                 Classical                                    PQ

                                                                                          (till 2030 & beyond)            (Available)                  (Alternatives)

                           ANSI-X9.63 [92]            2017
                           ANSI-X9.42 [93]            2013
 DH                                                                Agreement            256, 3072                                                          KEM
                           RFC-2631 [94]              1999
                           NIST SP-800-56A [95]       2018

                           NIST SP-800-56A [95]       2018
                           RFC 7748 [96]              2016                                                         Not
 ECDH                                                              Agreement            256, 3072                                                          KEM
                           RFC 6278 [97]              2011                                                         Quantum-Resistant
                           ISO/IEC 18033-1 [98]       2021

                           ANSI X9.63 (I) [92]        2017
 MQV                       IEEE-P1363 (I) [99]        2000         Agreement            256                                                                KEM
                           NIST SP-800-56A [95]       2018

                           NIST.SP.800-56Br2 [100]    2019
 RSA                                                               Transport            3072                                                               KEM
                           NIST.SP.800-131Ar2 [101]   2019

 Kyber                     NIST-PQC [6,13,56]         2022         Encapsulation        Kyber-                     Kyber-768 (key size:        McEliece(6944,5208,136),
                                                                                        512/768/1024               9472), Kyber-1024           BIKE-192(149),
                                                                                                                   (key size: 12544)           BIKE-256(189),
                                                                                                                                               HQC-256(128)

 McEliece                  NIST-PQC [56]              2022         Encapsulation        McEliece-                  (𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑡) ∶ (6944, 5208,    Kyber-768, Kyber-1024,
                                                                                        128/192/256                136)                        BIKE-192(149),
                                                                                                                                               BIKE-256(189),
                                                                                                                                               HQC-256(128)

 HQC                       NIST-PQC [56]              2022         Encapsulation        HQC-                       HQC-256(128)                Kyber-768, Kyber-1024,
                                                                                        128/192/256                                            BIKE-192(149),
                                                                                                                                               BIKE-256(189),
                                                                                                                                               McEliece(6944,5208,136)

 BIKE                      NIST-PQC [56]              2022         Encapsulation        BIKE-                      BIKE-192(149),              Kyber-768, Kyber-1024,
                                                                                        128/192/256                BIKE-256(189)               McEliece(6944,5208,136),
                                                                                                                                               HQC-256(128)

 SIKE                      NIST-PQC [56]              2022         Encapsulation                                          Not recommended

(𝐼) Represents Inactive.



subsequent encryption and decryption of messages. A popular key                               5. The encapsulated key can then be used for symmetric encryption
exchange algorithm is the Diffie–Hellman (DH) protocol. DH is a public-                          and decryption of messages.
key cryptosystem that allows two users to generate a shared secret key,
even if they are communicating over an insecure channel. The security                       Key establishment is a fundamental aspect of secure communication
of DH relies on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem.               in cryptography. Key exchange, key transport, and post-quantum key
    Key transport refers to the process of securely transmitting a cryp-                encapsulation are three techniques that enable the secure generation,
tographic key from one party to another. This technique often employs                   transmission, and management of cryptographic keys. By understand-
public-key cryptography to protect the key during transmission. In a                    ing these methods and selecting the most suitable approach for a given
typical scenario, the sender encrypts the key with the recipient’s public               scenario, secure communication can be achieved, protecting sensitive
key, and the recipient decrypts it using their private key. The RSA                     information from unauthorized access and ensuring robustness against
cryptosystem is commonly used for key transport.                                        potential quantum computer threats.
    Post-quantum key encapsulation is a technique that employs asym-
metric cryptographic algorithms believed to be resistant to quantum                     6.1. Key establishment standards
computer attacks. Quantum computers have the potential to solve
certain problems much faster than classical computers, which could                          In this section, we will explore several key establishment stan-
potentially break widely used cryptographic schemes such as RSA                         dards, including those developed by ANSI, IETF, NIST, ISO, etc. These
and ECC. Post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) are                           standards provide guidelines for the implementation of secure key
designed to provide key establishment that remains secure even in                       establishment schemes, including symmetric and asymmetric key al-
the presence of quantum computers. One notable post-quantum KEM                         gorithms, key management practices, and protocols for key exchange
is the kyber-based KEM. Kyber is a lattice-based cryptosystem that is                   and transport. Additionally, we will examine the emerging field of
considered to be resistant to quantum attacks. The kyber-based KEM                      post-quantum cryptography and the ongoing efforts to develop key es-
operates as follows:                                                                    tablishment algorithms that can resist attacks from quantum computers.
                                                                                        Table 13 outlines these standards and offers recommendations based on
      1. The recipient generates a public/private key pair based on the                 the criteria defined in Section 1.4.
         kyber algorithm.
      2. The sender generates a random ‘‘encapsulated key’’ and encrypts                      • ANSI X9: In 1985, ANSI released its initial standards related to
         it using the recipient’s public key, creating a ciphertext.                            key management, including ANSI X9.17 [102] and ANSI X9.24
      3. The sender transmits the ciphertext to the recipient.                                  [103]. These standards were designed to address the key manage-
      4. The recipient decrypts the ciphertext using their private key to                       ment issues facing financial institutions. Specifically, ANSI X9.17
         obtain the encapsulated key.                                                           focused on key management between banking establishments,

                                                                                   15
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


      while ANSI X9.24 dealt with key management between retail                       The purpose of this standard is to establish a common foundation
      devices and the financial institutions that managed them, such                  for the development, evaluation, and comparison of encryption
      as point-of-sale devices.                                                       algorithms and protocols, ensuring secure communication and
                                                                                      data protection.
          – ANSI X9.17 [102]: This standard was primarily aimed at                  • NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 [104]: This standard, issued by NIST,
            using single-length DES keys for secure key establishment                 focuses on key establishment schemes using Integer Factorization
            within financial institutions. However, it became apparent                Cryptography (IFC), primarily the RSA algorithm. In the context
            that the protection provided by single-length DES keys did                of key transport, NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 provides guidelines
            not meet the stringent security requirements of these insti-              for secure key-wrapping and unwrapping, ensuring the protection
            tutions (refer to Section 3.1 for an in-depth discussion on               of cryptographic keying material during transmission between
            DES). Consequently, the ANSI X9.17 standard was officially                parties. The standard aims to promote the proper use of crypto-
            withdrawn in 1999.                                                        graphic techniques for key transport in order to maintain secure
          – ANSI X9.24 [103]: Focuses exclusively on symmetric key                    communication and data protection.
            management and standardization techniques that employ                   • NIST SP 800-131 A Rev. 2 [105]: This standard, published by
            symmetric cryptography. Although it does not explicitly                   NIST, provides guidance on the transition from older crypto-
            outline a key management framework, the standard implies                  graphic algorithms and key lengths to more secure ones in order
            one by imposing stringent rules governing the usage and                   to enhance the security of federal information systems. NIST SP
            manipulation of keys.                                                     800-131 A Rev. 2 outlines recommendations for key manage-
                                                                                      ment practices, focusing on the usage of secure cryptographic
    • IETF RFC 2631: This standard, established by the IETF, outlines                 algorithms and key sizes for various applications, including key
      the Diffie–Hellman key agreement method for public key cryptog-                 establishment, digital signatures, and encryption. The standard
      raphy. It enables secure key exchange between parties over an in-               aims to improve the overall security of information systems by
      secure communication channel, without requiring any pre-shared                  promoting the adoption of up-to-date cryptographic techniques
      secrets. By specifying the protocol, message formats, and crypto-               and key management practices.
      graphic calculations, RFC 2631 facilitates secure communication               • NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography [6]: NIST initiated the Post-
      and data protection over the Internet.                                          Quantum Cryptography (PQC) project to address the potential
    • NIST SP 800-56A [95]: This standard, developed by the NIST,                     threats posed by quantum computers to current cryptographic
      provides guidelines for implementing key establishment schemes                  algorithms. The project aims to develop, standardize, and pro-
      using asymmetric key pairs. Covers key agreement and transport                  mote the adoption of new cryptographic algorithms that can
      protocols, specifying requirements for secure key exchange and                  withstand attacks from quantum computers, ensuring long-term
      key derivation functions. The purpose of NIST SP 800-56 A is to                 security for communication and data protection. NIST is in the
      ensure secure communication and data protection by promoting                    process of evaluating and selecting candidate algorithms for key
      the proper use of cryptographic techniques in key establishment                 exchange, digital signatures, and encryption that are resistant to
      processes.                                                                      quantum attacks, with the goal of incorporating them into future
    • RFC 7748: This standard, published by the IETF, specifies two el-               cryptographic standards.
      liptic curves for use in cryptography: Curve25519 and Curve448.
      These curves are designed for key agreement using the Ellip-               6.2. Recommendations
      tic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) protocol. RFC 7748 provides
      detailed information on the mathematical properties, coordinate                Table 13 presents an overview of key establishment algorithms,
      systems, and encoding formats of these curves. The primary goal            including key exchange, key transport, and post-quantum key encap-
      of the standard is to enhance security and performance in crypto-          sulation mechanisms. It provides information on the relevant standards
      graphic applications, such as key exchange and digital signatures,         and offers recommendations based on the criteria defined in Section 1.4
      by promoting the use of these modern elliptic curves.                      for their use in secure communication and data protection applications.
    • IEEE-P1363 (I) [89]: IEEE P1363 is a set of standards devel-                   According to traditional recommendations, all surveyed algorithms
      oped by the IEEE for public-key cryptography. It includes several          generally provide sufficient security, with the exception of SIKE, which
      related standards, each addressing different aspects of public-            has been reported as compromised. In the case of RSA, a key length
      key techniques. The P1363 standard defines methods for key                 of 3072 bits is considered secure. For MQV, a key length of 256 bits
      agreement using public-key cryptography, such as Diffie–Hellman            is recommended. For DH and ECDH, key pair lengths of (256, 3072)
      and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. It also specifies methods for key         are considered robust. Regarding post-quantum algorithms, aside from
      transport based on encryption, with RSA commonly used in these             SIKE, all other analyzed algorithms appear to offer satisfactory security.
      schemes.                                                                       On the other hand, none of the classical algorithms has demon-
    • RFC 6278: This standard outlines the utilization of the static-            strated the ability to effectively resist quantum attacks. Remarkably,
      static ECDH key agreement scheme within the Cryptographic                  not all post-quantum algorithms are equipped to withstand such at-
      Message Syntax. In this approach, both sender and receiver em-             tacks either. This implies that not all versions of these algorithms
      ploy long-term, static Diffie–Hellman values, which are stored in          are quantum-resistant; only those that ensure a 128-bit security level
      certificates. The document provides guidance on implementing               against post-quantum attack, namely: Kyber-768, Kyber-1024, McEliece
      this key agreement method to improve secure communication                  (6944, 5208, 136), HQC-256, BIKE-192, and BIKE-256, have proven to
      between parties.                                                           be resistant.
    • ISO/IEC 18033-1 [98]: This standard, published by the Inter-
      national Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Interna-           7. Hybridization of cryptographic primitives: Standards, recom-
      tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), provides an overview             mendations, and analysis
      of the ISO/IEC 18033 series on encryption algorithms. As the
      first part of the series, ISO/IEC 18033-1 defines general concepts,           Post-quantum hybridization analysis is a rapidly developing area of
      terminology, and security requirements for various cryptographic           research that seeks to create solutions by combining classical and post-
      techniques, including symmetric key algorithms, asymmetric key             quantum algorithms to withstand the threat of quantum computers.
      algorithms, and mechanisms for key exchange and management.                This approach is a promising way to address the challenges posed by

                                                                            16
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                    Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 14                                                                           Table 15
Number of messages stored/sent for storage and network.                            Digital signature performance analysis.
 Operation                       Storage                   Network                  Approach          Algorithm                Storage cost         Network cost
                      PK    Pr     Sign    Cipher   PK     Sign      Cipher         Classical         RSA-15360                9600                 3840
 Signature             2     1       2       0       1      1          0                              Dilithium5               19 238               7187
 Encryption            2     1       0       2       1      0          1            PQ                Falcon-1024              8551                 3123
 Key Exchange          2     2       0       2       2      0          2                              SPHINCS+                 99 968               49 920
                                                                                                      RSA-Dilithium5           28 838               11 027
                                                                                    Hybrid            RSA-Falcon-1024          18 151               6963
                                                                                                      RSA-SPHINCS+             109 568              53 760
quantum computing and plays a critical role in developing effective
hybrid cryptographic solutions. By leveraging the strengths of both
classical and post-quantum mechanisms, we can design robust protocols
that protect sensitive data. As we move toward a post-quantum era,
this analysis remains essential to ensure data security against emerging
quantum threats.                                                                   Table 16
    The post-quantum hybridization analysis aims to evaluate various               Key exchange performance analysis.
combinations of classical and post-quantum cryptographic primitives,                Approach          Algorithm                Storage cost         Network cost
such as hash functions, encryption schemes, and signature schemes, to               Classical         RSA-15360                19 264               7680
identify the most promising combinations that can offer high levels
                                                                                                      McEliece                 4218140              2095090
of security, efficiency, and compatibility with existing systems. Re-
                                                                                    PQ                HQC-256                  101490               43 428
searchers in this field use techniques such as mathematical modeling,                                 Kyber1024                18944                6272
simulation, and experimentation to analyze the complexity of opera-
                                                                                                      RSA-McEliece             4237340              2102770
tions, available resources, and the size of the data to be processed. The
                                                                                    Hybrid            RSA-HQC-256              120690               51108
outcome of post-quantum hybridization analysis is recommendations                                     RSA-Kyber1024            38144                13952
for designing and implementing secure and efficient cryptographic
protocols that are resistant to quantum attacks. These recommendations
are critical for organizations that rely on cryptography to protect
sensitive data, such as healthcare providers, governments, and financial                        • For Hybrid:
institutions.
                                                                                                     – At Sender: 2Pk, 2Pr, Signature
    This section begins by assessing the feasibility of the resulting
                                                                                                     – At Receiver End: 2Pk, Signature;
hybrid cryptographic algorithms in detail. Our analysis covers various
                                                                                                     – Total: 4Pk + 2Pr + 2Signature;
aspects such as signature, encryption, and key exchange. Furthermore,
we thoroughly evaluate the storage and network overhead associated
with hybrid algorithms, examining their computational complexity and
resistance to attacks.                                                               (ii) Encryption Hybrid Cost Computation:

                                                                                                • For Classical or PQ
7.1. Hybridization analysis
                                                                                                     – Receiver: Pk, Pr, Cipher;
    A hybrid system employs at least two algorithms, such as classical                               – Sender: Pk and Cipher;
and post-quantum algorithms. The anticipated storage and network                                     – Total Cost: 2Pk + Pr + 2Cipher;
costs of the hybrid approach are the sum of the respective individual
algorithm approximation costs utilized in the hybrid configuration.                             • For Hybrid:
The analysis provided here delves into the employment of RSA as the                                  – Receiver: 2Pk, 2Pr, Cipher;
classical standard, post-quantum algorithms, and hybrid algorithms (in-                              – Sender: 2Pk and Cipher;
corporating both classical and post-quantum approaches) across three
                                                                                                     – Total Cost: 4Pk + 2Pr + 2Cipher;
key functionalities: digital signatures, encryption, and key exchange.
Our evaluation encompasses all classical and post-quantum algorithms
operating at level V security to ensure a comprehensive performance
assessment and comparison. The primary focus of this comparison lies                 (iii) Key Exchange Cost Computation:
in scrutinizing key storage and network costs, measured in bytes. We                            • Classical Key Exchange Cost:
have excluded the SIKE algorithm as it has been reported to be bro-
ken [106]. The costs associated with these functionalities, as mentioned                             – At User End (for each user): Pk, Pr, Cipher;
in Table 14, are interpreted based on the required number of messages                                – Received from the other user: Pk and Cipher;
as follows:                                                                                          – Final key (256-bit): 32byte;
                                                                                                     – Total Cost: 2Pk + 2Pr + 2Cipher + 2*32
7.1.1. Storage cost
   In terms of storage costs, presented below is a concise overview of
the incurred costs:                                                                             • Post-quantum Key Exchange Cost:
   (i) Digital Signature Cost Computation:                                                           – At User End (for each user): Pk, Pr, Cipher;
                                                                                                     – Received from the other user: Pk, Cipher;
             • For Classical or PQ
                                                                                                     – Final key (256-bit): 32byte;
                    – At Sender End: Pk, Pr, Signature;                                              – Total Cost: 2Pk + 2Pr + 2Cipher +2*32
                    – At Receiver End: Pk, Signature;
                    – Total Cost: 2Pk + Pr + 2Signature;

                                                                              17
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 17                                                                       storage and network costs among the post-quantum candidates. This
Encryption performance analysis.                                               characteristic makes Falcon-1024 the most economically viable option
 Approach            Algorithm             Storage cost    Network cost        within the hybrid approach for RSA-Falcon-1024. As we delve into
 Classical           RSA-15360             9600            3840                encryption and key exchange performance, Tables 16 and 17 exhibit
                     McEliece              2 109 038       1047545             Kyber-1024’s efficiency from a cost perspective. Consequently, a fusion
 PQ                  HQC-256               50 713          21 714              of Kyber-1024 with RSA (RSA-Kyber1024) yields the most favorable
                     Kyber-1024            9440            3136                overall cost result.
                     RSA-McEliece          2 118 638       1051385
 Hybrid              RSA-HQC-256           60 313          25 554
                     RSA-Kyber-1024        19 040          6976                7.3. Standards and recommendations


                                                                                   Table 18 presents several hybrid approaches, some of which have
                                                                               already been standardized or are currently undergoing standardization
                                                                               in draft form. Based on our extensive research, we have identified
             • Hybrid:                                                         several notable hybrid approaches, specifically KEM, encryption, and
                                                                               key exchange. For each standard, we provide information on the year of
                    – At User End (for each user): 2Pk, 2Pr, Cipher;
                                                                               publication or proposal, the intended purpose, any noteworthy aspects,
                    – Received from the other user: 2Pk, Cipher;
                                                                               and recommendations based on the criteria defined in Section 1.4
                    – Final key (256-bit): 32byte;
                                                                               regarding the use of classical and post-quantum algorithms to achieve
                    – Total Hybrid Cost: 4Pk + 4Pr + 2Cipher + 2*32
                                                                               hybridization.



7.1.2. Network cost                                                            8. Worldwide cryptographic standards and security recommenda-
   In terms of network costs, presented below is a concise overview of         tions across countries
the incurred costs:
                                                                                  This section provides an overview of publicly available crypto-
   (i) Digital Signature Cost:
                                                                               graphic standards or guidelines for several countries, including Canada,
             • For Classical or PQ                                             Australia, USA, UK, Japan, and others. These standards and guidelines
                                                                               are designed to enhance the security of cryptographic systems and
                    – Sender Transmits: Pk, Signature;                         mitigate potential threats.
                    – Total Cost: Pk + Signature

             • Total Hybrid Cost: 2Pk + 2Signature
                                                                               8.1. Recommendations
   (ii) Encryption Cost:

             • For Classical or PQ                                                We have compiled country-specific recommendations from official
                                                                               sources, such as government or standards websites, in Table 19. These
                    – Sender Transmits: Pk, Cipher;                            recommendations are categorized according to different algorithm
                    – Total Cost: Pk + Cipher                                  types, including Hash and MAC, Symmetric Encryption, Asymmetric
                                                                               Encryption, Digital Signature, and Key Establishment.
             • Total Hybrid Cost: 2Pk + 2Cipher
                                                                                   We examined various cryptographic standards and offered potential
  (iii) Key Exchange Cost:                                                     classical and post-quantum recommendations to protect against poten-
                                                                               tial threats. Referring to our suggested recommendations, the entries
             • Classical Key Exchange:
                                                                               highlighted in bold in Table 19 indicate algorithms that, according
                    – Sender Transmits Pk, Cipher;                             to our analysis, are deemed inappropriate. Furthermore, in Table 22,
                    – Total Cost: Pk + Cipher                                  we present our assessment of the security strengths of established
                                                                               cryptographic algorithms. The table reflects our analysis of whether
             • Post-quantum Key Exchange:                                      these algorithms are currently classically secure, projected to remain so
                    – Sender Transmits: Pk, Cipher;                            beyond 2030, or are quantum-resistant, based on the criteria defined
                    – Total Cost: Pk + Cipher                                  in Section 1.4. It also provides alternative recommendations for the
                                                                               quantum era derived from our evaluation.


             • Hybrid:                                                         9. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for light-weight
                    – Sender Transmits: 2Pk + 2Cipher                          cryptography
                    – Total Cost: 2Pk + 2Cipher
                                                                                   Since 2015, NIST has led the effort to standardize lightweight
                                                                               cryptography that is suitable for resource-constrained environments
7.2. Findings                                                                  such as IoT devices and embedded systems. The aim was to iden-
                                                                               tify Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes
   In analyzing the performance of the digital signature presented             and optional hashing capabilities that share common components to
in Table 15, Falcon-1024 emerges as the optimal choice in terms of             minimize implementation size and complexity.

                                                                          18
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 18
IETF RFCs/Drafts on hybrid approaches.
 Algo-            RFC/Draft                                Year           Purpose                                       Note                                              Recommendations
 rithm

 KEM              draft-ounsworth-cfrg-kem-                2023           Defines combiner function for Hybrid          Expired in September 2023
                  combiners-03 [107]                                      KEMs

                  9180 [108]                               2022           Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)           HPKE applies to various combinations              ∙ Any classical algorithm
                                                                                                                        of asymmetric KEM, KDF, and AEAD                  should provide at least a
 Encryption                                                                                                             encryption functions                              128-bit security level, such
                                                                                                                                                                          as RSA-3072, ECC-256, etc.
                  draft-westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-              2023           Defines X25519Kyber768Draft00, a              Expired in October 2023
                                                                                                                                                                          ∙ Only NIST’s KEM PQC that
                  xyber768d00-02 [109]                                    hybrid PQ KEM, for HPKE (RFC9180)
                                                                                                                                                                          provides 128 security bits
                  draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-04 [110]          2022           Deterministic Nonce-less Hybrid Public        Expired in August 2024                            should be used
                                                                          Key Encryption

                  draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-          2023           Defines PQ hybrid KE methods                  These methods are formulated for
                  ke-01 [111]                                                                                           application within the context of
 Key Exch.                                                                                                              SSH/TLS

                  draft-tls-westerbaan-                    2023           Defines X25519Kyber768Draft00-03,             Expired in March 2024
                  xyber768d00-03 [112]                                    a hybrid PQ KE for TLS 1.3

                  draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-10          2023           Hybrid key exchange within the                Expired in October 2024
                  [113]                                                   context of the TLS 1.3



Table 19
Country-wise recommendation.
 Algorithm                           Canada              Australia           USA-NIST            USA-NSA                 Japan (till next rev)        UK                     ECRYPT-CSA

                      Hash           SHA-2/SHA-3≥        SHA-2≥ 224          SHA-2/SHA-          SHA-384 or SHA-512      SHA-1;                       SHA-256                SHA-2/SHA-3≥ 224
                                     224                                     3≥224                                       SHA-2≥ 224;                                         (256 beyond 2030)
 HASH and
                                     (256 beyond                             (256 beyond                                 SHA-3≥ 256;
 MAC
                                     2030)                                   2030)                                       SHAKE128, SHAKE256

                      MAC            KS ≥ 128                   —            KS ≥ 128                         —          KS ≥ 128                               —                       —

                      Algorithm      AES≥ 128            AES≥ 128;           AES≥ 128            AES-256                 AES≥128;                               —            AES/Camellia/Serpent
                                                         TDES(using 3                                                    Camellia≥128                                        ≥ 128
                                                         Distinct Keys
                                                         (3DES));
                                                         (must not use
                                                         ECB mode)
 Symmetric
 Encryption           Mode           ECB (not            ECB (Must not       ECB (not                         —          ECB (not allowed after       ECB (not allowed       OFB, CFB, CTR, CBC,
                                     allowed after       use), CBC,          allowed after                               2023), CBC, CTR, CFB,        after 2023), CBC,      ECB (No. acceptable),
                                     2023), CBC,         CTR, OFB, CFB       2023), CBC,                                 OFB, XTS, GCM,               CTR, CFB, OFB,         XTS, EME, FFX, CCM,
                                     CTR, CFB,                               CTR, CFB,                                   CMAC, CBC-MAC, CCM           XTS, GCM               CWC, GCM, OCB, EAX,
                                     OFB, XTS,                               OFB, XTS,                                                                                       GCM,
                                     GCM, CMAC,                              GCM, CMAC,                                                                                      ChaCha20+Poly1305
                                     CBC-MAC, CCM                            CBC-MAC, CCM

                                      RSA/DSA                                FFC(DSA,                         —          RSA-OAEP (≥2048),                      —
 Asymmetric Encryption               ≥2048                                   DH,MQV):                                    ECC (key sizes 256,
                                     (3072 beyond                            K_pu≥2048                                   384 or 521)
                                     2030);                                  (3072
                                                                                                 XMSS;                   DSA p≥2048, q≥224;           RSA 2048;
                                     ECDSA ≥224                              beyond2030),
                                                                                                 LMS (SHA-256/192);      ECSDA ≥224;                  ECDSA-256 P-256
                                     (256 beyond                             K_pr≥224                                                                                        RSA/DSA≥3072, ECC ≥ 224
                                                                                                 CRYSTALS-Dilithium      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5/           Curve
                                     2030)                                   (256
 Digital Signatures                                      DH ≥1024;                               (Level V);              RSASSA-PSS≥2048;
                                                                             beyond2030);
                                                         RSA/DSA                                 ECDSA (Curve P-384);
                                                                             IFC(RSA) ≥
                                                         ≥2048;                                  RSA≥3072
                                                                             2048
                                     FFC/DH/MQV          ECDSA/ECDH                              ECDH (Curve P-384);     DH/MQV                                 —
                                                                             (3072
                                     ≥ 2048              ≥160                                    DH ≥ 3072;              p≥2048, q≥224;
                                                                             beyond2030);
                                     (3072 beyond                            ECC(ECDSA,          RSA≥3072;               ECDH/ECMQV ≥224
                                     2030);                                  EdDSA,              CRYSTALS-Kyber(Level
 Key Establishment
                                     ECC-CDH or                              DH,MQV):            V)
                                     ECC-MQV ≥                               f ≥ 224
                                     224                                     (256
                                     (256 beyond                             beyond2030);
                                     2030)

Note: p is the prime modulus and q is the prime divisor, f is the range, and ‘‘–’’ means not available/mentioned.
Abbreviations are defined as follows: LMS: Leighton–Micali Signature, MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone, FFC: Finite Field Cryptography, PSS: Probabilistic Signature Scheme, XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature
Scheme, MS: Modulus Size, KS: Key Size, HL: Hash Length.



9.1. Lightweight AEAD standards and recommendations                                                      Romulus, SPARKLE, TinyJAMBU, and Xoodyak. These schemes were
                                                                                                         chosen to proceed to the final round of the selection process, which
  During March 2021, NIST revealed a list of 10 finalists, including                                     is shown in Table 20. In February 2023, NIST announced its deci-
ASCON, Elephant, GIFT-COFB, Grain-128AEAD, ISAP, PHOTON-Beetle,                                          sion to standardize the ASCON family for lightweight cryptography

                                                                                                   19
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                 Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114



Table 20
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) standardized algorithms.
 Algorithm           Standards Year              Purpose (building block)                                       Recommendations
                                                                                              Classical                              PQ
                                                                                        (till 2030 & beyond)       (Available)              (Alternatives)

 Ascon [116]                          A permutation-based scheme that uses the        Ascon-128,                       –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
                                      monkeyDuplex construction                       Ascon-128a,                                    TinyJAMBU-256
                                                                                      Ascon-80pq
                                      A permutation-based scheme that follows a        Jumbo (127),                    –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 Elephant [118]      NIST [117] 2023 nonce-based encrypt-then-MAC construction        Delirium (127)                                 TinyJAMBU-256
                                      A block-cipher based where the underlying        GIFT-COFB(128)                  –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 GIFT-COFB [119]                      block cipher is GIFT-128 and the mode is                                                       TinyJAMBU-256
                                      Combined Feedback
                                      A stream cipher optimized for hardware           Grain-128AEAD                   –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 Grain [120]                          implementations                                                                                TinyJAMBU-256
                                       A permutation-based with a nonce-based         ISAP-A-128a,                     –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 ISAP [121]                           encrypt-then-MAC construction mode              ISAP-K-128a,                                   TinyJAMBU-256
                                                                                      ISAP-A-128,
                                                                                      ISAP-K-128
                                       A permutation-based approach with a             PHOTON-Beetle-                  –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 PHOTON [122]                         combined feedback mode                          AEAD                                           TinyJAMBU-256
                                       A scheme that is based on the tweakable         Romulus-N,                      –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 Romulus [123]                        block cipher Skinny with MAC-then-Encrypt       Romulus-M                                      TinyJAMBU-256
                                      mode
                                      SPARKLE permutations-based operations that SCHWAEMM192–                  SCHWAEMM256-256 TinyJAMBU-256
 SPARKLE [124]                        apply multiple distinct instances of Alzette – 192(184),
                                      a four-round 64-bit block cipher               SCHWAEMM256-
                                                                                     256(248)
 TinyJAMBU [125]                      A keyed permutation that is based on a           TinyJAMBU-192,          TinyJAMBU-256         SCHWAEMM256-256
                                      128-bit nonlinear feedback shift register       TinyJAMBU-256
                                      Built from a fixed 384-bit permutation          Xoodyak-128                      –             SCHWAEMM256-256,
 Xoodyak [126]                        (called Xoodoo) operated in Cyclist mode                                                       TinyJAMBU-256




applications. On June 20, 2023, NIST’s report provides a public record                • High PQ margin (targeting ≥100–128-bit PQ): choose SPARKLE/
of the final round of the standardization process and explains the                      Schwaemm256-256 or TinyJAMBU-256. Independent work esti-
evaluation of the finalists that were chosen for standardization [114].                 mates Grover-attack resources for Schwaemm and finds no short-
The finalized standard, NIST SP 800-232, was released in August 2025                    cut beyond the square-root speed-up; NIST also points to these
and specifies Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, and                           larger-key options for PQ-sensitive deployments [114,130].
Ascon-CXOF128 [115].
                                                                                       Note. NIST remarks that the standardized ASCON variants do not
                                                                                   include a 256-bit key option. If approximately 128-bit post-quantum
9.1.1. Recommendations                                                             security (symmetric-only) is required, a 256-bit candidate such as
    In the quantum setting, Grover’s algorithm roughly halves the ef-              AES-GCM-256 should be used [114].
fective security of symmetric keys. Thus, a 128-bit key provides only
about 264 quantum security. Larger keys (or hash output) are required              9.2. Lightweight hash standards and recommendations
to restore the margin. NIST’s LWC status report [114] and the final
standard [115] both highlight these post-quantum considerations and                    Table 21 shows the standard lightweight hash algorithms that have
                                                                                   been recognized as standards by NIST. Five algorithms have the ability
note which finalists or standardized variants offered > 128-bit options.
                                                                                   to be used as hash functions in addition to their normal functionality
    • Default for ultra-constrained IoT (≈ 64-bit PQ): Ascon-AEAD                  as (AEAD) algorithms.
      128/128a, as standardized in SP 800-232 [115], remains the
                                                                                   9.2.1. Recommendations
      recommended baseline choice. Other 128-bit key finalists with-
                                                                                       Every lightweight hash standard algorithm presented in Table 21
      out known quantum-specific weaknesses (e.g. GIFT-COFB, Grain-
                                                                                   provides at least one version that guarantees adequate security for 2030
      128AEAD, ISAP, PHOTON-Beetle, Romulus, Xoodyak) also achieve                 and beyond. However, according to our research, none of these hash
      similar PQ levels. Public analyses and NIST reviews indicate                 algorithms appears to offer security against quantum attacks.
      only generic Grover-type impacts or preimage bounds; no faster                   Table 21 lists the standardized lightweight hash functions (some
      quantum attacks are known for these schemes [114,127,128].                   finalists also offer hash/XOF modes). NIST’s final-round report for
    • Small PQ bump with minimal overhead: ASCON-80pq (160-bit                     the LWC process summarizes published quantum preimage resource
      key) was added by the designers specifically to increase resistance          estimates for ASCON-Hash, PHOTON-Beetle-Hash, and Xoodyak-Hash;
      to quantum key search, while keeping the same design philosophy              independent studies provide similar estimates for SPARKLE/Esch [131,
      as ASCON-128 [129].                                                          132]. These results support the standard guidance:

                                                                              20
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                       Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 21
Lightweight hash functions standardized algorithms.
 Algorithm          Standards    Year          Purpose (Building Block)                                              Recommendations
                                                                                                    Classical                                     PQ
                                                                                              (till 2030 & beyond)                (Available)          (Alternatives)
 Ascon [116]                             A permutation-based approach that           ASCON-Hash-256, ASCON-Hasha-256                               –
                                         uses the monkeyDuplex construction
 PHOTON-            NIST [117]   2023    A permutation-based is based on a           PHOTON-Beetle-Hash-256                                        –
 Beetle-hash                             sponge structure
 [122]
 Romulus                                 A permutation-based with a                  Romulus-H-256                                                 –
 [123]                                   combined feedback mode
 SPARKLE                                 SPARKLE permutations-based that             ESCH256-256, ESCH384-384                                      –
 [124]                                   apply multiple distinct instances of
                                         Alzette – a 4-round 64-bit block
                                         cipher
 Xoodyak                                 Built from a fixed 384-bit                   Xoodyak-256                                                  –
 [126]                                   permutation (called Xoodoo)
                                         operated in Cyclist mode


    • For preimage security at approximately 128-bit strength against                collection of authentication protocols centered on digital signatures,
      quantum adversaries, select a 256-bit output (e.g., Ascon-Hash-                although these are a subset of those defined in ISO/IEC 9798-3.
      256, PHOTON-Beetle-Hash-256, Esch-256, Xoodyak-Hash-256/                           Internet RFC 4120 specifies Version 5 of the Kerberos network
      XOF) [131,132].                                                                authentication protocol, which is based on symmetric cryptography.
    • If collision resistance near 128-bit quantum strength is required,             Another protocol, named S/KEY, tailored for user authentication to
      use a 384-bit output (e.g., ESCH-384), since collisions admit an               remote servers is detailed in RFC 1760 [144]. This protocol relies on
      𝑂(2𝑛∕3 ) quantum attack [133,134].                                             a cryptographic hash function. In addition, RFC 1507 [142] introduces
                                                                                     an authentication protocol (DASS) that uses digital signatures. It should
   In short, these lightweight hashes remain quantum-resistant up to the             be noted that specific authentication requisites for the Internet context
generic bounds. Choose the output length to meet your target quantum                 are discussed in RFC 1704 [143].
security level.                                                                          Multiple cryptographic mechanisms are available to ensure the
                                                                                     integrity and origin authentication of individual protocol messages. We
10. Cryptographic standards and recommendations for authenti-                        examine five primary options, forming the foundation of the mecha-
cation                                                                               nisms standardized within ISO/IEC 9798.

10.1. Entity-based: Authentication standards                                             • Symmetric encryption
                                                                                         • Use of a MAC function
    We reviewed standards for authentication mechanisms as detailed                      • Use of a digital signature
in Table 23, listing recommendations for each standard based on its                      • Use of asymmetric encryption
cryptographic support. The International Organization for Standard-                      • Use of other asymmetric cryptographic techniques
ization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
have collaboratively introduced a multipart standard known as ISO/IEC                10.1.1. Recommendations
9798. This standard outlines a collection of authentication mechanisms                  Table 23 presents a comprehensive list of authentication standards
designed for general-purpose applications. The series currently consists             and specifications. It includes recommendations for each standard
of six sections, each addressing specific aspects as follows:                        based on their cryptographic support, which are crucial for ensuring
                                                                                     the security of various authentication applications, such as web se-
    • ISO/IEC 9798-1: serves as a foundational component, providing                  curity, online banking, and secure remote access. Implementing these
      definitions for key terms and notation. It also presents a basic               recommended standards and algorithms allows users to strengthen their
      model of an authentication mechanism.                                          cryptographic systems and protect themselves against potential future
    • ISO/IEC 9798-2: details mechanisms that rely on symmetric                      threats.
      encryption for their operation.
    • ISO/IEC 9798-3: outlines mechanisms centered on the utilization                10.2. Certificate-based: Public key infrastructure
      of digital signatures.
    • ISO/IEC 9798-4: specifies mechanisms that make use of MACs.                       The primary emphasis of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) re-
    • ISO/IEC 9798-5: focuses on a variety of zero-knowledge tech-                   volves around producing, disseminating, and continually administering
      niques.                                                                        public key certificates. These certificates encompass a set of data ele-
    • ISO/IEC 9798-6: involving manual data transfer mechanisms.                     ments that comprise a public key, multiple identifiers linked to the key
                                                                                     holder, and additional information (such as an expiration date). All of
    The protocols outlined in ISO/IEC 9798 have been designed with                   these components are subjected to digital signing by the Trusted Third
versatility to cater to various application domains, aiming to achieve               Party (TTP), recognized as a Certificate Authority (CA). This digital
maximum robustness.                                                                  signature ensures the cohesive association of the diverse elements
    Additional organizations, namely ITU-T, NIST, and the IETF, have                 within the certificate.
also introduced standards for entity authentication. For instance, ITU-                 A PKI can consist of diverse components that vary based on the
T X.509, recognized for its specifications related to public key and                 technology and organizational framework employed to distribute and
attribute certificates, encompasses three authentication protocols that              ensure the accuracy of public keys.
rely on digital signatures. Similarly, NIST FIPS Pub. 196 presents a                    This encompasses a variety of entity types, comprising:

                                                                                21
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 22
Security Strength Assessment of Cryptographic Algorithms: classical security and post-quantum readiness.
 Type               Algorithm         Variant                     Security     Classically       Classically       Quantum            Quantum Era
                                                                  Level        Secure            Secure            Resistance         (Alternatives)
                                                                               (Current)         (till 2030 &
                                                                                                 beyond)

                                      AES-128                     128          Yes               Yes               No
                    AES                                                                                                               Camellia-256
                                      AES-192                     192          Yes               Yes               No
 Symmetric                            AES-256                     256          Yes               Yes               Yes
 Block
                    DES
 cipher                                                                      Deprecated                                               AES-256, Camellia-256
                    Triple DES

                                      Camellia-128                128          Yes               Yes               No
                    Camellia                                                                                                          Camellia-256
                                      Camellia-192                192          Yes               Yes               No

                                      Camellia-256                256          Yes               Yes               Yes

                    RC4                                                      Deprecated

                    Grain             Grain-128                   128          Yes               Yes               No
                                                                                                                                      AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
 Symmetric          Trivium           Trivium-80                  80           No                No                No
 Stream             Rabbit            Rabbit-128                  128          Yes               Yes               No
 Cipher
                    Enocoro           Enocoro-128                 128          Yes               Yes               No

                                      AES-CTR/OFB/CFB-128         128          Yes               Yes               No
                    AES-CTR/OFB/CFB                                                                                                   AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)
                                      AES-CTR/OFB/CFB-192         192          Yes               Yes               No

                                      AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)       256          Yes               Yes               Yes

                    ChaCha            ChaCha20                    256          Yes               Yes               No                 AES-CTR/OFB/CFB (256)

                                      RSA-2048                    112                            No

                    RSA               RSA-3072                    128          Yes                                 No
                                                                                                 Yes
                                      RSA-7680                    192
 Asymmetric                           RSA-15360                   256                                                                  NIST PQ

                                      ECC-224                     112                            No

                    ECC               ECC-256                     128          Yes                                 No
                                                                                                 Yes
                                      ECC-384                     192

                                      ECC-512                     256

                    SM2               SM2-256                     256          Yes               Yes               No

                    SHA-1                                                    Deprecated                                               SHA/SHA3-512, SHAKE-256

                                      SHA-224                     112          Yes               No
                                                                                                                   No
                    SHA-2             SHA-256                     128          Yes               Yes                                  SHA3-512, SHAKE-256
                                      SHA-384                     192          Yes               Yes

 HASH                                 SHA-512                     256          Yes               Yes               Yes

                                      SHA-224                     112          Yes               No
                                                                                                                   No
                    SHA-3             SHA-256                     128          Yes               Yes                                  SHA-512, SHAKE-256
                                      SHA-384                     192          Yes               Yes

                                      SHA-512                     256          Yes               Yes               Yes

                                      SHAKE-128                   128          Yes               Yes               No
                    SHAKE                                                                                                             SHA/SHA3-512
                                      SHAKE-256                   256          Yes               Yes               Yes

                    SM3               SM3-256                     256          Yes               Yes               No                 SHA/SHA3-512, SHAKE-256

                                                                                                                                           (continued on next page)


    • CAs: are accountable for producing public key certificates follow-              Usually, each certificate is assigned a distinctive serial number. Con-
      ing a specified certification practice statement. These certificates         sequently, the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) only has to encompass
      can be interpretable within the framework of a defined certificate           the serial numbers of certificates that have been revoked.
      policy.
    • Registration Authorities (RAs): fulfill the role of authenticating           10.2.1. Recommendations
                                                                                       Public key cryptography standards and specifications play a cru-
      the identities of individuals who seek to obtain a certificate from
                                                                                   cial role in ensuring the security of communications and data protec-
      a CA
                                                                                   tion. Tables 24 and 25 list these standards, providing classical and
    • Certificate Repositories: are entities that securely store and               post-quantum recommendations for each standard based on the types
      provide access to public key certificates.                                   of cryptography it supports. These PKI standards and specifications
    • Certificate Status Servers: are entities that, upon request, pro-            are vital to establishing secure and trusted communication channels.
      vide online information about the current validity status of a               They provide a framework for secure key exchange, digital signa-
      certificate.                                                                 tures, and encryption. By adhering to these recommended standards

                                                                              22
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 22 (continued).
 Type               Algorithm    Variant               Security    Classically          Classically                     Quantum          Quantum Era
                                                       Level       Secure               Secure                          Resistance       (Alternatives)
                                                                   (Current)            (till 2030 &
                                                                                        beyond)

                                 SHA-1                                                Deprecated
                    HMAC                                                                                                                 CMAC, GMAC, BLAKE2-512
                                 SHA-2                       Similar to the SHA-2 algorithm assessment listed above

                                 SHA-3                       Similar to the SHA-3 algorithm assessment listed above

                    CMAC                                                                                                                 HMAC, GMAC, BLAKE2-512
 MAC                                                                             AES
                    GMAC                                                                                                                 HMAC, CMAC, BLAKE2-512

                    Poly1305     Poly1305-128          128         Yes                                        No
                                                                                                                                         HMAC, CMAC, GMAC,
                                 UMAC-64               64                                              No                                BLAKE2-512
                    UMAC
                                 UMAC-128              128         Yes                  Yes                             No

                                 BLAKE2-256            128         Yes                  Yes                             No
                    BLAKE2                                                                                                               HMAC, CMAC, GMAC
                                 BLAKE2-512            256         Yes                  Yes                             Yes

                    ECDSA                             Similar to the ECC algorithm assessment listed above
 Asymmetric
                    RSAES-PKCS                        Similar to the RSA algorithm assessment listed above                               NIST PQ
 Signature
                    RSASSA-PSS
                    RSA-OAEP

                                 Kyber-512             128                                                              No               McEliece-192/256
                    Kyber                                          Yes                  Yes                                              HQC-256
                                 Kyber-768             192
                                                                                                                        Yes              BIKE-192/256
                                 Kyber-1024            256

                                 McEliece-128          128                                                              No               Kyber-768/1024
                    McEliece                                       Yes                  Yes                                              HQC-256
 PQ KEM                          McEliece-192          192
                                                                                                                        Yes              BIKE-192/256
                                 McEliece-256          256

                                 HQC-128               128                                                              No               Kyber-768/1024
                    HQC                                            Yes                  Yes                                              McEliece-192/256
                                 HQC-192               192
                                                                                                                        Yes              BIKE-192/256
                                 HQC-256               256

                                 BIKE-128              128                                                              No               Kyber-768/1024
                    BIKE                                           Yes                  Yes                                              McEliece-192/256
                                 BIKE-192              192
                                                                                                                        Yes              HQC-256
                                 BIKE-256              256

                                 Dilithium-2           128                                                              No
                                                                                                                                         Falcon-1024
                    Dilithium                                      Yes                  Yes
                                 Dilithium-3           192                                                                               SPHINICS-192/256
                                                                                                                        Yes
 PQ                              Dilithium-5           256
 Signature                       Falcon-512            256                                                              No               Dilithium-3/5
                    Falcon                                         Yes                  Yes
                                                                                                                                         SPHINICS-192/256
                                 Falcon-1024           512                                                              Yes

                                 SPHINCS+-128          128                                                              No
                                                                                                                                         Dilithium-3/5
                    SPHINCS+                                       Yes                  Yes
                                 SPHINCS+-192          192                                                                               Falcon-1024
                                                                                                                        Yes
                                 SPHINCS+-256          256

                    DH                                Similar to the RSA algorithm assessment listed above
 Key
                                                                                                                                         PQC
 Establishment      ECDH                              Similar to the ECC algorithm assessment listed above

                    MQV                               Similar to the RSA algorithm assessment listed above




and algorithms, organizations can achieve the following benefits and                  standards. Table 26 provides a comprehensive overview of these stan-
advantages: robust security, confidentiality, authentication, integrity,              dards, listing both classical and post-quantum recommendations for
non-repudiation, and interoperability. In summary, adhering to the                    each standard based on its cryptographic support. Through a thorough
recommended PKI standards and algorithms ensures the security and                     examination of the security aspects of these standards, we provide rec-
reliability of the communication channels. By implementing PKI, or-                   ommendations to enhance the effectiveness of Kerberos. The protocol
ganizations can protect sensitive information, establish trust among                  utilizes symmetric key cryptography to establish strong authentica-
parties, and mitigate the risks associated with unauthorized access,                  tion mechanisms, encryption algorithms to protect data integrity, and
tampering, and denial of involvement.                                                 secure key distribution techniques for session key establishment. In
                                                                                      general, Kerberos relies on robust cryptographic standards to secure
10.3. Standards and recommendations for authentication protocols                      communication channels and prevent unauthorized access in untrusted
                                                                                      environments.
10.3.1. Kerberos standards and recommendations
    The Kerberos protocol is widely used to authenticate service re-                  10.3.2. DNSSEC standards and recommendations
quests between trusted hosts over untrusted networks, such as the                        The DNSSEC protocol protects Internet users and applications from
Internet. Ensure secure communication by employing cryptographic                      forged DNS data by utilizing public key cryptography to electronically

                                                                                 23
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 23
Standards for authentication mechanisms.
 Objective          Standard                   Year                 Purpose                                  Note                                        Recommendations

                                                                                                                                       Classical     (till 2030 & beyond)     PQ

                    ISO/IEC 9798-1 [135]       2021a                                     ∙ Defines an authentication model along     ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                                                         with overarching prerequisites and          ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                         limitations                                 ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                         ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithm
                                                                                         Asymmetric encryption and signatures
                                                                                         Symmetric encryption
                                                                                         Hash algorithms

                    ISO/IEC 9798-2 [136]       2019                                      ∙ Approaches utilizing authenticated        ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                        Security approaches for entity   encryption
 Authentication                                         authentication                   ∙ Support: Symmetric encryption

                    ISO/IEC 9798-3 [137]       2019                                      ∙ Procedures utilizing digital signature    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                         methods
                                                                                         ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature

                    ISO/IEC 9798-4 [138]       2021a                                     ∙ Approaches incorporating cryptographic    ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC algorithm
                                                                                         check function
                                                                                         ∙ Support: MAC algorithm

                    ISO/IEC 9798-5 [139]       2018a                                     ∙ Incorporation of zero-knowledge           ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                                                         procedures                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithm
                                                                                         ∙ Support:
                                                                                         Asymmetric encryption
                                                                                         Hash algorithms

                    ISO/IEC 9798-6 [140]       2021a                                     ∙ Procedures employing manual data          ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                         transfer                                    MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                         ∙ Support: Hash and MAC functions

                    NIST FIPS Pub. 196 [141]   1997     Entity Authentication Using      ∙ Withdrawn on October 2015                 ∙ Inactivated
                                                        Public Key Cryptography

                    IETF RFC 1507 [142]        1993     DASS - Distributed              ∙ Based on the use of digital signatures  ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                                        Authentication Security Service ∙ Support:                                encryption and signature, respectively
                                                                                        Asymmetric encryption and signature (RSA) ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                         Symmetric encryption (DES)                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithm
                                                                                         Hash function (MD2)

                    IETF RFC 1704 [143]        1994     Internet Authentication          ∙ Provide guidance for selecting suitable   ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                                                         authentication technologies based on        ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                         specific use cases, accessibility, and      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                         network connectivity                        ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithm
                                                                                         ∙ Support:
                                                                                         Asymmetric encryption (RSA) and
                                                                                         signatures (RSA/DH)
                                                                                         Symmetric encryption (DES)
                                                                                         Hash function (MD5)

                    IETF RFC 1760 [144]        1995     S/KEY: One-Time Password         ∙ Tailored for secure user authentication   ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithm
                                                        System for authentication        with remote servers
                                                                                         ∙ Support: Hash functions (MD4)

                    IETF RFC 4120 [145]        2005     Kerberos Network                 ∙ Furnishes an outline and specifications ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                        Authentication Service (V5)      for version 5, along with a comprehensive ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and MAC
                                                                                         protocol description                        recommendations, respectively
                                                                                         ∙ Support:
                                                                                         Symmetric encryption (DES-CBC,
                                                                                         AES-CTS-128/256)
                                                                                         Hash (MD5, SHA-1) and MAC (HMAC)
                                                                                         functions

a Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.



sign authoritative zone data upon entry into the DNS and subse-                               process mitigates the risk of DNS cache poisoning and man-in-the-
quently verify these data upon reaching its intended endpoint. Table                          middle attacks, preserving the accuracy and reliability of Internet traffic
27 provides a comprehensive overview of the cryptographic standards                           routing. Table 27 provides a comprehensive resource for understanding
used in the DNSSEC protocol, listing both classical and post-quantum                          and selecting suitable DNSSEC cryptographic standards based on their
recommendations based on the cryptographic support of each stan-                              intended purpose and cryptographic support.
dard. We thoroughly analyze the security aspects of these standards                               Our analysis delves into the security aspects of DNSSEC crypto-
and offer relevant recommendations to enhance their implementa-                               graphic standards, which are mentioned in the notes column of the
tion.                                                                                         corresponding table. For example, this standard supports digital signa-
   The purpose of DNSSEC is to ensure the integrity and authenticity                          tures and hash functions. Due to the use of specific cryptography, there
of DNS data. Digitally signing authoritative zone data prevents tamper-                       is a chance that some algorithms are outdated or vulnerable. In this
ing and unauthorized modifications during transit. This authentication                        way, we identify potential vulnerabilities and suggest corresponding

                                                                                         24
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 24
PKI standardization bodies and standards.
 Objective              Standards             Year                          Purpose                                           Note                                                Recommendations

                                                                                                                                                            Classical    (till 2030 & beyond)             PQ

                        ISO/IEC 9594-8        2020b     Framework for public-Key and attribute        ∙ Defines frameworks for PKI and PMI                ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signature
                        [146] (ITU-T X.509)             certificates                                  ∙ Also defines directory schema information         ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                                      allowing PKI and PMI-related data to be stored in   ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and MAC
                                                                                                      a directory                                         recommendations, respectively
                                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                                      Asymmetric digital signatures (i.e., RSA, DSA,
                                                                                                      ECDSA)
                                                                                                      Symmetric encryption (AES-128/192/256)
                                                                                                      Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3,
                                                                                                      HMAC)

                        ISO/IEC 15945 [147]   2018a     Certificate management (security              ∙ ISO/IEC 15945 [147] has additionally been         ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signature

 Specifications                                         techniques for defining TTP services that     embraced in the capacity of an ITU-T                ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                        facilitate the implementation of digital      Recommendation, designated as X.843
                                                        signatures)                                   ∙ Support:
                                                                                                      Asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                                      Hash functions

                        ISO 21188 [148]       2018      Establishing a policy framework and           ∙ It revised the ISO 15782-1 & 15782-2              ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric key
                                                        practices for PKI in the financial services   ∙ Support:                                          exchange and digital signature
                                                        sector                                        Asymmetric key exchange and digital signature       ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                                      Symmetric encryption                                ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                                                                                                      MAC function

                        ANSI X9.62 [149]      1998      PKC with ECDSA For The Financial              ∙ Defines a technique for generating and            ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                        Services Industry                             validating digital signatures                       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                                      Asymmetric digital signature (ECDSA)
                                                                                                      Hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-2)

                        ANSI X9.63 [150]      2001      Utilizing ECC in PKC for the Financial        ∙ Defines Key Agreement and key transport           ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                                        Services Sector: Facilitating Secure Key      mechanism                                           cryptography
                                                        Agreements and Key Transports                 ∙ Support:                                          ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and MAC
                                                                                                      Asymmetric key agreement/transport (using ECC)      recommendations, respectively
                                                                                                      Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, HMAC)

                        PKCS #7 [151]         1998      ASN.1-driven approach to structuring          ∙ DER or PEM format                                 ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                        cryptographic messages                        ∙ Support:                                          ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                                      Asymmetric encryption (RSA)                         ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                                      Symmetric encryption (DES)
                                                                                                      Hash function (MD5)

‘‘–’’ represents Not Applicable/Available.
a Standard was last reviewed and confirmed in the mentioned year.
b Standard was last approved/revised in the mentioned year.



recommendations, which are already mentioned in the previous tables.                                               impacted. To maintain long-term security for SAML-dependent systems,
Thus, we refer to those existing tables in the recommendation field.                                               it is necessary to transition to post-quantum signature algorithms in
    By offering recommendations, we ensure the effective and secure                                                SAML implementations.
implementation of DNSSEC, keeping pace with best practices, emerging                                                   Although there is no specific hybrid version of SAML, it uses crypto-
threats, and advancements in cryptographic techniques. With Table 27                                               graphic algorithms that can replace quantum-safe ones. SAML utilizes
as a reference, users and implementers can make informed decisions to                                              message digest algorithms such as SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512 to
protect against forged DNS data, ultimately improving the security of                                              create hash values for digital signatures and message integrity checks.
Internet users and applications.                                                                                   Post-quantum recommendations for the Hash function can be found
                                                                                                                   in Table 10. SAML supports various asymmetric key algorithms for
10.3.3. SAML standards and recommendations                                                                         digital signatures and exchange, including RSA and DSA. Table 8
    SAML represents the Security Assertion Markup Language, an open                                                presents post-quantum recommendations for asymmetric cryptography.
standard widely adopted that facilitates the interchange of authentica-                                            SAML utilizes key transport algorithms to securely transmit symmetric
tion and authorization information among diverse entities, especially                                              keys for message encryption, typically involving asymmetric encryption
in web applications. With SAML, users only need to authenticate once
                                                                                                                   algorithms such as RSA or Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Table 13
with an Identity Provider (IdP) and can then access multiple services or
                                                                                                                   provides post-quantum recommendations for key exchange.
applications without repeatedly entering their credentials. This feature
is called Single-Sign-On (SSO) [213].
    The OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured In-                                                  10.3.4. Oauth standards and recommendations
formation Standards) consortium is responsible for developing and                                                      OAuth (Open Authorization) is a protocol that helps protect the
maintaining the SAML standard. Although OASIS is the primary orga-                                                 security of user or application resources. It allows users to give limited
nization for developing SAML standards, other groups, such as IETF,                                                access to their data or functionality to other applications without
also contribute to advancing SAML-related technology. Tables 28 and                                                sharing their login information [214]. To ensure compatibility and con-
29 illustrate the SAML IETF and OASIS standards, respectively. We ref-                                             sistency across different systems, OAuth has been standardized through
erence both classical and post-quantum recommendations based on the                                                efforts of the IETF, which has defined various RFCs for OAuth stan-
cryptographic support of the corresponding standards. We thoroughly                                                dardization. The standardization of OAuth by IETF is shown in Table
analyze the security aspects of these standards and offer relevant                                                 30, listing both classical and post-quantum recommendations based on
recommendations to enhance their implementation.                                                                   the cryptographic support of each standard. We thoroughly analyze the
    Regarding post-quantum cryptography, the use of digital signatures                                             security aspects of these standards and offer relevant recommendations
for authentication and integrity verification in SAML is significantly                                             to enhance their implementation.

                                                                                                           25
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 25
IETF standards for cryptography in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
 Algorithm          RFC          Year                    Purpose                                       Note                                      Recommendations

                                                                                                                                 Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)         PQ

                    4055 [152]   2005   Enhancing RSA cryptography with            ∙ Updates RFC 3279 and Updated by RFC ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                        supplementary algorithms and identifiers   5756                                        digital signature and key transport, respectively
                                        for integration within the PKIX profile    ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                   Asymmetric digital signature (RSASSA-PSS)
                                                                                   and key transport (RSAES-OAEP)
                                                                                   Hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-2)

                    5756 [86]    2010   Enhancements for RSAES-OAEP and            ∙ Updates the standards for algorithm      ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                        RSASSA-PSS algorithm configuration         parameters within the subjectPublicKeyInfo digital signature and key transport, respectively
                                                                                   field of an X.509 certificate
                                                                                   ∙ Support:
 RSA                                                                               Asymmetric digital signature (RSASSA-PSS)
                                                                                   and key transport (RSAES-OAEP)

                    8017 [54]    2016   RSA Cryptography Specifications            ∙ Recommendations including                 ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                                                                   cryptographic primitives, encryption        encryption and digital signature, respectively
                                                                                   schemes, signature schemes, etc.            ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                   ∙ Support:
                                                                                   Asymmetric encryption (RSA,
                                                                                   RSAES-OAEP) and digital signature
                                                                                   (RSASSA-PSS, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
                                                                                   Hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2)

                    8018 [153]   2017   Password-Based Cryptography Specification ∙ Recommendations encompass essential        ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                                                  key derivation functions, encryption         ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                   methodologies, message authentication       ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                   protocols, etc.                             MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                   ∙ Support:
                                                                                   Asymmetric encryption (RSA)
                                                                                   Symmetric encryptions (DES/3DES-CBC,
                                                                                   AES-CBC-128/192/256 RSA)
                                                                                   Hash and MAC functions (MD5, SHA-1,
                                                                                   SHA-2, HMAC)

                    5753 [154]   2010   Use of ECC Algorithms in CMS               ∙ Obsoletes RFC 3278                        ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                                                                   ∙ Support:                                  cryptography
                                                                                   Asymmetric cryptography (ECDSA, DH,         ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                   RSA)                                        ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                   Symmetric encryption (3DES-CBC,             MAC recommendations, respectively
 ECC
                                                                                   AES-CBC-128/192/512)
                                                                                   Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, SHA-2,
                                                                                   HMAC)

                    5480 [155]   2009   Defines the syntax and semantics for the   ∙ Updates RFC 3279 and Updated by RFC ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                        Subject Public Key Information field in    8813                                        cryptography
                                        certificates that enable ECC support       ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                   Asymmetric cryptography (ECDSA, ECDH,
                                                                                   ECMQV)
                                                                                   Hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-2)

                                                                                                                                                           (continued on next page)


    At present, the OAuth protocol does not have any quantum-safe                        IPsec, SSH, FTP, and S/MIME. Our goals are to (1) evaluate the crypto-
cryptography measures. Despite not having a hybrid option, the pro-                      graphic mechanisms and algorithms currently employed and (2) pro-
tocol uses cryptographic algorithms that can potentially be replaced by                  vide security recommendations addressing both classical and post-
quantum-safe alternatives. Like other cryptographic protocols, OAuth                     quantum threats. By assessing protocols current security posture and
uses cryptographic algorithms such as symmetric encryption, asymmet-                     considering the potential impact of quantum computing, our goal is to
ric encryption, and digital signatures. Tables B.37, 8, and 12, containing               provide actionable guidance to strengthen their resilience and ensure
post-quantum recommendations for symmetric/asymmetric cryptogra-                         the continued protection of sensitive information.
phy and digital signature recommendations, respectively. OAuth 2.0 is                        We present both classical and post-quantum recommendations for
the most commonly used version of OAuth. It employs secure commu-                        these protocols (Tables 31–36), based on their cryptographic sup-
nication protocols such as TLS [215] to ensure the confidentiality and                   port as defined in Section 1.4. The analysis covers security aspects
integrity of data transmission. Table 31 presents a hybrid version of                    of the standards and offers recommendations to improve their imple-
TLS that can be used in place of the classical version to improve safety                 mentation. For detailed guidelines on table columns, cryptographic
in the context of post-quantum security.                                                 recommendations, and evaluation criteria, see Sections 1.3 and 1.4.

                                                                                         11.1. TLS standards and recommendations
11. Standards and recommendations for communication protocols
                                                                                            Table 31 presents a comprehensive overview of Transport Layer
   This section analyzes the cryptographic standards used in widely                      Security (TLS) cryptographic standards, which are widely used to en-
adopted network communication and security protocols such as TLS,                        sure secure communication across networks. As part of our examination

                                                                                    26
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                      Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 25 (continued).
 Algorithm          RFC               Year                        Purpose                                    Note                                       Recommendations

                                                                                                                                        Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)           PQ

                    8692 [156]        2019    Enhancing Algorithm Identifiers for         ∙ Describes the guidelines governing the    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital
                                              RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA utilizing SHAKEs       utilization of the SHAKE function family  signature
                                              for Internet X.509 PKI                      ∙ Support:                                ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                                                                          Asymmetric digital signature (RSASSA-PSS,
                                                                                          ECDSA)
                                                                                          Hash functions (SHA-3 (SHAKE-128/256))

                    5758 [157]        2010    Enhanced Algorithms and Identifiers for ∙ Define algorithm identifiers and ASN.1
                                              DSA and ECDSA within the Internet X.509 encoding rules
 Multiple                                     PKI                                         ∙ Support:
 Algorithmsa                                                                              Asymmetric digital signature (DSA, ECDSA)
                                                                                          Hash functions (SHA-2)

                    3279 [158]        2002    Specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1   ∙ Algorithms and Identifiers for the PKIX   ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                              encoding formats for digital signatures and profile                                     digital signature and key exchange, respectively
                                              subject public keys in the Internet X.509   ∙ Updated by RFC 4055 [152], RFC 4491       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms
                                              PKI                                         [159], RFC 5480 [155], RFC 5758 [157],
                                                                                          RFC 8692 [156] ∙ Support:
                                                                                          Asymmetric digital signature (RSA, DSA,
                                                                                          ECDSA) and key exchange (DH)
                                                                                          Hash functions (MD5, SHA-1)

                    6955 [160]        2013    Crafted with the intent of offering a       ∙ Obsoletes RFC 2875 and outlines a pair    ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                              Proof-of-Possession for the private key     of techniques for generating an integrity   digital signature and key agreement, respectively
                                              rather than serving as a general-purpose    check value from a DH key pair, along       ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                              signing algorithm                           with a method for deriving an integrity     MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                          check value from an EC key pair
                                                                                          ∙ Support:
                                                                                          Asymmetric digital signature (ECDSA) and
                                                                                          key agreement (DH, ECDH)
                                                                                          Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, SHA-2,
                                                                                          HMAC)

 MAC                9045 [161]        2021    Revisions have been made to the             ∙ PKI CRMF specified in RFC 4211            ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                              cryptographic algorithm prerequisites for   ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 and
                                              the Password-Based MAC in the Internet      Symmetric encryption (DES/3DES,             Table 11 for Hash and MAC recommendations,
                                              X.509 PKI CRMF                              AES-GMAC-128)                           respectively
                                                                                          Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, SHA-256,
                                                                                          HMAC, GMAC)

                    5754 [162]        2010    Outlines the guidelines for utilizing SHA-2 ∙ Provides ‘SMIMECapabilities’ attribute    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital
                                              Algorithms within CMS                       values for each algorithm                   signature
                                                                                          ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash
 HASH                                                                                     Asymmetric digital signature (RSA, DSA,     and MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                          ECDSA)
                                                                                          Hash and MAC functions (SHA-2, HMAC)

                    8702 [163]        2020    Outlines the guidelines for incorporating   Hash functions used with the RSASSA-PSS
                                              the SHAKE family of hash functions into     and ECDSA
                                              the CMS                                     ∙ Support:
                                                                                          Asymmetric digital signature (RSASSA-PSS,
                                                                                          ECDSA)
                                                                                          Hash and MAC functions (SHA-3
                                                                                          (SHAKE-128/256), KMAC)

Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: MS: Modulus Size, KS: Key Size, HL: Hash Length.
a It comprises a set of security and cryptography standards that employ a combination of algorithms.



of the cryptographic standards of TLS, we analyze its security aspects                          support for each standard. Our exploration of these standards includes
and provide relevant recommendations. Standards that share the same                             a thorough analysis of their security aspects, and we provide relevant
cryptographic recommendations are consolidated and categorized ac-                              recommendations based on our findings. To simplify the presentation,
cording to the cryptographic mechanisms they employ. Additionally,                              we have grouped standards with similar cryptographic recommenda-
the table includes the hybrid draft standard of TLS, which enhances                             tions based on the specific mechanisms they employ. Additionally, the
security in the post-quantum cryptography era by employing multiple                             table includes the IKE standard for post-quantum security, which incor-
key exchange algorithms simultaneously.                                                         porates Mixing Pre-shared Keys to provide resistance against quantum
                                                                                                computers.
11.2. Ipsec standards and recommendations
                                                                                                11.3. SSH standards and recommendations
   Tables 32 and 33 provide a comprehensive overview of the IPsec/IKE
cryptographic standards, which are widely utilized for secure com-                                 Table 34 presents a comprehensive overview of Secure Shell (SSH)
munication purposes. IPsec/IKE is commonly employed to establish                                cryptographic standards, a widely used network protocol that pro-
secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and protect data transmission                            vides secure remote login, file transfer, and command execution be-
over the Internet. The table offers valuable information such as the                            tween network devices. As we explore SSH cryptographic standards,
year of publication, intended purpose, specific notes, and cryptographic                        we extensively analyze their security aspects and provide relevant

                                                                                           27
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114



Table 26
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known Kerberos protocols.
 Protocol           RFC            Year                Purpose                                    Note                                        Recommendations

                                                                                                                              Classical (till 2030 & beyond)           PQ

                    2712 [164]     1999    Propose new cipher suites in        ∙ Enabling mutual authentication and         ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 23 for asymmetric
                                           TLS for Kerberos-based              secure communication                         Key exchange and authentication, respectively
                                           authentication                      ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                               Asymmetric Cryptography for                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                               Authentication and key exchange (RSA,        MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               DH)                                          ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                                               Symmetric encryption (DES, 3DES)
                                                                               Hash and MAC functions (MD5, SHA)
                                                                               TLS

                    3962 [165]     2005    Specify the integration AES         ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                           algorithm into the Kerberos 5       Symmetric encryption (AES-CTS-128/256)       ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
 Kerberos                                  cryptosystem suite                  Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1, HMAC)         MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               Authentication                               ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication

                    4120 [145]     2005    The Kerberos Network                ∙ Support:
                                           Authentication Service (V5)         Symmetric encryption (DES,
                                                                               AES-CTS-128/256)
                                                                               Hash and MAC functions (MD5, SHA-1,
                                                                               HMAC)
                                                                               Authentication

                    8009 [166]     2016    Specify encryption and              ∙ Support:
                                           checksum types for Kerberos 5       Symmetric encryption (AES-CTS-128/256)
                                           using AES in CTS mode and           Hash and MAC functions (SHA-2-256/384,
                                           HMAC with SHA-2                     HMAC)
                                                                               Authentication

                    5349 [167]     2008    ECC Support for PKC for Initial     ∙ Describes the use of ECC in PKINIT for     ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                           Authentication in Kerberos          secure public key-based authentication and   digital signature and Key exchange, respectively
                                           (PKINIT)                            key exchange                                 ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                               ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 23 for authentication
                                                                               Asymmetric digital signature and key         ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                               exchange (ECDSA)
                                                                               Hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-256/384/512)
                                                                               Authentication and PKI

                    6251 [168]     2011    Specify the integration of the      ∙ Defines Kerberos V5 protocol integration   ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
                                           Kerberos V5 protocol with TLS       with TLS to enhance security                 ∙ Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                               ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                                               Authentication, PKI, and TLS

                    6803 [169]     2012    Specify camellia encryption for     ∙ Defines encryption and checksum types      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                           Kerberos 5                          using Camellia block cipher and CMAC         ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                               algorithm                                    MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               ∙ Support:
                                                                               Symmetric encryption
                                                                               (Camellia-CTS-128/256)
                                                                               Hash and MAC (SHA-1, HMAC, CMAC)

                    7751 [170]     2016    Introduce a Kerberos                ∙ Supporting multiple MACs                   ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                                           authorization data container        ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
                                           with multiple MACs to enhance       MAC and Authentication
                                           authentication

                    8636 [171]     2019    PKC for Initial Authentication in   ∙ Enhances PKINIT standard by removing       ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric Key exchange ∙
                                           Kerberos (PKINIT) Algorithm         algorithm dependencies, enabling             Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                           Agility                             flexibility, and future-proofing against     ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                               vulnerabilities                              MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 23 for authentication
                                                                               Asymmetric key exchange (DH)                 ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                               Symmetric encryption (AES-CTS-256)
                                                                               Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1,
                                                                               SHA-256/384/512)
                                                                               Authentication and PKI




recommendations to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data                      exchange with PQ KEM to provide PQ hybrid key exchange meth-
transmission. We categorize standards that share the same crypto-                        ods. This comprehensive overview of SSH cryptographic standards
graphic recommendations, grouping them according to the specific                         aims to help researchers, developers, and security practitioners in
cryptographic mechanisms they use. Additionally, the table includes                      understanding and implementing robust security measures in SSH com-
the hybrid draft standard of SSH, which combines classical ECDH key                      munications.

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                          Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 27
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known DNSSEC protocols.
 Protocol           RFC              Year             Purpose                               Note                                          Recommendations

                                                                                                                        Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                    4033 [172]       2005      DNS Security             ∙ Ensures data source authentication and      ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signature
                                               Introduction and         content integrity within the Domain Name      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               Requirements             System                                        ∙ Refer to Table 23 for authentication
                                                                        ∙ Support:
                                                                        Digital signature
                                                                        Hash functions
                                                                        Authentication

                    4398 [173]       2006      Storing cryptographic    ∙ CERT resource records enable                ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                               certificates and         authentication of cryptographic public keys
 DNSSEC                                        revocation lists in      in DNS                                        ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               DNS                      ∙ Support:                                    ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                        Asymmetric digital signatures
                                                                        Hash functions
                                                                        PKI

                    5155 [174]       2008      DNSSEC Hashed            ∙ NSEC3 resource record in DNSSEC             ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                               Authenticated Denial     enhances denial of existence authentication
                                               of Existence             and safeguards against zone enumeration       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                        and facilitates expansion of
                                                                        delegation-centric zones
                                                                        ∙ Support:
                                                                        Asymmetric digital signatures (DSA, RSA)
                                                                        Hash functions (SHA-1)

                    6781 [175]       2012      Provide operational      ∙ Covering key management, signature          ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                               guidelines for zone      generation, and related policies              digital signature and Key exchange
                                               administrators           ∙ Support:                                    ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               deploying DNSSEC         Asymmetric digital signatures and key         ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
                                                                        exchange (RSA)                                ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                                        Hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256)
                                                                        Authentication and TLS

                    7091 [176]       2013      Digital Signature        ∙ Offers comprehensive guidance on the        ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                               Algorithm is specified   generation and authentication of digital
                                               by GOST R                signatures using GOST R 34.10-2012            ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               34.10-2012               ∙ Support:
                                                                        Digital signature (GOST R 34.10-2012)
                                                                        Hash functions

                    8080 [177]       2017      Provides guidelines      ∙ Focuses on the utilization of EdDSA with    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signature
                                               for specifying EdDSA     the two specified curves (Ed25519 and
                                               keys and signatures      Ed448) for DNSSEC implementation
                                               in DNSSEC                ∙ Support:
                                                                        Digital signature (EdDSA (Ed25519 and
                                                                        Ed448))

                                                                                                                                                      (continued on next page)


11.4. FTP standards and recommendations                                               allowing us to provide relevant and actionable recommendations. To
                                                                                      enhance readability and comprehension, we have consolidated the
    Table 35 presents a comprehensive overview of three widely used                   standards based on the specific cryptographic recommendations they
protocols for secure file transfer: FTP, FTPS, and SFTP. FTP, which                   employ, allowing for a systematic evaluation process.
stands for File Transfer Protocol, is a conventional network protocol
used to facilitate the transfer of files between a computer network’s
                                                                                      11.5. S/MIME standards and recommendations
client and server. Its purpose is to facilitate the efficient exchange of
files, allowing users to upload, download, and manage files remotely.
On the other hand, FTPS, or FTP Secure, is an extension of FTP that                       S/MIME, which stands for Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Ex-
adds an extra layer of security through the use of SSL/TLS encryption.                tensions, is a commonly used standard that guarantees safety in email
This protocol enhances the security of file transfers by encrypting                   communication. It involves a variety of protocols and formats that
the data exchanged between the client and the server, ensuring that                   allow encryption, signing, and authentication of the email message. The
sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access.                     S/MIME protocol is built on the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
    SFTP, which stands for Secure File Transfer Protocol, is an entirely              created by the IETF. It uses asymmetric encryption, digital signatures,
different protocol from FTP and FTPS. Unlike its counterparts, SFTP                   and certificates to secure the privacy, accuracy, and legitimacy of email
is not an extension, but rather a standalone protocol that operates                   content [278].
over SSH (Secure Shell) connections. SFTP provides secure file transfer                   S/MIME is not directly standardized by ISO and ANSI. The respon-
capabilities combined with the strong authentication and encryption                   sibility for standardizing S/MIME lies with the IETF, which achieves
features of SSH, making it an excellent choice for secure file transfers              this through the creation of RFCs. These RFCs outline core specifi-
in a wide range of environments.                                                      cations, including encryption, digital signatures, and certificate han-
    In Table 35, we thoroughly examine the security aspects of the FTP                dling. They establish standards and protocols for the implementation
cryptographic standards to identify their strengths and vulnerabilities,              of S/MIME, serving as authoritative guides for its implementation and

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 27 (continued).
 Protocol               RFC                 Year          Purpose                               Note                                         Recommendations

                                                                                                                           Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                        6605 [178]          2012   Elaborates on the        ∙ Focuses on the utilization of EdDSA with   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                   technique of defining    the two specified curves (Ed25519 and
                                                   ECDSA keys and           Ed448) for DNSSEC implementation             ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                   signatures in DNS        ∙ Support:
                                                   Security (DNSSEC)        Asymmetric digital signature (ECDSA
                                                   using SHA-2 hashes       (P-256, P-384)
                                                                            Hash Functions (SHA-256/384)

                        5933 [179]          2010   Utilizing GOST           ∙ Outlines the process of creating digital   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                   Signature Algorithms     signatures and hash functions using GOST
                                                   in DNSKEY and            algorithms                                   ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                   RRSIG Resource           ∙ Support:
                                                   Records for DNSSEC       Digital signature (ECC-GOST (GOST R
                                                                            34.10-2001))
                                                                            Hash functions (GOST R 34.11-94)

                        5702 [180]          2009   Incorporating SHA-2      ∙ Provides instructions for generating       ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                   algorithms in            DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for
                                                   conjunction with RSA     DNS Security Extensions                      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                   within DNSKEY and        ∙ Support:
                                                   RRSIG resource           Asymmetric digital signature (RSA)
                                                   records for DNSSEC       Hash functions (SHA-256/512)

                        3110 [181]          2001   RSA/SHA-1                ∙ Incorporates advancements in hashing for   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                   signatures and RSA       DNS signatures and deprecates the weaker
                                                   keys used in DNS         mechanism                                    ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                            ∙ Support:
                                                                            Asymmetric digital signature (RSA)
                                                                            Hash functions (SHA-1)

                        draft-makarenko-    2023   Provide guidelines       ∙ Focuses on the usage of these algorithms   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                        gost2012-dnssec-           for generating digital   for DNSKEY, RRSIG, and DS resource
                        05 [182]                   signatures and hash      records in DNSSEC. Expired in July 2024      ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                   functions via GOST R     ∙ Support:                                   MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                   34.10-2012 and           Asymmetric digital signature (GOST R
                                                   GOST R 34.11-2012        34.10-2012)
                                                   algorithms within        Hash and MAC functions (GOST R
                                                   DNSSEC                   34.11-2012, HMAC)

                        draft-dnsop-        2023   Mechanism to             ∙ Protocol is extended to address            ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signature
                        dnssec-extension-          enhance DNSSEC           vulnerabilities in DNS messages, providing   ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                        pkix-01 [183]              protocol, ensuring       integrity assurance. Expired in September
                                                   the integrity of DNS     2023
                                                   messages using PKIX      ∙ Support:
                                                   certificates             Digital signature
                                                   independently            PKI

                        draft-cuiling-      2023   Provide guidelines       ∙ SM3 is used as the hash algorithm for      ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                        dnsop-sm2-alg-05           for specifying SM2       signatures in DNSSEC. Expired in
                        [184]                      Digital Signature        September 2023                               ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations.
                                                   Algorithm keys and       ∙ Support:
                                                   signatures in DNSSEC     Digital signature (SM2)
                                                                            Hash functions (SM3)




understanding. The S/MIME standardization RFCs are listed in Table                        offer protection against both classical and quantum-based attacks. The
36.                                                                                       recommendations for using hybrid TLS/SSL in S/MIME are presented
    The security of S/MIME relies on MIME and CMS. CMS is a syntax                        in Table 31, and in Table 12, there are hybrid recommendations for
that encapsulates data for protection, and its parameters influence                       using digital signatures in S/MIME.
many of S/MIME’s security properties. Fortunately, the CMS parameters
are customizable, including the choice of the algorithm used. This
                                                                                          11.6. Summary
flexibility facilitates the transition of protocols such as TLS, SSL, and
RSA to quantum-safe cryptography [297].
    When it comes to S/MIME, post-quantum cryptography has an                                 This section offers a comprehensive overview of cryptographic stan-
impact on encryption and digital signatures. This means that post-                        dards for different protocols and provides cryptographic recommenda-
quantum encryption algorithms can replace current ones, such as RSA                       tions based on the supported cryptographic mechanisms. Its primary
or ECC. Typically, S/MIME relies on the widely-used RSA encryption                        goal is to assist researchers, developers, and security practitioners in
algorithm. However, to ensure secure encryption against quantum com-                      gaining a clear understanding of these standards and in effectively
puters, it should be replaced with quantum-safe algorithms in a hybrid                    implementing robust security measures. By providing detailed infor-
approach [298].                                                                           mation and insights, the section equips its intended audience with
    By using a combination of classical cryptographic algorithms and                      the knowledge necessary to navigate the complexities of cryptographic
post-quantum algorithms, a post-quantum hybrid S/MIME system can                          protocols and ensure the implementation of robust security practices.

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V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                        Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 28
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for SAML.
 Protocol            RFC             Year                     Purpose                                    Note                                            Recommendations

                                                                                                                                        Classical (till 2030 & beyond)             PQ

                     8409 [185]      2019        The Entity Category (SAML)           ∙ Describes two SAML entity attributes:         ∙ Refer to Table 12 for digital signatures
                                                 Attribute Types                      one to indicate an entity’s membership in
                                                                                      a category, and another to signal that an
                                                                                      entity supports or interoperates with
                                                                                      entities in such categories.
                                                                                      ∙ Support:Digital signature

                     7833 [186]      2016        A RADIUS Attribute, Binding,         ∙ Describes the use of the SAML with            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                 Profiles, Name Identifier            RADIUS in the context of the Application
 SAML                                            Format, and Confirmation             Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web
                                                 Methods for the (SAML)               (ABFAB) architecture
                                                                                      ∙ Support: TLS

                     7522 [187]      2015        SAML 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0       ∙ Defines the use of a SAML 2.0 Bearer          ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                 Client Authentication and            Assertion as a means for requesting an          ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                 Authorization Grants                 OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for           ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                                                      client authentication                           ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                                      ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                      (RSA), Hash function (SHA-256), X.509

                     6595 [188]      2015        A Simple Authentication and          ∙ Specifies a SASL mechanism and a              ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                                 Security Layer (SASL) and            GSS-API mechanism for SAML 2.0 that             ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                 GSS-API Mechanism for the            allows the integration of existing SAML.
                                                 SAML                                 Identity Providers with applications using
                                                                                      SASL and GSS-API
                                                                                      ∙ Support: TLS, X.509




Table 29
OASIS cryptographic standards/drafts for SAML.
 Protocol           Standard      Year                        Purpose                                         Note                                        Recommendations

                                                                                                                                          Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)         PQ

                                  2007      Metadata Profile for the OASIS Security      ∙ Defines a profile of the OASIS SAML         ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash
                                            Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V1.x        V2.0 metadata specification for use in
                                            [189]                                        describing SAML V1.0 and V1.1 entities.
                                                                                         ∙ Support: Hash function

                                  2005      Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS       ∙ Defines the syntax and semantics for        ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS/SSL
                                            SAML V2.0 [190]                              XML-encoded assertions about                  ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric cryptography
                                                                                         authentication, attributes, and authorization ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                         ∙ Support: TLS/SSL, Asymmetric, Hash
 SAML               OASIS                                                                function

                                  2011      SAML v2.0 Metadata Profile for Algorithm ∙ Defines metadata extension elements to          ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                            Support Version 1.0 [191]                    enable entities to describe the XML           cryptography
                                                                                         Signature [XMLSig] algorithms they            ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                         support                                       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                         ∙ Support: Symmetric cryptography,
                                                                                         Asymmetric cryptography, HASH function

                                  2010      SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Web Browser          ∙ The SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Web           ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS/SSL
                                            SSO Profile Version 1.0 [192]                Browser SSO Profile allows for transport of ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                                         holder-of-key assertions by standard HTTP
                                                                                         user agents with no modification of client
                                                                                         software and maximum compatibility with
                                                                                         existing deployments
                                                                                         ∙ Support: TLS, SSL, X.509



12. Discussion                                                                                  secure against quantum attacks by using larger key sizes or different
                                                                                                algorithms. Many existing cryptographic standards, such as AES and
    Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is designed to be secure against                            SHA-3, have been analyzed to determine their resistance to quan-
both classical and quantum computers. PQC algorithms rely on math-                              tum attacks, and recommendations have been made to increase their
ematical problems that are considered challenging for quantum com-                              security. Therefore, in this work, we have presented both classical
puters to solve. Efforts to develop PQC standards are ongoing and                               and post-quantum recommendations for block ciphers, hash and MAC
several organizations are actively involved in this area. For exam-                             functions, key establishment, digital signatures, some widely used cryp-
ple, NIST has launched a competition to develop PQC standards. The                              tographic protocols, and so on. These recommendations can be used
competition is now in its final stage, and several post-quantum cryp-                           to protect sensitive information in the post-quantum era. The main
tography algorithms have been selected as finalists and standardized,                           goal of these recommendations is to ensure the ongoing security of
as discussed in Section 1.2. However, PQC is not the only solution                              cryptographic standards in response to advancements in quantum com-
to the quantum threat. Classical cryptography can also be made more                             puting.

                                                                                           31
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 30
 IETF cryptographic standards for OAuth.
 Protocol       RFC          Year                    Purpose                                           Note                                      Recommendations

                                                                                                                              Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                9201 [193]   2022   Introducing Additional OAuth Parameters      Introduces novel parameters and encodings ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                    for Authentication and Authorization in      intended to enhance the OAuth 2.0 token
                                    Constrained Environments (ACE)               and introspection endpoints
                                                                                 ∙ Support: Symmetric key

                8705 [194]   2020   OAuth 2.0 Protocol for Mutual-TLS Client     ∙ Support: Asymmetric key (RSA), Hash      ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                    Authentication and Certificate-Bound         function (SHA-256), TLS                    cryptography
                                    Access Tokens                                                                           ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                7662 [195]   2015   OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection                ∙ Support: TLS, SSL                        ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS/SSL

                7523 [196]   2015   Profile of JSON Web Token (JWT) usage        ∙ Support: Hash function, TLS              ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                    for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and                                                 ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                    Authorization Grants

                7628 [197]   2015   A collection of Simple Authentication and
 OAuth                              Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms devised
                                    for integration with OAuth

                7636 [198]   2015   Utilization of Proof Key for Code Exchange
                                    by Public Clients under OAuth

                7521 [199]   2015   Framework for Assertion within OAuth 2.0 ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature        ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                    Client Authentication and Authorization  (ECDSA P-256), Hash and MAC functions
                                    Grants                                       (SHA-256, MAC)                             ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                                                            MAC recommendations, respectively

                7522 [187]   2015   Exploration of SAML 2.0’s application as a ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature  ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                    profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication (RSA), Hash and MAC functions (SHA-256,
                                    and Authorization Grants                    MAC), TLS                               ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                                                            MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                9101 [200]   2021   Enhancing OAuth 2.0 by securing              ∙ Support: Asymmetric encryption (DSA,  ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                    authorization requests with JWT              RSA, GOST) and signature (ECDSA P-256), cryptography
                                                                                 symmetric encryption (DES/3DES/GOST),      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                 Hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, GOST)          ∙ Refer to Table 10 for hash algorithms

                9200 [201]   2022   Authentication and Authorization within      ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature,   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                    Constrained Environments leveraging the      Hash and MAC functions, TLS                ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                    OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)                                                         MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                6819 [202]   2013   Threat Model and Security Considerations     ∙ Support: Asymmetric Cryptography,     ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                    pertaining to OAuth 2.0                      Symmetric Keys, Hash and MAC functions, cryptography
                                                                                 TLS                                     ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption


                7591 [203]   2015   Dynamic Client Registration Protocol for     ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                    OAuth 2.0                                    (RS256), MAC function, TLS
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                6750 [204]   2012   The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework:       ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature,
                                    Bearer Token Usage                           MAC function, TLS

                9068 [205]   2021   Profile of JWT meant for OAuth 2.0 Access ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature,      ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                    Tokens                                                                                  digital signature

                6749 [206]   2012   The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework        ∙ Support: MAC functions, TLS              ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                7009 [207]   2013   OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation

                7592 [208]   2015   Management Protocol for Dynamic Client
                                    Registration within OAuth 2.0                ∙ Support: TLS                             ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                8252 [209]   2017   OAuth 2.0 Application Pattern for Native
                                    Apps

                8414 [210]   2018   Metadata for OAuth 2.0 Authorization
                                    Servers

                8628 [211]   2019   OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant

                8693 [212]   2020   OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange




   For instance, we have provided recommendations on the appro-                              available post-quantum mechanisms for asymmetric cryptography. It is
priate key and hash sizes for symmetric cryptography to maintain                             important to note that the development of post-quantum cryptography
a quantum-resistant environment. We also recommend considering                               standards and the evaluation of classical standards against quantum

                                                                                        32
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                          Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 31
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known network protocols (TLS/SSL).
 Protocol     RFC       Year                       Purpose                                       Note                                      Recommendations

                                                                                                                         Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)           PQ

              5288      2008     AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS provide       ∙ Support:                                ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
              [216]              confidentiality and data origin             Asymmetric key exchange (RSA, DSA, DH)    ∙ Refer to Table 6 and Table B.37 for symmetric
                                 authentication.                             Symmetric encryption (AES-GCM             encryption and recommendations on classical and
                                                                             (128/256))                                PQ modes
                                                                             Hash functions (SHA-2-256/384)            ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                                                       MAC recommendations, respectively

              5487      2009     Enhancing security with TLS Pre-Shared      ∙ Support:                                ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
              [217]              Key (PSK) cipher suites featuring           Asymmetric key exchange (PSK, DHE_PSK,    ∙ Refer to Table 6
                                 SHA-256/384 and AES GCM                     and RSA_PSK)                              and Table B.37 for symmetric encryption and
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (AES-GCM             recommendations on classical and PQ modes
                                                                             (128/256))                                ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions (SHA-256/384,      MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                             HMAC)

              5489      2009     ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for TLS             ∙ Support:
 TLS/SSL
              [218]                                                          Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE_PSK)
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (3DES, AES-CBC
                                                                             (128/256))
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1,
                                                                             SHA-256/384, HMAC)

              5932      2010     Specify a collection of cipher suites for   ∙ Support:
              [219]              TLS that support the Camellia encryption    Asymmetric key exchange (RSA, DHE_RSA,
                                 algorithm                                   DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS)
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (Camellia-CBC
                                                                             (128/256))
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1 ,
                                                                             SHA-256, HMAC)

              6655      2012     AES-CCM Cipher Suites for TLS               ∙ Support:
              [220]                                                          Asymmetric key exchange (PSK, RSA,
                                                                             DHE_RSA)
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (AES-CCM
                                                                             (128/256))
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions (SHA-256,
                                                                             HMAC)

              7251      2014     Illustrating AES-CCM integration in TLS     ∙ Support:
              [221]              and define cipher suites using ECC          Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE_ECDSA)
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (AES-CCM
                                                                             (128/256))
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions
                                                                             (SHA-256/384/512, HMAC)

              8446      2018     Specifies TLS Protocol Version 1.3          ∙ Support:                                ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
              [222]                                                          Asymmetric key exchange (PSK, RSA, DH,    key exchange and digital signature, respectively
                                                                             ECDHE (secp256r1, X25519)) and digital    ∙ Refer to Table 6 and Table B.37 for symmetric
                                                                             signature (RSASSA-PSS,                    encryption and recommendations on classical and
                                                                             RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA)                 PQ modes
                                                                             Symmetric encryption (AES-CCM/GCM         ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                             (128/256))                                MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                             Hash and MAC functions (SHA-1,
                                                                             SHA-256/384/512, HMAC)

                                                                                                                                                      (continued on next page)




attacks is an ongoing process. As quantum computing technology con-                       be crypto-agile, organizations can ensure they are prepared to in-
tinues to evolve, new attacks may emerge, requiring the development                       tegrate new algorithms without overhauling their entire infrastruc-
of new defenses. Therefore, ongoing research and development in                           ture. This forward-thinking approach future-proofs security systems,
quantum-resistant cryptography is crucial to safeguard sensitive in-                      allowing them to remain resilient in the face of evolving threats.
formation in the post-quantum era. To address this challenge, we                              As a concrete illustration of crypto-agility, Section 3.3.3 presents a
suggest adopting crypto-agile practices. Crypto-agility [299] refers to                   phased migration for financial-grade TLS from RSA-2048 key exchange
the ability of a cryptographic system to switch quickly and seamlessly                    to a hybrid RSA+ Kyber1024 handshake. The plan preserves backward
between different cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and standards                      compatibility, enables controlled canary rollouts, and limits operational
as they evolve. This adaptability is essential because, as quantum                        change to load-balancer configuration, HSM policy, and certificate
computing progresses, algorithms that are currently considered se-                        workflows rather than a complete redesign PKI redesign. The measured
cure may become vulnerable to quantum-based attacks, while new                            latency and bandwidth impacts remain within the online banking bud-
quantum-resistant algorithms will emerge. By designing systems to                         gets, and Kyber’s compact artifacts fit existing X.509 v3 structures and

                                                                                   33
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 31 (continued).
 Protocol     RFC       Year                     Purpose                                         Note                                           Recommendations

                                                                                                                            Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)              PQ

              5289      2008   Introducing cipher suites based on ECC       ∙ Support:                                    ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
              [223]            featuring SHA-256/384 and AES-GCM            Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE) and           key exchange and digital signature
                                                                            digital signature (ECDSA, RSA)                ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                            Symmetric encryption                          ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                            (AES-GCM/CBC-128/256)                         MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                            Hash and MAC functions (SHA-256/384,
                                                                            HMAC)

              6101      2011   Specifies the SSL 3.0 protocol               ∙ Support:
              [224]                                                         Asymmetric key exchange (RSA, DH) and
                                                                            digital signature (RSASSA-PKCS1, DSS)
                                                                            Symmetric encryption (DES, 3DES)
                                                                            Hash and MAC functions (SHA, MD5,
                                                                            MAC)

              9325      2022   Offering best practices for the secure use   ∙ Support:
              [225]            of TLS/DTLS                                  Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE) and
                                                                            digital signature (ECDSA, RSA)
                                                                            Symmetric encryption (AES-GCM-128/256)
                                                                            Hash and MAC functions (SHA-256/384,
                                                                            HMAC)

              8422      2018   Describe key exchange algorithms based on    ∙ Specifies the use of ECDHE key              ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
              [226]            ECC for the TLS                              agreement in a TLS handshake                  key exchange and digital signature
                                                                            ∙ Support:                                    ∙ Refer to Table 6 and Table B.37 for symmetric
                                                                            Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE) and           encryption and recommendations on classical and
                                                                            digital signature (ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA)         PQ modes
                                                                            Symmetric encryption                          ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                            (AES-CBC/GCM-128/256)
                                                                            Hash functions (SHA-256/384)

              9367      2023   GOST Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3               ∙ Specifies the utilization of GOST           ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
              [227]                                                         algorithms to establish cipher suites,        key exchange and digital signature
                                                                            signature schemes, and key exchange           ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                            methods                                       ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                            ∙ Support:                                    MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                            Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE, PSK)
                                                                            and digital signature (GOST R 34.10-2012)
                                                                            Symmetric encryption (GOST R
                                                                            34.12-2015)
                                                                            Hash and MAC functions (GOST R
                                                                            34.11-2012, HMAC)

              8734      2020   ECC Brainpool Curves for TLSv1.3             ∙ Incorporates essential protocol             ∙ Refer to Table 13 and Table 12 for asymmetric
              [228]                                                         mechanisms to enable the utilization of       key exchange and digital signature
                                                                            ECC Brainpool curves within TLS 1.3           ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                            ∙ Support:
                                                                            Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE) and
                                                                            digital signature (ECDSA)
                                                                            Hash functions (SHA-256/384/512)

              7027      2013   Specifies ECC Brainpool Curves for TLS       ∙ Provides authentication and key             ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
              [229]                                                         exchange
                                                                            ∙ Support:
                                                                            Asymmetric cryptography for key exchange
                                                                            (ECC Brainpool curves)

              6091      2011   Define TLS authentication use                ∙ Also establishes a registry for non-X.509   ∙ Refer to Table 13
              [230]                                                         certificate types                             for asymmetric key
                                                                            ∙ Support:                                    exchange
                                                                            Asymmetric key exchange (DHE_DSS,
                                                                            DHE_RSA)

              7366      2014   Propose a method to facilitate the           ∙ Addressing the security vulnerabilities     ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
              [231]            negotiation of the encrypt-then-MAC          associated with the MAC-then-encrypt          ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                               security mechanism within TLS/DTLS           ∙ Support:
                                                                            Symmetric encryption
                                                                            MAC function (HMAC)

                                                                                                                                                               (continued on next page)




certificate-transparency processes. This hybrid posture provides an im-                          In summary, the threat quantum computing poses to cryptography is
mediate rollback path as standards evolve and helps satisfy regulatory                        a significant challenge that requires continuous attention and research.
expectations for crypto-agility in payment environments.                                      PQC and classical standards resistant to quantum attacks are being

                                                                                         34
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 31 (continued).
 Protocol     RFC           Year                    Purpose                                      Note                                         Recommendations

                                                                                                                            Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

              9147          2022   Specify version 1.3 of the DTLS protocol   ∙ Enabling secure communication over the    ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
              [232]                                                           Internet while preventing eavesdropping,    ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                              tampering, and message forgery
                                                                              ∙ Support:
                                                                              Symmetric encryption
                                                                              (AES-GCM/CCM-128/256) Hash-function
                                                                              (SHA-256)

              7905 [43]     2016   ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for TLS    ∙ Outline the utilization of the ChaCha     ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                                                              stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator    encryption and key exchange, respectively
                                                                              in the TLS and DTLS protocols               ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                              ∙ Support:
                                                                              Asymmetric key exchange (DHE_RSA,
                                                                              ECDHE_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA)
                                                                              Symmetric encryption (CHACHA20)
                                                                              Hash functions (SHA-256, POLY1305)

 TLS-Hybrid   draft-ietf-   2023   Introduce hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3   ∙ Utilizing multiple key exchange           ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
              tls-hybrid-                                                     algorithms simultaneously for enhanced      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
              design-10                                                       security in the post-quantum cryptography
              [113]                                                           era (Draft is Expired in October 2024)
                                                                              ∙ Support:
                                                                              Asymmetric key exchange (ECDHE
                                                                              (x25519, secp256r1) with kyber (512, 768)
                                                                              Hash functions (SHA-3)



developed, but the field is constantly evolving. Organizations must stay                  strategies, particularly in authentication and communication proto-
up-to-date with the latest advancements in quantum-resistant cryptog-                     cols, will better protect sensitive data and communications during the
raphy to ensure the security of their digital communications and data.                    transition. This approach mitigates the risks associated with quantum
Furthermore, we recommend implementing ‘‘crypto-agile’’ practices for                     vulnerabilities without requiring a complete redesign of existing sys-
existing cryptographic systems. This involves designing systems that                      tems, ensuring continuity. Furthermore, these recommendations pro-
can easily adapt to new cryptographic standards, recommendations,                         vide forward-looking strategies to help organizations future-proof their
and algorithms as they are developed, ensuring ongoing security in the                    security infrastructure as quantum technologies evolve.
era of quantum computing.                                                                     The adoption of crypto-agile systems will be pivotal in navigating
                                                                                          the uncertainties of the post-quantum era. Crypto-agile systems, de-
13. Conclusion
                                                                                          signed to adapt to evolving cryptographic standards, will empower
                                                                                          organizations to swiftly respond to future cryptographic challenges.
    The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to
                                                                                          Future research should continue to refine quantum-resistant cryp-
the security of traditional cryptographic algorithms, necessitating an
urgent shift toward a quantum-resistant environment. In this paper, we                    tographic techniques, optimize hybrid implementations, and ensure
provide a comprehensive evaluation of cryptographic standards across                      seamless integration of these solutions into global standards and widely
various domains, including both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms,                      adopted protocols. By embracing these recommendations and fostering
and propose quantum-resistant recommendations to facilitate a secure                      cryptographic agility, the global cryptographic community can pave the
transition for existing systems. Our analysis covers essential crypto-                    way for a quantum-resistant future, ensuring the long-term security of
graphic primitives, such as block and stream ciphers, hash functions,                     digital systems in the quantum age.
digital signatures, and key establishment protocols. We also review
global cryptographic standards and security recommendations from                          CRediT authorship contribution statement
various countries to assess the current state of readiness for quantum
threats.
    Additionally, we examine the quantum readiness of cryptographic                           Vikas Chouhan: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original
standards and provide essential Quantum-Resistant/Post-Quantum (PQ)                       draft, Validation, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation,
recommendations for authentication. This includes entity-based au-                        Formal analysis, Conceptualization. Mohammed Aldarwbi: Writing –
thentication standards, public key infrastructure for certificate-based                   review & editing, Writing – original draft, Supervision, Project admin-
authentication, and specific PQ recommendations for widely used                           istration, Investigation, Formal analysis, Conceptualization. Somayeh
authentication protocols such as Kerberos, DNSSEC, SAML, and OAuth.                       Sadeghi: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Val-
We further explore the standards for communication protocols, in-                         idation, Investigation, Formal analysis. Ali Ghorbani: Supervision,
cluding TLS, IPsec, SSH, FTP, and S/MIME, offering the necessary PQ                       Resources, Project administration. Aaron Chow: Writing – review &
recommendations for these protocols. These standards are crucial for                      editing, Validation, Supervision, Project administration, Methodology,
securing data transmission and maintaining integrity across diverse                       Investigation, Formal analysis. Robby Burko: Validation, Supervision,
applications, particularly as we transition to a quantum-resistant en-                    Project administration, Investigation, Formal analysis.
vironment. Moreover, we assess hybrid cryptographic standards and
emerging drafts that combine classical and quantum-resistant mech-
                                                                                          Declaration of competing interest
anisms to ensure backward compatibility and minimize disruption
during the transition.
    The proposed quantum-resistant recommendations offer immediate                            The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
benefits by strengthening cryptographic defenses against both classi-                     cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
cal and quantum-based attacks. Organizations that adopt these PQ                          influence the work reported in this paper.

                                                                                    35
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                   Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 32
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known network protocols (IPsec/IKE).
 Protocol     RFC                   Year                    Purpose                                     Note                                         Recommendations

                                                                                                                                    Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)          PQ

              draft-ietf-ipsecme-   2023   Establish a mechanism in the IKEv2 that   ∙ Expired in October 2023                    ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
              ikev2-auth-                  enables implementations to communicate    ∙ Support:
              announce-03                  the list of supported authentication      Asymmetric digital signature (RSA, DSS,      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
              [233]                        methods                                   ECDSA-SHA-256 (P-256 curve),
                                                                                     ECDSA-SHA-384 (P-384 curve)),
                                                                                     ECDSA-SHA-512 (P-521 curve)
                                                                                     Hash functions (SHA-256/384)

              7296 [234]            2014   Describe IKEv2                            ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                                                                     Asymmetric Digital Signature                 digital signature and Key exchange, respectively
                                                                                     (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)                          ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                     Diffie–Hellman exchange                      ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                     Symmetric encryption (3DES, IDEA,            MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                     AES-128/192/256)                             ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
 IKE                                                                                 Hash (MD5, SHA-1) and MAC (HMAC,
                                                                                     CMAC) functions
                                                                                     PKI

              9370 [235]            2023   Describe the extension of the IKEv2 to    ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 13 for Key exchange
                                           allow multiple key exchanges              Asymmetric key exchange                      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                     (DH,ECDH,PQ_KEM)                             ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                     Symmetric encryption (AES)                   MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                     Hash (SHA-2) and MAC (HMAC) functions

              7427 [236]            2015   Signature authentication in the IKEv2     ∙ Introduces negotiation for the signature   ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                                                     hash algorithm
                                                                                     ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric encryption
                                                                                     Asymmetric Digital Signature (RSA, DSA,      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                     ECDSA, RSASSA-PSS,ECGDSA, ElGamal)           ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                                     Asymmetric encryption (RSA)
                                                                                     Hash (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3) functions
                                                                                     PKI

              6989 [237]            2013   Additional Diffie–Hellman Tests for the   ∙ Ensuring the secure operation of the       ∙ Refer to Table 13 for key exchange
                                           IKEv2                                     IKEv2 specifically with elliptic curve
                                                                                     groups
                                                                                     ∙ Support:
                                                                                     Asymmetric Key exchange (DH, ECDH)

              4754 [238]            2007   IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the    ∙ Emphasizes that the addition of ECDSA      ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                           ECDSA                                     does not require any modifications to the
                                                                                     existing IKE                                 ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                     ∙ Support:
                                                                                     Asymmetric digital signature (ECDSA-256,
                                                                                     ECDSA-384, ECDSA-521)
                                                                                     Hash functions (SHA-256/384/512)

                                                                                                                                                                (continued on next page)


Appendix A. Standardization organizations                                                             effort between ISO and the IEC. JTC1 has several subcommittees,
                                                                                                      including JTC1/SC17, JTC1/SC27, and JTC1/SC37, which all fo-
    Standardization organizations play a crucial role in establishing                                 cus on different aspects of cryptographic standards. JTC1/SC17
uniformity and quality benchmarks across industries worldwide, facil-                                 is responsible for developing international standards for per-
itating cooperation among stakeholders to develop and maintain stan-
                                                                                                      sonal identification and security cards, while the main focus of
dards that enhance efficiency, interoperability, and consumer safety.
                                                                                                      JTC1/SC27 is on innovation related to information technology
Below are the following standardization organizations that contribute
                                                                                                      security, such as cryptography, intrusion detection, and incident
to shaping global/national norms and practices across various sectors.
                                                                                                      management. Finally, JTC1/SC37 is responsible for develop-
A.1. International standardization organizations                                                      ing international standards for biometric techniques, such as
                                                                                                      fingerprint recognition and facial recognition.
      (i) International Organization for Standardization (ISO)                                        The technical committee, TC68, focused on the financial services
          The standardization efforts of ISO21 are carried out by multi-                              industry, comprises several subcommittees that specialize in
          ple Technical Committees (TCs) that focus on specific fields of                             using cryptography to protect financial information. These sub-
          study. These committees assign responsibilities to Subcommit-                               committees primarily interpret the general cryptography stan-
          tees (SCs), which further distribute the workload among multi-                              dards established by JTC1 and adapt them for use in the financial
          ple Working Groups (WGs). The development of cryptographic
                                                                                                      domain.
          standards within ISO is primarily handled by two technical
                                                                                                      ISO standards are assigned standard numbers that are used to
          committees: TC68 and JTC1, the latter being a collaborative
                                                                                                      refer to them. For instance, ISO 8730 specifies the requirements
                                                                                                      for message authentication codes utilized in the financial sector.
 21
       https://www.iso.org                                                                            When ISO and the IEC publish a standard jointly via the JTC,

                                                                                         36
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 32 (continued).
 Protocol     RFC                 Year                    Purpose                                           Note                                       Recommendations

                                                                                                                                      Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)           PQ

              4307 [239]          2005   Define a set of mandatory-to-implement       ∙ Support:                                    ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                         cryptographic algorithms for the IKEv2       Symmetric encryption (3DES-CBC,               ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                      AES-128-CBC, AES_CTR, AES128_CBC,             MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                      AES_XCBC_96)
                                                                                      Hash and MAC functions (HMAC_MD5,
                                                                                      HMAC_MD5_96, HMAC-SHA-1,
                                                                                      HMAC_SHA-1_96)

              4434 [240]          2006   Describe the AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm      ∙ Support:
                                         for the IKE                                  Symmetric encryption (AES-XCBC-PRF-128)
                                                                                      Hash and MAC functions (HMAC-SHA-1,
                                                                                      MAC-PRF)

              5930 [241]          2010   Utilize the AES-CTR with the IKEv2           ∙ AES-CTR is employed by IKEv2 to             ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                      enhance the security and confidentiality of
                                                                                      data transmission
                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                      Symmetric encryption (AES-CTR)

              8420 [242]          2018   Utilization of the EdDSA within the IKEv2    ∙ Providing secure digital signatures and     ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital
                                                                                      ensuring the authenticity and integrity of    signatures
                                                                                      the exchanged data
                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                      Asymmetric digital signature (EdDSA)

              8784 [243]          2020   Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKEv2 for       ∙ Describe the extension of IKEv2 to          ∙ Refer to Tables 8, 12, and 13 for asymmetric
                                         Post-quantum Security                        provide resistance to quantum computers       cryptography
                                                                                      through the utilization of preshared keys     ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
 IKE-PQ
                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                      Asymmetric cryptography
                                                                                      Symmetric encryption

              draft-smyslov-      2023   Alternative procedure for Mixing Preshared   ∙ Provide protection against quantum          ∙ Refer to Table 13 for key establishment
              ipsecme-ikev2-qr-          Keys in IKEv2 for PQ Security                computers for both IPsec traffic and the      mechanisms
              alt-07 [244]                                                            initial IKEv2 SA in scenarios. This draft
                                                                                      Expired in October 2023
                                                                                      ∙ Support:
                                                                                      Pre-shared key mechanism



          it is recognized as an ISO/IEC standard. Notably, ISO 2700122                             (ii) International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
          is one of the most widely adopted international standards for                                  The IEC26 is in charge of producing standards for all types of
          Information Security Management Systems (ISMS). It offers orga-                                electrical and electronic technologies. Regarding cryptography
          nizations a systematic approach to managing sensitive company                                  and security-related issues, the IEC’s primary emphasis is on its
          information, ensuring its security across people, processes, and                               collaboration with ISO through the joint technical committee,
          IT systems by implementing a robust risk management pro-                                       JTC1. This collaboration helps the IEC to achieve its objectives
          cess. ISO 2700223 provides best practice recommendations on                                    in this field.
          information security management for use by those responsible                             (iii) International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
          for initiating, implementing, or maintaining ISMS. ISO 2701724
                                                                                                         ITU27 is an organization sponsored by the United Nations that
          offers guidelines for information security controls applicable to
                                                                                                         aims to facilitate global telecommunications networks and ser-
          the provision and use of cloud services, ensuring both cloud
                                                                                                         vices through government and corporate collaboration. ITU is
          service providers and their customers have the same informa-
                                                                                                         divided into three main branches, namely ITU-R, ITU-D, and
          tion security controls to mitigate risks in the cloud environ-
          ment. ISO 2701825 focuses on protecting personal data in the                                   ITU-T, where ITU-R is responsible for radio communication,
          cloud, establishing control objectives, controls, and guidelines                               ITU-D focuses on the development of telecommunications ser-
          for implementing measures to protect Personally Identifiable                                   vices, and ITU-T creates telecommunications standards. One of
          Information (PII) in accordance with the privacy principles in                                 the most important standards in ITU-T is the X series, which
          ISO 29100 for the public cloud computing environment. These                                    is concerned with data networks and emphasizes network de-
          ISO standards are essential for organizations to establish robust                              sign over cryptography. However, the X series covers signifi-
          information security management practices, especially in the era                               cant topics such as public-key infrastructures and cryptographic
          of increasing cyber threats and data breaches. In addition to                                  network services. ITU-T standards are typically referred to as
          standards, ISO issues technical reports, which are specifications                              ‘‘recommendations’’.
          for specific tasks rather than actual standards. Technical reports                       (iv) Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
          can be recognized by the letters ‘‘TR’’, as seen in the example of                             The Internet is the outcome of a collaborative effort between
          ISO/IEC TR 14516, which provides recommendations regarding                                     various entities such as governments, academia, and enterprises
          the utilization of trusted third parties.                                                      to establish a global communication network. To ensure the
                                                                                                         Internet functions efficiently and securely, it must be built on
 22
    https://www.iso.org/standard/27001
 23
    https://www.iso.org/standard/75652.html
 24                                                                                                26
    https://www.iso.org/standard/82878.html                                                             https://www.iec.ch
 25                                                                                                27
    https://www.iso.org/standard/76559.html                                                             https://www.itu.int


                                                                                          37
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 33
(Cont.) IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known network protocols (IPsec/IKE).
 Protocol     RFC            Year                   Purpose                                     Note                                         Recommendations

                                                                                                                          Classical (till 2030 & beyond)              PQ

              3602 [245]     2003   Describes the utilization of the       ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                    AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm for the       Symmetric encryption                         ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                    IPsec Encapsulating Security           (AES-CBC-128/192/256)                        MAC recommendations, respectively
                                    Payload (ESP)                          Hash and MAC functions
                                                                           (SHA-256/384/512, HMAC)

              3566 [246]     2003   Introduces the AES-XCBC-MAC-96         ∙ Support:
                                    algorithm and specifies its use with   Symmetric encryption (AES-XCBC,
                                    IPsec                                  AES-128)
                                                                           Hash and MAC functions (HMAC)

              4494 [247]     2006   Specify the use of the AES-CMAC-96     ∙ Support:
                                    algorithm for the IPsec                Symmetric encryption (AES-CMAC-96)
                                                                           Hash and MAC functions (MAC, CMAC)

              4894 [248]     2007   Discuss the usage of hash functions    ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
 IPsec/IKE                          in the IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec         Symmetric encryption (AES-XCBC-PRF-128)      ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                    protocols                              Hash and MAC functions                       MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                           (SHA-256/384/512, HMACs)                     ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                           PKI

              4308 [249]     2005   Provide the specification for          ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                    cryptographic suites used in IPsec     Symmetric encryption                         ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                           (TripleDES-CBC,AES-XCBC)                     MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                           Hash and MAC functions                       ∙ Refer to Table 13 for key establishments
                                                                           Diffie–Hellman

              6379 [250]     2011   Proposes cryptographic user            ∙ Support:
                                    interface suites for IPsec             Symmetric encryption
                                                                           (AES-GCM/GMAC-128/256)
                                                                           Hash and MAC functions
                                                                           (HMAC-SHA-256/384)
                                                                           Diffie–Hellman

              4106 [251]     2005   Utilization of GCM mode in IPsec       ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for
                                    Encapsulating Security Payload         Symmetric encryption                         symmetric encryption
                                    (ESP)                                  (AES-GCM-128/192/256)

              4312 [36]      2005   Describe the utilization of the        ∙ Support:
                                    Camellia algorithm for IPsec           Symmetric encryption
                                                                           (Camellia-128/192/256)

              3526 [252]     2003   Define new Modular Exponential         ∙ Introduces new Diffie–Hellman groups       ∙ Refer to Table 13 for key exchange
                                    (MODP) Diffie–Hellman Groups for       with varying bit lengths (2048, 3072,        ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                    the IKE                                4096, 6144, and 8192)
                                                                           ∙ Support:
                                                                           Asymmetric Key exchange (Diffie–Hellman
                                                                           (2048 to 8192 bit MODP Group))
                                                                           Symmetric encryption (AES-128/192/256)

                                                                                                                                                           (continued on next page)


       standardized communication protocols, which the IETF28 de-                                      IANA29 initially administered by Jon Postel in the late 1970s,
       signs. Apart from the IETF, the Internet Research Task Force                                    IANA’s functions are now operated by the Internet Corporation
       (IRTF) is also responsible for exploring research issues relevant                               for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). It manages the
       to the Internet in the long run. The IRTF is focused on exploring                               global allocation of IP addresses, domain names, protocol pa-
       new and innovative solutions to some of the Internet’s most com-                                rameters, and other Internet resources. IANA’s work ensures the
       plex and challenging issues, such as network security, scalability,                             stable and secure operation of the Internet’s unique identifiers
       and performance. Through these efforts, the IRTF helps to ensure                                through its coordination and management of various registries,
       that the Internet remains a vital and reliable resource for people                              such as the Domain Name System (DNS) root zone and the
       around the world.                                                                               Internet Protocol (IP) address space. Its responsibilities include
       In addition to developing Internet standards, the IETF has also                                 overseeing the assignment of Internet number resources to Re-
       created a set of publication records called Requests for Com-                                   gional Internet Registries (RIRs) and maintaining registries for
       ments (RFCs). These documents provide guidance, recommenda-                                     protocol parameters defined by the Internet Engineering Task
       tions, and information on a wide range of topics related to the                                 Force (IETF).
       Internet, including protocols, procedures, and concepts. RFCs are
       published openly and are freely available to the public, making                       A.2. National standardization organizations
       them an invaluable resource for developers, researchers, and
       anyone interested in the workings of the Internet.                                       The establishment of national standardization organizations is a
   (v) Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)                                            common practice across many countries aimed at ensuring standardiza-


 28                                                                                           29
      https://www.ietf.org                                                                         https://www.ietf.org/process/iana


                                                                                        38
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 33 (continued).
 Protocol     RFC           Year                    Purpose                                   Note                                          Recommendations

                                                                                                                          Classical (till 2030 & beyond)               PQ

              1828 [253]    1995    Utilization of keyed MD5 with the      ∙ Keyed MD5 is utilized to provide           ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                    IP Authentication Header               integrity and authentication
                                                                           ∙ Support:
                                                                           Hash function (MD5)

              2085 [254]    1997    Describe a keyed-MD5 transform to      ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                    be used with the IP Authentication     Hash and MAC functions (HMAC, MD5)           MAC recommendations, respectively
                                    Header

              2403 [255]    1998    Utilization of the HMAC algorithm
                                    with MD5 as an authentication
                                    mechanism in revised IPSEC

              2404 [256]    1998    Utilization of the HMAC algorithm      ∙ Support:
                                    using SHA-1 for authentication         Hash and MAC functions (HMAC, SHA-1)
                                    purposes within the updated IPSEC

              2857 [257]    2000    Utilization of the HMAC approach       ∙ Support:
                                    using the RIPEMD-160 algorithm         Hash and MAC functions (HMAC,
                                    for authentication within the          RIPEMD-160)
                                    revised IPSEC

              4868 [258]    2007    Employing HMAC along with the          ∙ Support:
                                    SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512          Hash and MAC functions (HMAC,
                                    algorithms within the realm of IPsec   SHA-256/384/512)

              6380 [259]    2011    Specify the conventions and            ∙ Providing relevant details and aiding      ∙ Refer to Tables 12 and 13 for asymmetric
                                    guidelines for using Suite B           developers who opt to implement Suite B      cryptography
                                    cryptography in (IPsec)                cryptography in IPsec                        ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                           ∙ Support:                                   ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                           Asymmetric Key exchange (ECDH (P-256 &       MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                           P-384))                                      ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                           Asymmetric digital signature (ECDSA
                                                                           (P-256 & P-384))
                                                                           Symmetric encryption (AES-128/256)
                                                                           Hash (SHA-256/384) and MAC (HMAC,
                                                                           GMAC-128, GCM-256) functions
                                                                           PKI

              5529 [35]     2009    Utilization of the Camellia            ∙ Camellia algorithm is an                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                    algorithm in various modes (CBC,       optional-to-implement component in IKEv2     ∙ Refer to Table 11 for MAC recommendations
                                    CTR, and CCM) with IPsec               and ESP, offering robust security features
                                                                           for secure communication over the Internet
                                                                           ∙ Support:
                                                                           Symmetric encryption
                                                                           (Camellia-CBC/CTR/CCM-128/192/256)
                                                                           MAC function



tion in various fields. These entities have the autonomy to produce their                     (ii) British Standards Institution (BSI)
standards while also collaborating with international standardization                              BSI32 is responsible for managing standardization efforts in the
bodies to contribute to the development of global standards. This dual                             United Kingdom and serves as the official member body rep-
role enables national standardization bodies to maintain a balance be-                             resenting the country in ISO. While BSI is not widely known
tween domestic needs and global standards, promoting interoperability                              for its technical cryptographic standards, it has made signifi-
and enhancing efficiency in various sectors.                                                       cant contributions to the field of management techniques. For
                                                                                                   instance, BSI has produced several influential standards, such as
      (i) American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
          ANSI30 functions as the coordinating organization for volun-                             the BS 7799-2 standard, which provides guidelines and require-
          tary standardization initiatives in the United States (U.S.) and                         ments for information security management systems. Overall,
          represents the U.S. in the ISO. In addition to its coordination                          BSI’s contributions to the field of standardization extend beyond
          role, ANSI is also responsible for developing its own standards,                         cryptography and highlight the importance of organizational
          which cover a wide range of industries and technologies. Among                           management and processes in ensuring security and efficiency in
          the standardization bodies accredited by ANSI, X931 is the most                          various sectors. Later, it was adopted by ISO (ISO/IEC 27001) in
          eminent in cryptography. X9 is dedicated to creating, publishing,                        2005.
          and advocating standards for the financial services industry and                   (iii) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
          working in close collaboration with the ISO’s TC68 commit-                               NIST33 is a significant standards organization in the United
          tee. Thanks to its expertise and contributions, X9 has played                            States that operates as the federal agency responsible for stan-
          a vital role in ensuring the security and integrity of financial                         dardization within the technology administration of the U.S.
          transactions worldwide, and its standards are widely adopted by                          Commerce Department. In addition to its wide-ranging secu-
          financial institutions and organizations.


 30                                                                                          32
      http://www.ansi.org                                                                         https://www.bsigroup.com
 31                                                                                          33
      https://x9.org                                                                              https://www.nist.gov


                                                                                        39
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114




Table 34
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known network protocols (SSH).
 Protocol           RFC               Year               Purpose                                     Note                                          Recommendations

                                                                                                                                 Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                    4251 [260]        2006   SSH Protocol Architecture         ∙ Support:                                      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                               Symmetric encryption (3DES, AES)                ∙ Refer to Table 13 for Key exchange
                                                                               Asymmetric key exchange (DH)                    ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                               Hash and MAC functions (MAC, HMAC,              MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               SHA-1)

                    6668 [261]        2012   SHA-2 Data Integrity              ∙ Support:                                      ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                             Verification for the SSH          Hash and MAC functions (HMAC,                   MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                               SHA-2-256, SHA-2-512)

                    draft-gutmann     2022   A Pre-Authentication Mechanism    ∙ Support:
                    -ssh-preauth-00          for SSH. This draft Expired in    Hash and MAC functions (HMAC,
                    [262]                    June 2023.                        SHA-256)

                    9142 [263]        2022   Revisions to the suggested        ∙ Revision of SSH protocol’s key exchange       ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                             number of key exchange            methods to address the need for stronger        ∙ Refer to Table 13 for Key exchange
 SSH                                         techniques within the SSH         security                                        ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                             protocol                          ∙ Support:
                                                                               Asymmetric key exchange (ECC, DH,
                                                                               ECDH, RSA-1024/2048)
                                                                               Symmetric encryption (3DES-cbc,
                                                                               AES-128/192/256)
                                                                               Hash functions (SHA-1, SHA-256/384/512)

                    6594 [264]        2012   Enhance the SSHFP DNS             ∙ Support:                                      ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital
                                             Resource Record by                Asymmetric digital signature (RSA, DSA,         signatures
                                             incorporating the SHA-256         ECDSA)                                          ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                             algorithm with RSA, DSA, and      Hash-function (SHA-256)
                                             ECDSA

                    8332 [265]        2018   Introducing new public key        Asymmetric digital signature
                                             algorithms using RSA keys         (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
                                             alongside SHA-256 and SHA-512     Hash functions (SHA-256/512)
                                             in the SSH Protocol

                    8709 [266]        2020   Outlines the utilization of the   Asymmetric digital signature (Ed25519 and
                                             Ed25519 and Ed448 digital         Ed448)
                                             signature schemes in the SSH      Hash functions (SHA-256)

                    8731 [267]        2020   Specifies the usage of            ∙ Incorporating key exchange methods in         ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                             Curve25519 and Curve448 key       SSH for enhanced security and                   digital signature and key establishment
                                             exchange algorithms in the SSH    cryptographic operations                        mechanisms, respectively
                                             protocol                          ∙ Support:                                      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                               Asymmetric key exchange (ECDH,
                                                                               Curve25519, Curve448), key agreement
                                                                               (ECMQV), and digital signature (ECDSA)
                                                                               Hash functions (SHA-256/512)

                    8268 [268]        2017   Enhancement of the Modular        ∙ Rectification of an error pertaining to the   ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                             Exponentiation (MODP) DH Key      verification of the Peer’s DH Public Key        cryptography
                                             Exchange (KEX) Groups             ∙ Support:                                      ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                             dedicated to SSH                  Asymmetric key exchange (DH, ECDH,
                                                                               ECDSA)
                                                                               Hash functions (SHA-256/512)

                                                                                                                                                              (continued on next page)




        rity standards, NIST has also developed various measurement,                        A.3. Industrial standardization organizations
        testing, and evaluation protocols. Nonetheless, NIST is perhaps
        best known for its role in creating the AES encryption algo-                            The production of cryptographic standards is not limited to govern-
                                                                                            ments and government-led organizations, as the business community
        rithm, which is broadly implemented. NIST issues its standards
                                                                                            also takes the initiative to establish standards in this field.
        as Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), which are
        mandated for use in various U.S. government agencies and by                               (i) Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
        many private organizations. NIST is currently in the process                                  The 3GPP34 is a collaborative platform that unites multiple
        of developing standards for Post-Quantum (PQ) cryptography,                                   corporations and standardization organizations in developing
                                                                                                      third-generation cellular networks. Given that security and pri-
        which is designed to be resistant to attacks by quantum com-
                                                                                                      vacy are crucial aspects of these advanced networks, the 3GPP
        puters [8]. The goal is to ensure that the cryptographic systems
        used to secure our digital infrastructure remain secure even in
                                                                                             34
        the face of quantum computing advances.                                                   http://www.3gpp.org


                                                                                     40
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 34 (continued).
 Protocol           RFC                 Year               Purpose                                  Note                                        Recommendations

                                                                                                                              Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                    6239 [269]          2011   Cryptographic Suites for SSH     ∙ Incorporates ECDH key agreement,          ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                                                                ECDSA, AES-GCM, SHA-2 family hashes         digital signature and key establishment
                                                                                (SHA-256 and SHA-384), and X.509            mechanisms, respectively
                                                                                certificates                                ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                Asymmetric key agreement (ECDH) and         MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                digital signature (ECDSA)
                                                                                Symmetric encryption (AES-GCM-128/256)
                                                                                Hash (SHA-256 and SHA-384) and MAC
                                                                                functions

                    4252 [270]          2006   Define the SSH authentication    ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                               protocol designed for secure     Asymmetric cryptography                     cryptography
                                               remote login and network         Hash functions                              ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               services

                    4432 [271]          2006   RSA Key Exchange for the SSH     ∙ Support:
                                               Protocol                         Asymmetric encryption (RSAES-OAEP
                                                                                (1024,2048))
                                                                                Hash functions (SHA-1,SHA-256)

                    4344 [272]          2006   SSH Transport Layer Encryption   ∙ Provides guidelines for SSH               ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                               Modes                            implementation rekeying                     ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                ∙ Support:                                  MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                Symmetric encryption (3DES-CTR,
                                                                                AES-CTR-128/192/256)
                                                                                Hash and MAC functions (HMAC, SHA-1)

                    4462 [273]          2006   Outlines the usage of the        ∙ Support:                                  ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
                                               Generic Security Service         Asymmetric key exchange (DH)                ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                               Application Program Interface    Hash-function (SHA-1)
                                               (GSS-API) Authentication and
                                               Key Exchange within the
                                               framework of the SSH Protocol

 SSH-Hybrid         draft-kampanakis-   2023   Defines PQ hybrid key exchange   ∙ It combines classical ECDH key exchange   ∙ Refer to Table 13 for asymmetric key exchange
                    curdle-ssh-pq-ke-          methods in the SSH               with PQ KEM. This draft Expired in          ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                    01[111]                                                     October 2023                                MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                                ∙ Support:
                                                                                Asymmetric key exchange: Classical (ECDH
                                                                                (x25519)) and PQ (kyber-512/768/1024)
                                                                                Hash and MAC functions
                                                                                (SHA-256/384/512, HMAC)



        has played a crucial role in standardizing both network security                          second major standardization group is the 802 group, which
        characteristics and cryptographic approaches to ensure the pro-                           is focused on developing standards for wireless local area net-
        tection of sensitive information transmitted over these networks.                         works. This group is responsible for producing the widely used
        Through this effort, the 3GPP has helped to establish a high                              802.11 series of standards, which have revolutionized the way
        level of security for mobile communications, which has become                             we connect to the Internet and communicate wirelessly.
        increasingly essential in our digital age.                                           (iv) Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG)
   (ii) European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI)                                     Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced as a novel
        ETSI35 is a self-governing entity that consists of organizations                          type of public-key cryptography based on complex mathematical
        that have a mutual objective of creating telecommunications                               structures in the early 1990s. A group of businesses spearheaded
        standards. It is among the organizational collaborators that par-                         by Certicom was the first to recognize the potential of this
        ticipate in coordinating the 3GPP project.                                                innovative cryptographic approach in the corporate world. To
  (iii) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)                                  facilitate interoperability and tackle practical concerns associ-
        IEEE36 is a professional organization of engineers that strives to                        ated with ECC, these businesses established the SECG.37 In the
        facilitate the exchange of technical knowledge and information                            year 2000, two standards were released by the SECG. The first,
        related to electrical and electronic engineering. It also plays a                         SEC 1, standardized the application of ECC in cryptography.
        pivotal role in hosting conferences and publishing books and                              This standard laid out a framework for implementing elliptic
        journals to promote the dissemination of information in these                             curve cryptography in various settings such as digital signatures,
        fields. From a cryptographic standpoint, there are two major                              key exchange, and encryption. The second standard, SEC 2,
        standardization groups within the IEEE that are of particular                             advocated specific parameters, such as curve equations and point
        interest. The first group, known as the 1363 group, concentrates                          representations, for utilizing ECC.
        on developing standards related to asymmetric cryptography.                           (v) Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCSs)
        These standards cover a broad range of topics, including key                              RSA Laboratories stands out as one of the few companies that
        management, digital signatures, and public key encryption. The                            have independently developed a comprehensive set of standards
                                                                                                  in addition to collections of businesses producing industrial

 35
      http://www.etsi.org
 36                                                                                          37
      https://standards.ieee.org                                                                  http://www.secg.org


                                                                                      41
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 35
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for well-known network protocols (FTP).
 Protocol           RFC          Year                  Purpose                                    Note                                         Recommendations

                                                                                                                               Classical (till 2030 & beyond)          PQ

                    2228 [274]   1997   FTP Security Extensions               ∙ Specify Internet standards and solicit       ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric cryptography
                                                                              feedback for improvement                       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                              ∙ Support:                                     ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
 FTP                                                                          Asymmetric keys (RSA)
                                                                              Hash functions
                                                                              Authentication

                    2577 [275]   1999   To address security vulnerabilities   ∙ Highlights issues with proxy FTP and         ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
                                        in the FTP specification and          unlimited password attempts, offering
                                        provide recommendations for           suggestions for improving security in FTP
                                        mitigating associated risks           implementations
                                                                              ∙ Support: Authentication

                    4253 [276]   2006   Describes SSH as a secure protocol    ∙ Defines SSH transport layer, encryption,     ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                        for remote login and network          authentication, and algorithms used for        digital signature and Key exchange, respectively
                                        services over an insecure network     secure network communication                   ∙ Refer to Table 6 and Table B.37 for symmetric
                                                                              ∙ Support:                                     encryption and recommendations on classical and
                                                                              Asymmetric key exchange (DH) and               PQ modes
                                                                              signature (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, DSS)             ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                              Symmetric encryption (3DES-CBC,                MAC recommendations, respectively
 SFTP                                                                         AES-CBC-128/192/256)                           ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
                                                                              Hash and MAC functions (MD5, SHA-1,            ∙ Refer to Table 34 for SSH
                                                                              HMAC)
                                                                              Authentication and SSH

                    6668 [261]   2012   Defines algorithm names and           ∙ Introduces a novel data integrity            ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                        parameters for SHA-2 family hash      algorithm for SSH, updating RFC 4253           MAC recommendations, respectively
                                        algorithms for data integrity         ∙ Support:                                     ∙ Refer to Table 34 for SSH
                                        verification                          Hash and MAC functions (HMAC,
                                                                              SHA-2-256, SHA-2-512)
                                                                              SSH

                    4217 [277]   2005   To outline a mechanism for            ∙ Specifies the required extensions and        ∙ Refer to Table 23 for Authentication
 FTPS                                   implementing TLS-based security       parameters, discusses policy considerations,   ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                        and authentication in FTP clients     and promotes interoperability
                                        and servers                           ∙ Support: Authentication and TLS



       standards. The PKCS began as simple standards for using the                              groups that define and refine specifications, such as the Security
       RSA encryption and signature schemes but later expanded to                               Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and the OpenDocument
       cover all aspects of asymmetric cryptography, including key                              Format (ODF), through a transparent and consensus-driven pro-
       management, cryptographic message syntax, and cryptographic                              cess. OASIS provides a neutral and collaborative environment
       token interfaces. The PKCS series has been widely adopted and                            for stakeholders from diverse industries to collaborate on the
       has significantly impacted the development of public-key cryp-                           development of standards that address common challenges and
       tography.
                                                                                                enable the seamless exchange of information and services across
  (vi) CA/Browser Forum
                                                                                                different platforms and systems.
       Formed in 2005, the CA/Browser Forum38 comprises leading
                                                                                         (viii) Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Alliance and Coalition
       Certificate Authorities (CAs) and browser vendors, aiming to
                                                                                                The emergence of the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Al-
       enhance the security and trustworthiness of SSL/TLS certificates
                                                                                                liance40 and Coalition41 was prompted by the increasing threat
       used in web encryption. The forum establishes guidelines and
       best practices for CAs and browser vendors, developing base-                             posed by quantum computing. These organizations are dedi-
       line requirements and extended validation guidelines to ensure                           cated to standardizing and promoting cryptographic algorithms
       the integrity and authenticity of digital certificates. Its work                         and protocols resistant to quantum attacks. By collaborating to
       addresses evolving security threats and industry needs, promot-                          evaluate and endorse candidate algorithms, they contribute to
       ing the adoption of cryptographic best practices and standards-                          the development of future-proof cryptographic standards. Engag-
       compliant certificate issuance and validation processes. Through                         ing researchers, cryptographers, industry stakeholders, and stan-
       collaboration and consensus-building, the CA/Browser Forum                               dards bodies, they strive to advance the state of cryptography
       strives to maintain trust in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)                         and ensure long-term security against emerging threats. Their
       ecosystem and protect users from fraudulent activities and secu-                         work is crucial in preparing for the transition to quantum-safe
       rity vulnerabilities.                                                                    cryptographic algorithms and mitigating risks to information
 (vii) Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Stan-                         security and privacy.
       dards (OASIS)                                                                            The landscape of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has wit-
       Founded in 1993 as a nonprofit consortium, OASIS39 develops                              nessed the emergence of two significant entities: the PQC Al-
       open standards for security, cloud computing, web services,
                                                                                                liance and the PQC Coalition. Their shared purpose is to address
       and other areas to facilitate interoperability and promote in-
       dustry collaboration. It hosts technical committees and working

                                                                                          40
                                                                                              https://pqca.org
 38                                                                                       41
    https://cabforum.org                                                                      www.mitre.org/news-insights/news-release/post-quantum-cryptography-
 39
    https://www.oasis-open.org/org                                                       coalition-launches


                                                                                    42
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 36
IETF cryptographic standards/drafts for S/MIME.
 Protocol           RFC          Year                    Purpose                              Note                                           Recommendations

                                                                                                                            Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)            PQ

                    8551 [279]   2019    S/MIME Version 4.0 Message       ∙ Outlines how to add cryptographic             ∙ Refer to Table 8, Table 12, and Table 13 for
                                         Specification                    signature and encryption services to MIME       asymmetric cryptography
                                                                          data, including using the multipart/signed      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                          media type for S/MIME signed messages           ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                          ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature         MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                          (RSA, ECDSA), encryption (RSA) and key
                                                                          establishment (DH, ECDH), Symmetric
                                                                          encryption (AES-GCM-128/256, ChaCha20),
                                                                          Hash and MAC functions (MD5, SHA-1,
                                                                          SHA-2, Poly1305, HMAC)

                    2634 [280]   1999    Enhanced Security Services for   ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature         ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                         S/MIME                           (RSA,DSS), Hash function (SHA-1)                ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations

                    6210 [281]   2011    Hash Functions with Parameters   ∙ Support: Asymmetric digital signature         ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
 S/MIME                                  in the CMS and S/MIME            (RSA), Hash and Mac functions (MD5,             ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                          SHA-1, HMAC)                                    MAC recommendations, respectively

                    3657 [282]   2004    Utilizing the Camellia           ∙ Support: Symmetric encryption                 ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                         encryption algorithm with CMS    (Camellia-cbc-128/192/256,
                                                                          AES-128/192/256)

                    9216 [283]   2022    S/MIME Example Keys and          ∙ Defining a small set of X.509v3               ∙ Refer to Table 8, Table 12, Table 13 for
                                         Certificates                     certificates and keys                           asymmetric cryptography
                                                                          ∙ Support: Asymmetric cryptography (RSA,        ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                          Ed25519, ECDH), symmetric encryption            ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                          (AES-128), Hash and MAC functions               MAC recommendations, respectively
                                                                          (SHA-256, HMAC), PKI (X.509)                    ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations

                    9219 [284]   2022    Signature Verification           ∙ Specifies an extension to ‘‘The JSON          ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric digital signature
                                                                          Meta Application Protocol (JMAP) for
                                                                          Mail’’ (RFC 8621) for returning the
                                                                          S/MIME signature verification status
                                                                          ∙ Support: Digital Signature

                    8823[285]    2021    Automatic Certificate            ∙ The ACME process for issuing S/MIME           ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                         Management Environment           certificates to email users requires specific   ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                          identifiers and challenges
                                                                          ∙ Support: Hash functions (SHA-256), PKI
                                                                          (X.509)

                    8550 [286]   2019    (S/MIME) Version 4.0             ∙ Support: Asymmetric Encryption and            ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 12 for asymmetric
                                         Certificate Handling             signatures (RSA, ECDSA, DSA), Hash              cryptography
                                                                          functions (SHA-1, SHA-256), PKI (X.509,         ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                          PKIX)                                           ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations

                                                                                                                                                        (continued on next page)


        the threat posed by quantum computing to cryptographic sys-                           various technical projects, such as software development for new
        tems. Focusing on standardization and promotion of quantum-                           post-quantum algorithms and hosting initiatives like the Open
        resistant cryptographic algorithms, they collaborate to evalu-                        Quantum Safe project and the PQ Code Package Project, the
        ate and endorse candidate algorithms, contributing to the es-                         PQCA welcomes organizations and individuals to participate and
        tablishment of future-proof cryptographic standards. Their re-                        contribute to the advancement of post-quantum cryptography.
        sponsibility involves engaging various stakeholders to advance
        cryptography and ensure long-term security against emerging                    Appendix B. Standards for modes of operation
        threats.
        Comprised of members such as IBM Quantum, Microsoft, MITRE,                        As shown in Table B.37, each operational mode is analyzed for its
        PQShield, SandboxAQ, and the University of Waterloo, the PQC                   intended purpose (confidentiality, authentication, or both), standard-
        Coalition is dedicated to facilitating global adoption of PQC.                 ization body, and year of publication. The ‘Mode’ column confirms
        Their efforts include advancing standards relevant to PQC mi-                  support for all listed modes in their respective rows, while the ‘Algo-
        gration, creating educational materials, producing open-source,                rithm’ column indicates support for corresponding modes listed in their
        production-quality code, and ensuring cryptographic agility. The               respective rows. Furthermore, the ‘Note’ column provides specific infor-
        Coalition aims to streamline organizational migration to PQC                   mation about each standard. For detailed guidelines on cryptographic
        and provide comprehensive guidance for the community.                          recommendations, including the basic criteria we follow, please refer
        In February 2024, the Linux Foundation introduced the Post-                    to Section 3.2.
        Quantum Cryptography Alliance (PQCA) to drive the advance-
        ment and adoption of post-quantum cryptography. Supported                      B.1. Recommendations
        by founding members like Amazon Web Services (AWS), Cisco,
        Google, and IBM, the PQCA aims to secure sensitive data and                       Based on our recommendations presented in Table B.37, we con-
        communications in the post-quantum era. Their objective in-                    clude CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR are post-quantum resistant if they come
        cludes providing production-ready libraries and packages and                   with a block cipher that is post-quantum safe such as AES-256, which
        enabling cryptographic agility across the ecosystem. Engaging in               means the security of these modes depends on the security of the block

                                                                                  43
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


Table 36 (continued).
 Protocol           RFC            Year                Purpose                                      Note                                       Recommendations

                                                                                                                              Classical   (till 2030 & beyond)             PQ

                    8591 [287]     2019    SIP-Based Messaging with             ∙ Support: Asymmetric encryption (RSA)      ∙ Refer to Table 8 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                           S/MIME                               and key agreement (ECDH-curve25519),        cryptography
                                                                                Symmetric encryption (AES-128), Hash        ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                function (SHA-256), PKI                     ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                                                            ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations

                    8162 [288]     2017    Using Secure DNS to Associate        ∙ Defines how to associate an S/MIME        ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                           Certificates with Domain Names       user’s certificate with a domain name       ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                           for S/MIME                           using secure DNS                            ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                                                                ∙ Support: Hash functions (SHA-256,
                                                                                SHA-512), TLS, PKI

                    7508 [289]     2015    Securing Header Fields with          ∙ Explains how the S/MIME protocol can      ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS
                                           S/MIME                               secure message headers, known as ‘Secure
                                                                                Headers’, defined in RFC 5322
                                                                                ∙ Support: TLS

                    6318 [290]     2011    Suite B in S/MIME                    ∙ Support: Asymmetric signature             ∙ Refer to Table 12 and Table 13 for asymmetric
                                                                                (ECDSA-P-256/384) and key agreement         cryptography
                                                                                (ECDH-P-256/384), symmetric encryption      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                (AES-CBC-128/256), Hash function            ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                (SHA-256/384)

                    6664 [291]     2012    S/MIME Capabilities for Public       ∙ Support: Asymmetric signature             ∙ Refer to Table 8, Table 12, and Table 13 for
                                           Key Definitions                      (RSASSA-PSS), key transport (RSAES-OAEP)    asymmetric cryptography
                                                                                and key agreement (DH), Hash function       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256)

                    7107[292]      2014    Object Identifier Registry for the   ∙ Support: Asymmetric cryptography (RSA,    ∙ Refer to Table 8 for asymmetric cryptography
                                           S/MIME Mail Security Working         ECC), symmetric encryption (AES), Hash      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                           Group                                and Mac functions (MD5, HMAC)               ∙ Refer to Table 10 and Table 11 for Hash and
                                                                                                                            MAC recommendations, respectively

                    4262 [293]     2005    X.509 Certificate Extension for      ∙ Support: PKI                              ∙ Refer to Table 24 for PKI recommendations
                                           S/MIME Capabilities

                    7281 [294]     2014    Authentication-Results
                                           Registration for S/MIME
                                           Signature Verification

                    3853 [295]     2004    S/MIME AES Requirement for           ∙ Require the AES for S/MIME                ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric signature
                                           the Session Initiation Protocol      ∙ Support: Asymmetric signature (RSA),      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                           (SIP)                                Symmetric encryption (AES), Hash function   ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                (SHA-1), TLS                                ∙ Refer to Table 31 for TLS

                    3854 [296]     2004    Securing X.400 Content with          ∙ Describes a protocol for adding           ∙ Refer to Table 12 for asymmetric signature
                                           S/MIME                               cryptographic signature and encryption      ∙ Refer to Table 6 for symmetric encryption
                                                                                services to X.400 content with S/MIME       ∙ Refer to Table 10 for Hash recommendations
                                                                                ∙ Support: Asymmetric signature (RSA,
                                                                                DSA), Symmetric encryption (AES), HASH
                                                                                function (SHA-1)



cipher. In addition, chosen block cipher should be PRF, and finally,                             (i) ChaCha20: ChaCha20 is a reliable and versatile stream cipher
each mode should be IND-qCPA qPRF to be post-quantum resistant.                                      algorithm widely used for secure encryption. It has gained pop-
We also provide recommendations for each mode regarding classical                                    ularity due to its simplicity, efficiency, and high level of security.
and post-quantum cryptography. CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR, CMAC, CCM,                                        The IETF has standardized ChaCha20, and various RFCs are
GCM, KW, KWP, and TKW modes are considered post-quantum safe                                         available in Table 7 to cover different aspects of it.
under certain conditions. However, it is essential to note that using
                                                                                                     Based on the evaluation presented by Bathe et al. [40], ChaCha20-
3DES block cipher in any mode will be prohibited42 after 2023 (By
                                                                                                     256, in its current configuration of 20 rounds, cannot be con-
NIST [32]). In contrast, encrypting confidential information using ECB,
                                                                                                     sidered quantum-resistant to a degree comparable to AES-256.
as indicated in the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD), is
considered a severe security vulnerability.                                                          The analysis demonstrates that ChaCha20 falls short of meeting
                                                                                                     the quantum security criteria established by NIST, primarily due
Appendix C. Stream ciphers                                                                           to its lower complexity when subjected to Grover’s quantum
                                                                                                     search algorithm. Specifically, ChaCha20-256 would require sig-
                                                                                                     nificantly fewer quantum resources to break compared to AES-
C.1. Stream ciphers standards                                                                        256. According to the authors’ estimations, ChaCha would need
                                                                                                     approximately 166 rounds (far beyond its standard implementa-
    We thoroughly examined the Stream Ciphers Standards and have
                                                                                                     tion) to attain a quantum security level equivalent to AES-256.
summarized them in Table 7, detailing several key columns. For de-
                                                                                                     For clarity and ease of reference, this recommended configura-
tailed guidelines on table columns and cryptographic recommenda-
tions, please refer to Section 3.2.                                                                  tion can be denoted as ChaCha166-256, indicating a version of
                                                                                                     ChaCha with a 256-bit key and 166 rounds. ChaCha20-256 can
                                                                                                     be considered tentatively quantum-safe and is recommended for
 42
      https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2023/nist-to-withdraw-sp-800-67-rev-2                               non-critical applications [308].

                                                                                      44
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114




Table B.37
Standards for modes of operation.
 Mode         Standards       Year             Purpose          Algorithm                        Note                                          Recommendations

                                                                                                                                  Classical                          PQ
                                                                                                                           (till 2030 & beyond)                  (Available)

 ECB                                                                         Consider disallowing ECB to encrypt         NIST proposes limiting ECB approval to instances
                                                                             secrets. (March 2023)                       explicitly allowed by other NIST standards or
                                                                                                                         guidance.

 CBC                                                                         Security of CBC depends on the              CBC-128/192/256              CBC-256 (IND-qCPA
              NIST SP                                                        security of AES (as a PRP)                                               qPRF)
                              2010      Confidentiality Modes   AES
              800-38E [300]
 CFB                                                                         Camellia-256                                CFB-128/192/256              CFB-256 (IND-qCPA
                                                                                                                                                      qPRF)

 OFB                                                                                                                     OFB-128/192/256               OFB-256 (IND-qCPA
                                                                                                                                                      qPRF)

 CTR                                                                                                                     CTR-128/192/256              CTR-256 (IND-qCPA
                                                                                                                                                      qPRF)

 XTS          NIST SP         2010                                           The key size for XTS is twice the           128, 192, 256 bit            None
              800-38E [300]                                                  security strength

 FF1          NIST SP         2013                                                                                       None                         None
              800-38G [301]
 FF3

 CMAC         NIST SP         2005      Authentication mode                  CMAC is a variant of CBC-MAC, the           128, 256 bit                 CMAC-256
              800-38B                                                        security properties of CMAC are similar                                  (IND-qCPA qPRF)
              [302]                                                          to those of CBC

 CCM          NIST SP         2004                                           It is considered to be secure when used     128, 192, 256 bit
              800-38C                                                        with a secure block cipher, such as
              [303]                                                          AES. The size of the MAC also affects
                                                                             the security of CCM mode. A larger
                                                                                                                                                      256 bits
                                                                             MAC size provides greater security
                                        Combined modes for
 GCM          NIST SP          2007     confidentiality and                  Suitable for files less than 64 GiB The     128, 192, 256 bit
              800-38D                   authentication                       size of the MAC is fixed at 128 bits.
              [304]                                                          The recommended authentication tag
              IEEE 802.11                                                    size for GCM mode is 128 bits, which
              [305]                                                          provides a high level of security
                                                                             against known attacks

 KW           NIST SP                                                        To wrap a 256-bit key using AES Key         128, 192, 256 bit
                              2013
              800-38G                                                        Wrap, you would need to use AES-256
 KWP
              [301]                                                          for the encryption steps
 TKW

 TECB-I       NIST SP         2012      Confidentiality Modes   3DES (ANSI
              800-20∗ [306]                                     X9.52)                                                 Disallowed after 2023
 KW                                     Combined modes for
              NIST SP
                                        confidentiality and
 TKW          800-38F [307]
                                        authentication

(∗) Withdrawn on September 26, 2018.




Table D.38
Public-key algorithms broken by Shor’s algorithm.
 Algorithm                              Function                                 Security based on                                       Specification
 RSA (PKCS#1, OAEP, PSS)                Key Establishment, Digital Signatures    Integer Factorization                                   PKCS#1, FIPS 186
 Diffie–Hellman (DH)                    Key Establishment                        Discrete Logarithm (finite field)                       NIST SP 800-56A/B/C, RFC 3526
 Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)   Key Establishment                        Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     NIST SP 800-56A, FIPS 186
 MQV, ECMQV                             Key Establishment                        Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     NIST SP 800-56A
 X25519, X448                           Key Establishment                        Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     RFC 7748
 DSA                                    Digital Signatures                       Discrete Logarithm (finite field)                       FIPS 186
 ElGamal                                Encryption                               Discrete Logarithm (finite field)                       IEEE P1363
 ECDSA                                  Digital Signatures                       Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     FIPS 186-5
 Ed25519, Ed448 (EdDSA)                 Digital Signatures                       Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     RFC 8032
 BLS Signatures                         Digital Signatures                       Discrete Logarithm (pairing-friendly curves)            draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature
 ECIES, EC-ElGamal                      Encryption/Key Encapsulation             Discrete Logarithm (elliptic curve)                     ISO/IEC 18033-2




   (ii) RC4: The RC4 algorithm is a popular symmetric stream cipher                              longer considered secure for most applications due to vulnera-
          used to encrypt data in many cryptographic systems and pro-                            bilities in its design that have been discovered over time [309].
          tocols. However, it is important to be aware that RC4 is no                            Table 7 provides details on the standardization of RC4 by

                                                                                 45
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                     Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


                    Table D.39
                    Symmetric algorithms affected by Grover’s algorithm.
                     Category                    Examples                                          Mitigation/Recommendation
                     Block Ciphers               AES-128, SM4, SEED                                Use AES-256 to restore ≥128-bit
                                                                                                   post-quantum security
                     Stream Ciphers              ChaCha20, Salsa20                                 Use AES-256 in CTR, OFB or CFB mode, with
                                                                                                   a recommendation to use CTR mode
                     Hash Functions              SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256,              Use SHA-512 or SHA3-512 to maintain
                     (collision resistance)      SHA3-512, SM3                                     ≥128-bit post-quantum collision resistance
                     Hash Functions              SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-family                     SHA-256 provides 128-bit PQ security;
                     (preimage resistance)                                                         SHA-512 provides 256-bit PQ security
                     Message Authentication      HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA512, Poly1305                Use HMAC-SHA512 or 256-bit keys to
                                                                                                   maintain ≥128-bit post-quantum security
                     Authenticated               AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM,                         Use AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20–Poly1305
                     Encryption                  ChaCha20–Poly1305                                 with 256-bit keys; 128-bit tags remain secure


                       Table D.40
                       Recommended post-quantum replacements for vulnerable classical algorithms.
                         Replace this                     With (PQC algorithm)                Notes/Remarks
                         RSA, DH, ECDH, MQV, X25519       ML-KEM-768/1024 (Kyber)             NIST FIPS 203; lattice-based KEM; hybrid mode
                                                                                              (e.g., X25519+ML-KEM-768) recommended
                                                                                              during transition
                         RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DSA           ML-DSA-65/87 (Dilithium),           NIST FIPS 204, 205; ML-DSA balances
                                                          SLH-DSA-128/256 (SPHINCS+)          size/speed; SLH-DSA is stateless hash-based;
                                                                                              FN-DSA (Falcon) under consideration


        IETF, NIST, IEEE, and ISO. However, it is no longer recom-                          AES-CTR is a stream cipher mode that is easy to implement,
        mended by any of these organizations. For encryption purposes,                      parallelize, and pipelined. It also supports key stream precompu-
        it is recommended to use more secure alternatives, such as the                      tation and has a smaller implementation size compared to other
        AES.                                                                                AES modes.
  (iii) SNOW 2.0: The Snow stream cipher was first created for cellular
        communication standards like 3G and 4G. Its purpose is to                     Appendix D. Algorithms vulnerable to quantum attacks
        offer efficient and secure encryption for wireless communication.
        ISO/IEC 18033 includes SNOW 2.0 stream cipher algorithms                          Shor’s algorithm efficiently solves two mathematical problems that
        standards and recommendations [310].                                          are fundamental to modern public-key cryptography: integer factor-
  (iv) Trivium: Trivium is a stream cipher method that is able to                     ization and the discrete logarithm problem (in both finite fields and
        balance speed and hardware usage, while still being efficient                 elliptic curve groups). As a result, any cryptographic scheme that
        when implemented in software. Trivium is a hardware-efficient                 depends on these computational hardness assumptions will become
        cipher that is easy to use and performs well. However, it has                 completely insecure once large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers
        been analyzed and found to have weaknesses. To ensure secure                  are realized. Table D.38 summarizes the major affected algorithms and
        communication and data protection, it is recommended to use                   their underlying security foundations.
        other modern and thoroughly tested stream ciphers, such as                        Once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer becomes available,
        those found in the eSTREAM portfolio or the AES [311]. As a                   the above schemes will provide no security guarantees whatsoever.
        lightweight stream cipher, ISO has some standardization and                   Past ciphertexts and signatures generated using these algorithms can
        recommendations for it in ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012 [48].                          be retrospectively compromised under a harvest-now, decrypt-later
   (v) Enocoro: Enocoro is a family of pseudorandom number genera-                    (HNDL) threat model, in which adversaries collect encrypted data today
        tors (stream ciphers). It comprises two algorithms, Enocoro-80                to decrypt once quantum capabilities mature. Organizations managing
        and Enocoro-128v1.1, which have key lengths of 80 bits and 128                long-lived sensitive data, such as medical records, financial transac-
        bits, respectively [312]. ISO/IEC 29192-3:2012 [48] provides                  tions, or classified government communications, should prioritize the
        standardization and recommendations for Enocoro.                              immediate transition away from these algorithms.
  (vi) Grain: There are two types of Grain ciphers: an 80-bit and a                       While Shor’s algorithm completely compromises public-key cryp-
        128-bit variant labeled as Grain and Grain-128, respectively.                 tosystems, Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic speedup for exhaus-
        These designs utilize two shift registers and a nonlinear output              tive key search, effectively reducing the security strength of symmetric
        function, and are intended for hardware environments with                     primitives by up to half in the worst case. For example, a 128-bit
        limited gate count, power consumption, and memory. Addi-                      key provides at most 64-bit quantum security against Grover’s attack,
        tionally, expanding the hardware can make the ciphers faster,                 whereas a 256-bit key retains up to 128-bit post-quantum security.
        but this comes at a cost [313]. Grain-128AEAD is a highly                     Table D.39 summarizes the effects on symmetric algorithms and the
        compatible choice for the Internet of Things (IoT) and em-                    corresponding recommended countermeasures.
        bedded systems due to its significant advantages. Its previous
        versions have also proven to be relevant in industrial appli-                 D.1. PQC replacements
        cations. NIST and ISO provide recommendations for handling
        Grain in their respective publications, NISTIR 8369 and ISO/IEC                  To mitigate quantum threats, NIST has standardized PQC algorithms
        29167-13:2015 [50].                                                           specifically designed to resist both classical and quantum attacks. These
 (vii) AES-CTR: AES-CTR is a stream cipher that utilizes the AES block                algorithms are based on mathematical problems believed to be hard for
        cipher. It XORs the key stream generated by AES encryption of                 quantum computers, including lattice problems, hash-based signatures
        sequential counter block values to encrypt and decrypt data.                  and code-based cryptography. During the transition period, hybrid

                                                                                 46
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


modes that combine classical and PQC algorithms are strongly rec-                             [22] UK National Cyber Security Centre, Post-quantum cryptography migration
ommended to ensure security against both current and future threats.                               timelines and guidance, 2024, URL https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-
                                                                                                   migration-timelines.
Table D.40 provides a practical migration roadmap from vulnerable
                                                                                              [23] Z. Huang, S. Sun, Synthesizing quantum circuits of AES with lower t-depth
classical schemes to their quantum-resistant counterparts.                                         and less qubits, in: International Conference on the Theory and Application of
                                                                                                   Cryptology and Information Security, Springer, 2022, pp. 614–644.
Data availability                                                                             [24] M. Grassl, B. Langenberg, M. Roetteler, R. Steinwandt, Applying Grover’s
                                                                                                   algorithm to AES: quantum resource estimates, in: Post-Quantum Cryptography,
                                                                                                   Springer, 2016, pp. 29–43.
    No data was used for the research described in the article.
                                                                                              [25] NIST, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): Security (Evaluation Criteria),
                                                                                                   2021,            https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-
                                                                                                   quantum-cryptography-standardization/evaluation-criteria/security-(evaluation-
References                                                                                         criteria)#FN5. (Online; Accessed 10 February 2022).
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                                                                                         47
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                 Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


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                                                                                         48
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                                                                                        49
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                  Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


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[142] C.W. Kaufman, DASS-Distributed Authentication Security Service, RFC 1507 Re-                   RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8702, URL https://www.rfc-
      quest for Comments, RFC Editor, 1993, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC1507,                      editor.org/info/rfc8702.
      URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1507.                                             [164] A. Medvinsky, M. Hur, Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer
[143] R. Atkinson, N.M. Haller, On Internet Authentication, RFC 1704 Request for                     Security (TLS), RFC 2712 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 1999, http://dx.
      Comments, RFC Editor, 1994, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC1704, URL https:                     doi.org/10.17487/RFC2712, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2712.
      //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1704.                                                       [165] K. Raeburn, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption for Kerberos
                                                                                                     5, RFC 3962 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.
[144] N.M. Haller, The S/KEY One-Time Password System, RFC 1760 Request for
                                                                                                     17487/RFC3962, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3962.
      Comments, RFC Editor, 1995, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC1760, URL https:
                                                                                               [166] M.J. Jenkins, M. Peck, K.W. Burgin, AES Encryption with HMAC-SHA2 for
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                                                                                                     Kerberos 5, RFC 8009 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2016, http://dx.
[145] D.C. Neuman, S. Hartman, K. Raeburn, T. Yu, The Kerberos Network Authenti-
                                                                                                     doi.org/10.17487/RFC8009, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8009.
      cation Service (V5), RFC 4120 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2005, http://
                                                                                               [167] K. Jaganathan, K. Lauter, L. Zhu, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Support for
      dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4120, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120.
                                                                                                     Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT), RFC
[146] ISO Central Secretary, Information Technology – Open Systems Interconnection                   5349 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      – the Directory: Public-Key and Attribute Certificate Frameworks, Standard                     RFC5349, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5349.
      ISO/IEC 9594-8, International Organization for Standardization, 2020, URL                [168] S. Josefsson, Using Kerberos Version 5 over the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
      https://www.iso.org/standard/80325.html.                                                       Protocol, RFC 6251 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.
[147] ISO Central Secretary, Information Technology-Security Techniques-                             org/10.17487/RFC6251, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6251.
      Specification of TTP Services to Support the Application of Digital Signatures,          [169] G. Hudson, Camellia Encryption for Kerberos 5, RFC 6803 Request for Com-
      Standard ISO/IEC 15945:2002, International Organization for Standardization,                   ments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6803, URL https://
      2002, URL https://www.iso.org/standard/29578.html.                                             www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6803.
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      and Policy Framework, Standard ISO/IEC 21188:2018, International Organi-                       tiple Message Authentication Codes (MACs), RFC 7751 Request for Comments,
      zation for Standardization, 2018, URL https://www.iso.org/standard/63134.                      RFC Editor, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7751, URL https://www.rfc-
      html.                                                                                          editor.org/info/rfc7751.
[149] American Bankers Association, et al., ANSI X9. 62: The Elliptic Curve Dig-               [171] L. Astrand, L. Zhu, M. Cullen, M. Cullen, G. Hudson, Public Key Cryptography
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      Association, 1999.                                                                             quest for Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8636,
[150] American Bankers Association, et al., ANSI X9. 63 elliptic curve key agreement                 URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8636.
      and key transport protocols.[on-line], 1999.                                             [172] S. Rose, M. Larson, D. Massey, R. Austein, R. Arends, DNS Security Introduction
                                                                                                     and Requirements, RFC 4033 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2005, http://
[151] B. Kaliski, PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5, RFC 2315 Re-
                                                                                                     dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4033, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033.
      quest for Comments, RFC Editor, 1998, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC2315,
                                                                                               [173] S. Josefsson, Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS), RFC
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                                                                                                     4398 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
[152] R. Housley, J. Schaad, B. Kaliski, Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for
                                                                                                     RFC4398, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398.
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                                                                                               [174] R. Arends, G. Sisson, D. Blacka, B. Laurie, DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed
      Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, RFC 4055 Request
                                                                                                     Authenticated Denial of Existence, RFC 5155 Request for Comments, RFC Ed-
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4055, URL
                                                                                                     itor, 2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5155, URL https://www.rfc-editor.
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055.
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[153] K. Moriarty, B. Kaliski, A. Rusch, PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography                  [175] O. Kolkman, M. Mekking, R.M. Gieben, DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version
      Specification Version 2.1, RFC 8018 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                          2, RFC 6781 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.
      2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8018, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                      17487/RFC6781, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781.
      info/rfc8018.                                                                            [176] V. Dolmatov, A. Degtyarev, GOST R 34.10-2012: Digital Signature Algorithm,
[154] S. Turner, D.R.L. Brown, Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms                   RFC 7091 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.
      in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), RFC 5753 Request for Comments,                          17487/RFC7091, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091.
      RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5753, URL https://www.rfc-               [177] O. Surý, R. Edmonds, Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for
      editor.org/info/rfc5753.                                                                       DNSSEC, RFC 8080 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2017, http://dx.doi.
[155] T. Polk, R. Housley, S. Turner, D.R.L. Brown, K. Yiu, Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-                org/10.17487/RFC8080, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080.
      phy Subject Public Key Information, Request for Comments, (5480) RFC Editor,             [178] P.E. Hoffman, W. Wijngaards, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
      2009, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5480, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                      for DNSSEC, RFC 6605 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.
      info/rfc5480.                                                                                  doi.org/10.17487/RFC6605, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6605.
[156] P. Kampanakis, Q. Dang, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional             [179] V. Dolmatov, I. Ustinov, A. Chuprina, Use of GOST Signature Algorithms
      Algorithm Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs, RFC 8692 Re-                      in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC, RFC 5933 Request
      quest for Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8692,                      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5933, URL
      URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692.                                                   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5933.
[157] D.R.L. Brown, Q. Dang, T. Polk, S. Santesson, K. Moriarty, Internet X.509                [180] J. Jansen, Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource
      Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and                   Records for DNSSEC, RFC 5702 Request for Comments, (5702) RFC Editor,
      ECDSA, RFC 5758 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/                     2009, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5702, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      10.17487/RFC5758, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5758.                                 info/rfc5702.
                                                                                               [181] D.E.E. 3rd, RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System
[158] R. Housley, T. Polk, L.E.B. III, Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet
                                                                                                     (DNS), RFC 3110 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2001, http://dx.doi.org/
      X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
                                                                                                     10.17487/RFC3110, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3110.
      Profile, RFC 3279 Request for Comments, (3279) RFC Editor, 2002, http://dx.
                                                                                               [182] B. Makarenko, V. Dolmatov, Use of GOST 2012 Signature Algorithms in
      doi.org/10.17487/RFC3279, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279.
                                                                                                     DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC, Internet-Draft draft-
[159] D. Shefanovski, S. Leontiev, Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-
                                                                                                     makarenko-gost2012-dnssec-05, Internet Engineering Task Force, 2024, URL
      2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
                                                                                                     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-makarenko-gost2012-dnssec/05/, Work in
      Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile, RFC 4491 Request for Comments,
                                                                                                     Progress.
      RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4491, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                               [183] H. Lee, T. Kwon, DNSSEC Extension by Using PKIX Certificates, Internet-
      editor.org/info/rfc4491.
                                                                                                     Draft draft-dnsop-dnssec-extension-pkix-01, Internet Engineering Task Force,
[160] J. Schaad, H. Prafullchandra, Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms,                   2023, URL https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dnsop-dnssec-extension-pkix/
      RFC 6955 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.                         01/, Work in Progress.
      17487/RFC6955, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6955.                              [184] C. Zhang, Y. Liu, F. Leng, Q. Zhao, Z. He, SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm
[161] R. Housley, Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key                     for DNSSEC, Internet-Draft draft-cuiling-dnsop-sm2-alg-05, Internet Engineering
      Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), RFC 9045 Request                     Task Force, 2023, URL https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cuiling-dnsop-sm2-
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9045, URL                        alg/05/, Work in Progress.
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045.                                                 [185] I. Young, L. Johansson, S. Cantor, The Entity Category Security Assertion
[162] S. Turner, Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax, RFC                        Markup Language (SAML) Attribute Types, RFC 8409 Request for Comments,
      5754 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/                       RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8409, URL https://www.rfc-
      RFC5754, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754.                                          editor.org/info/rfc8409.


                                                                                          50
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


[186] J. Howlett, S. Hartman, A. Pérez-Méndez, A RADIUS Attribute, Binding, Profiles,        [209] W. Denniss, J. Bradley, OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps, RFC 8252 Request for
      Name Identifier Format, and Confirmation Methods for the Security Assertion                  Comments, RFC Editor, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8252, URL https:
      Markup Language (SAML), RFC 7833 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                           //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252.
      2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7833, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/              [210] M.B. Jones, N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata,
      info/rfc7833.                                                                                RFC Editor Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.
[187] B. Campbell, C. Mortimore, M.B. Jones, Security Assertion Markup Language                    17487/RFC8414, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414.
      (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization               [211] W. Denniss, J. Bradley, M.B. Jones, H. Tschofenig, OAuth 2.0 Device Autho-
      Grants, RFC 7522 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/                  rization Grant, RFC 8628 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.
      10.17487/RFC7522, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7522.                               doi.org/10.17487/RFC8628, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628.
[188] K. Wierenga, E. Lear, S. Josefsson, A Simple Authentication and Security Layer         [212] M.B. Jones, A. Nadalin, B. Campbell, J. Bradley, C. Mortimore, OAuth 2.0 Token
      (SASL) and GSS-API Mechanism for the Security Assertion Markup Language                      Exchange, RFC 8693 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.
      (SAML), RFC 6595 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.                      org/10.17487/RFC8693, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693.
      org/10.17487/RFC6595, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6595.                     [213] Y. Wilson, A. Hingnikar, SAML 2, in: Solving Identity Management in Modern
[189] G. Whitehead, et al., Metadata Profile for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup               Applications: Demystifying OAuth 2, OpenID Connect, and SAML 2, Springer,
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[191] OASIS Committee Specification 01, SAML v2.0 Metadata Profile for Algo-                       pher Suites for TLS, RFC 5288 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2008, http://
      rithm Support Version 1.0,, 2011, URL http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/                   dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5288, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288.
      saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-metadata-algsupport-v1.0-cs01.odt.                              [217] M. Badra, Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and
[192] W. Draft, SAML V2. 0 holder-of-key web browser SSO profile version 1.0, 2008.                AES Galois Counter Mode, RFC 5487 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
[193] L. Seitz, Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication and Authorization for               2009, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5487, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      Constrained Environments (ACE), RFC 9201 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                   info/rfc5487.
      2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9201, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
                                                                                             [218] I. Hajjeh, M. Badra, ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security
      info/rfc9201.
                                                                                                   (TLS), RFC 5489 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2009, http://dx.doi.org/
[194] B. Campbell, J. Bradley, N. Sakimura, T. Lodderstedt, OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS
                                                                                                   10.17487/RFC5489, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5489.
      Client Authentication and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens, RFC 8705 Request
                                                                                             [219] M.K. A. Kato, S. Kanno, Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS, RFC 5932 Request
      for Comments, (8705) RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8705,
                                                                                                   for Comments, RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5932, URL
      URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705.
                                                                                                   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5932.
[195] J. Richer, OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection, RFC 7662 Request for Comments,
                                                                                             [220] D. McGrew, D. Bailey, AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security
      RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7662, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                                   (TLS), RFC 6655 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/
      editor.org/info/rfc7662.
                                                                                                   10.17487/RFC6655, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655.
[196] M.B. Jones, B. Campbell, C. Mortimore, JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for
                                                                                             [221] D. McGrew, D. Bailey, M. Campagna, R. Dugal, AES-CCM Elliptic Curve
      OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants, RFC 7523 Request
                                                                                                   Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for TLS, RFC 7251 Request for Comments,
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7523, URL
                                                                                                   RFC Editor, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7251, URL https://www.rfc-
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523.
                                                                                                   editor.org/info/rfc7251.
[197] W. Mills, T. Showalter, H. Tschofenig, A Set of Simple Authentication and
                                                                                             [222] E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC
      Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms for OAuth, RFC 7628 Request for Comments,
                                                                                                   8446 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7628, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                                   RFC8446, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446.
      editor.org/info/rfc7628.
                                                                                             [223] E. Rescorla, TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES
[198] N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, N. Agarwal, Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth
                                                                                                   Galois Counter Mode (GCM), RFC 5289 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      Public Clients, RFC 7636 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.
                                                                                                   2008, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC5289, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      doi.org/10.17487/RFC7636, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636.
                                                                                                   info/rfc5289.
[199] B. Campbell, C. Mortimore, M.B. Jones, Y.Y. Goland, Assertion Framework for
      OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants, RFC 7521 Request             [224] A.O. Freier, P. Karlton, P.C. Kocher, The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7521, URL                      Version 3.0, RFC 6101 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521.                                                     org/10.17487/RFC6101, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6101.
[200] N. Sakimura, J. Bradley, M.B. Jones, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework:            [225] Y. Sheffer, P. Saint-Andre, T. Fossati, Recommendations for Secure Use of
      JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR), RFC 9101 Request for Comments,                      Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS),
      RFC Editor, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9101, URL https://www.rfc-                   RFC 9325 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.
      editor.org/info/rfc9101.                                                                     17487/RFC9325, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325.
[201] L. Seitz, G. Selander, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig, Authentication        [226] Y. Nir, S. Josefsson, M. Pégourié-Gonnard, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
      and Authorization for Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Frame-                    Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier, RFC
      work (ACE-OAuth), RFC 9200 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2022, http://                   8422 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9200, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200.                    RFC8422, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422.
[202] T. Lodderstedt, M. McGloin, P. Hunt, OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security               [227] S.V. Smyshlyaev, E. Alekseev, E. Griboedova, A. Babueva, L. Nikiforova, GOST
      Considerations, RFC 6819 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2013, http://dx.                  Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC
      doi.org/10.17487/RFC6819, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819.                       9367 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2023, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
[203] J. Richer, M.B. Jones, J. Bradley, M. Machulak, P. Hunt, OAuth 2.0 Dynamic                   RFC9367, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9367.
      Client Registration Protocol, RFC 7591 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,               [228] L. Bruckert, J. Merkle, M. Lochter, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool
      2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7591, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                    Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Version 1.3, RFC 8734 Request
      info/rfc7591.                                                                                for Comments, RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8734, URL
[204] M.B. Jones, D. Hardt, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token                    https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8734.
      Usage, RFC 6750 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/             [229] J. Merkle, M. Lochter, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for
      10.17487/RFC6750, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750.                               Transport Layer Security (TLS), RFC 7027 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
[205] V. Bertocci, JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens, RFC                   2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7027, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      9068 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/                     info/rfc7027.
      RFC9068, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068.                                  [230] N. Mavrogiannopoulos, D.K. Gillmor, Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer
[206] D. Hardt, The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, RFC 6749 Request for                        Security (TLS) Authentication, RFC 6091 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6749, URL https:                   2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6091, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749.                                                           info/rfc6091.
[207] T. Lodderstedt, S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu, OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation, RFC               [231] P. Gutmann, Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Data-
      7009 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/                     gram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), (7366) RFC Editor, 2014, http://dx.doi.
      RFC7009, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009.                                        org/10.17487/RFC7366, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366.
[208] J. Richer, M.B. Jones, J. Bradley, M. Machulak, OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client               [232] E. Rescorla, H. Tschofenig, N. Modadugu, The Datagram Transport Layer
      Registration Management Protocol, RFC 7592 Request for Comments, RFC Ed-                     Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC 9147 Request for Comments,
      itor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7592, URL https://www.rfc-editor.                  RFC Editor, 2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9147, URL https://www.rfc-
      org/info/rfc7592.                                                                            editor.org/info/rfc9147.


                                                                                        51
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                 Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


[233] V. Smyslov, Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in IKEv2, Internet-             [256] K.R. Glenn, C.R. Madson, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, RFC
      Draft Draft-Ietf-Ipsecme-Ikev2-Auth-Announce-03, Internet Engineering Task                    2404 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 1998, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      Force, 2023, URL https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-auth-              RFC2404, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2404.
      announce/03/, Work in Progress.                                                         [257] A.D. Keromytis, N. Provos, The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and
[234] C. Kaufman, P.E. Hoffman, Y. Nir, P. Eronen, T. Kivinen, Internet Key Exchange                AH, RFC 2857 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2000, http://dx.doi.org/10.
      Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 7296 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                        17487/RFC2857, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2857.
      2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7296, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/               [258] S. Frankel, S.G. Kelly, Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
      info/rfc7296.                                                                                 512 with IPsec, RFC 4868 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2007, http://dx.
[235] C. Tjhai, M. Tomlinson, G. Bartlett, S. Fluhrer, D.V. Geest, O. Garcia-Morchon,               doi.org/10.17487/RFC4868, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868.
      V. Smyslov, Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol                [259] K. Burgin, M. Peck, Suite B Profile for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), RFC
      Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 9370 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2023, http://                   6380 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9370, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9370.                     RFC6380, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6380.
[236] T. Kivinen, J. Snyder, Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange            [260] C.M. Lonvick, T. Ylonen, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC
      Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 7427 Request for Comments, (7427) RFC Editor,                          4251 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7427, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                     RFC4251, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251.
      info/rfc7427.                                                                           [261] M.D. Baushke, d. bider, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell
[237] Y. Sheffer, S. Fluhrer, Additional Diffie-Hellman Tests for the Internet Key
                                                                                                    (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 6668 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 6989 Request for Comments,
                                                                                                    2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6668, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      RFC Editor, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6989, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                                    info/rfc6668.
      editor.org/info/rfc6989.
                                                                                              [262] P. Gutmann, A Pre-Authentication Mechanism for SSH, Internet-Draft draft-
[238] D.E. Fu, J. Solinas, IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve
                                                                                                    gutmann-ssh-preauth-00, Internet Engineering Task Force, 2022, URL https:
      Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), RFC 4754 Request for Comments, (4754)
                                                                                                    //datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gutmann-ssh-preauth/00/, Work in Progress.
      RFC Editor, 2007, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4754, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                              [263] M.D. Baushke, Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for
      editor.org/info/rfc4754.
                                                                                                    Secure Shell (SSH), RFC 9142 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2022, http://
[239] J.I. Schiller, Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange
                                                                                                    dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9142, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9142.
      Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 4307 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2005, http://
      dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4307, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4307.               [264] O. Surý, Use of the SHA-256 Algorithm with RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm
[240] P.E. Hoffman, The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange                    (DSA), and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) in SSHFP Resource Records, RFC
      Protocol (IKE), RFC 4434 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.                   6594 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      doi.org/10.17487/RFC4434, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4434.                        RFC6594, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6594.
[241] S. murthy, S. Shen, Y. Mao, Using Advanced Encryption Standard Counter Mode             [265] d. bider, Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell
      (AES-CTR) with the Internet Key Exchange version 02 (IKEv2) Protocol, RFC                     (SSH) Protocol, RFC 8332 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.
      5930 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2010, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/                      doi.org/10.17487/RFC8332, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8332.
      RFC5930, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5930.                                   [266] B. Harris, L. Velvindron, Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the
[242] Y. Nir, Using the Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) in the                    Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol, RFC 8709 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 8420 Request for                        2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8709, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
      Comments, RFC Editor, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8420, URL https:                    info/rfc8709.
      //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8420.                                                      [267] A. Adamantiadis, S. Josefsson, M.D. Baushke, Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange
[243] S. Fluhrer, P. Kampanakis, D. McGrew, V. Smyslov, Mixing Preshared Keys                       Method Using Curve25519 and Curve448, RFC 8731 Request for Comments,
      in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum                      RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8731, URL https://www.rfc-
      Security, RFC 8784 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2020, http://dx.doi.                     editor.org/info/rfc8731.
      org/10.17487/RFC8784, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8784.                      [268] M.D. Baushke, More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH)
[244] V. Smyslov, Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for                       Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH), RFC 8268 Request for
      Post-quantum Security, Internet-Draft draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-08, In-              Comments, RFC Editor, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8268, URL https:
      ternet Engineering Task Force, 2023, URL https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/                    //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8268.
      draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt/08/, Work in Progress.                               [269] K. Igoe, Suite B Cryptographic Suites for Secure Shell (SSH), RFC 6239 Request
[245] S. Frankel, K.R. Glenn, S.G. Kelly, The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use                  for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6239, URL
      with IPsec, RFC 3602 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2003, http://dx.doi.                   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6239.
      org/10.17487/RFC3602, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3602.                      [270] C.M. Lonvick, T. Ylonen, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC
[246] S. Frankel, H.C. Herbert, The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With                      4252 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      IPsec, RFC 3566 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2003, http://dx.doi.org/                    RFC4252, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252.
      10.17487/RFC3566, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3566.                          [271] B. Harris, RSA Key Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
[247] R. Poovendran, J. Song, J. Lee, The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use with                    Protocol, RFC 4252 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.
      IPsec, RFC 4494 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/                    org/10.17487/RFC4432, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4432.
      10.17487/RFC4494, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4494.                          [272] C. Namprempre, T. Kohno, M. Bellare, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
[248] P.E. Hoffman, Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and
                                                                                                    Encryption Modes, RFC 4344 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://
      IPsec, RFC 4894 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2007, http://dx.doi.org/
                                                                                                    dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4344, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4344.
      10.17487/RFC4894, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4894.
                                                                                              [273] J.A. Salowey, V. Welch, J. Hutzelman, J. Galbraith, Generic Security Service
[249] P.E. Hoffman, Cryptographic Suites for IPsec, RFC 4308 Request for Comments,
                                                                                                    Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Authentication and Key Exchange for
      RFC Editor, 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4308, URL https://www.rfc-
                                                                                                    the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol, RFC 4462 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      editor.org/info/rfc4308.
                                                                                                    2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4462, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
[250] L. Law, J. Solinas, Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec, RFC 6379 Request
                                                                                                    info/rfc4462.
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6379, URL
                                                                                              [274] S.J. Lunt, FTP Security Extensions, RFC 2228 Request for Comments, RFC Ed-
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6379.
                                                                                                    itor, 1997, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC2228, URL https://www.rfc-editor.
[251] J. Viega, D. McGrew, The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec
                                                                                                    org/info/rfc2228.
      Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
      2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4106, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/               [275] M. Allman, S. Ostermann, FTP Security Considerations, Request for Comments,
      info/rfc4106.                                                                                 RFC Editor, 1999, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC2577, URL https://www.rfc-
[252] M. Kojo, T. Kivinen, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups                    editor.org/info/rfc2577.
      for Internet Key Exchange (IKE), RFC 3526 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,             [276] C.M. Lonvick, T. Ylonen, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC
      2003, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC3526, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                     4253 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2006, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/
      info/rfc3526.                                                                                 RFC4253, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253.
[253] P.E. Metzger, W.A. Simpson, IP Authentication Using Keyed MD5, RFC 1828 Re-             [277] P. Ford-Hutchinson, Securing FTP with TLS, RFC 4217 Request for Comments,
      quest for Comments, RFC Editor, 1995, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC1828,                     RFC Editor, 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4217, URL https://www.rfc-
      URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1828.                                                  editor.org/info/rfc4217.
[254] M. Oehler, K.R. Glenn, HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention,               [278] J. Schaad, B. Ramsdell, S. Turner, Secure/multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
      RFC 2085 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 1997, http://dx.doi.org/10.                        (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Message Specification, Tech. Rep., 2019.
      17487/RFC2085, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2085.                             [279] J. Schaad, B.C. Ramsdell, S. Turner, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Ex-
[255] K.R. Glenn, C.R. Madson, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH, RFC                        tensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Message Specification, RFC 8551 Request for
      2403 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 1998, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/                      Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8551, URL https:
      RFC2403, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2403.                                         //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551.


                                                                                         52
V. Chouhan et al.                                                                                                                 Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104114


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      smime-rfc2634-update-00, Internet Engineering Task Force, 2004, URL https://                 purpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), RFC 3854 Request for Comments,
      datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-smime-rfc2634-update/00/, Work in Progress.              RFC Editor, 2004, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC3854, URL https://www.rfc-
[281] J. Schaad, Experiment: Hash Functions with Parameters in the Cryptographic                   editor.org/info/rfc3854.
      Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME, RFC 6210 Request for Comments, RFC Ed-                [297] European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Quantum safe cryptography
      itor, 2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6210, URL https://www.rfc-editor.                  and security, 2015, URL https://www.etsi.org/images/files/ETSIWhitePapers/
      org/info/rfc6210.                                                                            QuantumSafeWhitepaper.pdf.
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      graphic Message Syntax (CMS), RFC 3657 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                     resistant public key infrastructure, in: International Workshop on Post-Quantum
      2004, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC3657, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                    Cryptography, Springer, 2017, pp. 384–405.
      info/rfc3657.                                                                          [299] N. Alnahawi, N. Schmitt, A. Wiesmaier, A. Heinemann, T. Grasmeyer, On
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                                                                                                   the state of crypto-agility, 2023, URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/487, https:
      Comments, RFC Editor, 2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9216, URL https:
                                                                                                   //eprint.iacr.org/2023/487, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/487.
      //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9216.
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                                                                                                   Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, National
      Application Protocol (JMAP), RFC 9219 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
                                                                                                   Institute of Standards & Technology, 2010.
      2022, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC9219, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
                                                                                             [301] M. Dworkin, et al., Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
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                                                                                                   Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, vol. 800, NIST Special Publication,
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      End-User S/MIME Certificates, RFC 8823 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                     2016, p. 38G.
      2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8823, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/              [302] M.J. Dworkin, SP 800-38B. Recommendation For Block Cipher Modes of
      info/rfc8823.                                                                                Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, National Institute of Standards
[286] J. Schaad, B.C. Ramsdell, S. Turner, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Ex-                   & Technology, 2005.
      tensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0 Certificate Handling, RFC 8550 Request for               [303] M.J. Dworkin, SP 800-38c. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Opera-
      Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8550, URL https:                   tion: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, National Institute
      //www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8550.                                                           of Standards & Technology, 2004.
[287] B. Campbell, R. Housley, SIP-Based Messaging with S/MIME, RFC 8591 Request             [304] M.J. Dworkin, SP 800-38d. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Oper-
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2019, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8591, URL                      ation: Galois/counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, National Institute of Standards
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8591.                                                     & Technology, 2007.
[288] P.E. Hoffman, J. Schlyter, Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with             [305] B. Crow, I. Widjaja, J. Kim, P. Sakai, IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area networks,
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      2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC8162, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                    620533.
      info/rfc8162.                                                                          [306] S.K. (NIST), Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryp-
[289] L. Cailleux, C. Bonatti, Securing Header Fields with S/MIME, RFC 7508 Request                tion Algorithm (TMOVS): Requirements and Procedures, vol. 800, NIST Special
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7508, URL                      Publication, 2012, p. 20.
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7508.                                               [307] M. Dworkin, NIST Special Publication 800-38F December 2012, vol. 800, NIST
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      (S/MIME), RFC 6318 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2011, http://dx.doi.              [308] NCC Group, Post-Quantum Cryptography Overview, Tech. Rep., NCC
      org/10.17487/RFC6318, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6318.                           Group, 2016, URL https://www.nccgroup.com/media/swdbffg3/_ncc-group-
[291] J. Schaad, S/MIME Capabilities for Public Key Definitions, RFC 6664 Request                  cryptographic-services.pdf, Section: Post-quantum algorithm overview. States
      for Comments, RFC Editor, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC6664, URL                      that current symmetric ciphers with 256-bit keys, such as AES-256 and
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6664.
                                                                                                   ChaCha20, are believed to be quantum-resistant.
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      Group, RFC 7107 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/
                                                                                             [310] P. Ekdahl, T. Johansson, A new version of the stream cipher SNOW, in: Selected
      10.17487/RFC7107, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7107.
                                                                                                   Areas in Cryptography: 9th Annual International Workshop, SAC 2002 St.
[293] S. Santesson, X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
                                                                                                   John’s, Newfoundland, Canada, August 15–16, 2002 Revised Papers 9, Springer,
      Extensions (S/MIME) Capabilities, RFC 4262 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,
                                                                                                   2003, pp. 47–61.
      2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC4262, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
                                                                                             [311] C. De Canniere, B. Preneel, Trivium, in: New Stream Cipher Designs: The
      info/rfc4262.
[294] A. Melnikov, Authentication-Results Registration for S/MIME Signature Verifi-                ESTREAM Finalists, Springer, 2008, pp. 244–266.
      cation, RFC 7281 Request for Comments, RFC Editor, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/            [312] L. Jiao, Y. Hao, D. Feng, Stream cipher designs: a review, Sci. China Inf. Sci.
      10.17487/RFC7281, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7281.                               63 (2020) 1–25.
[295] J. Peterson, S/MIME Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Requirement for the             [313] M. Hell, T. Johansson, W. Meier, J. Sönnerup, H. Yoshida, An AEAD variant
      Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), RFC 3853 Request for Comments, RFC Editor,                of the grain stream cipher, in: International Conference on Codes, Cryptology,
      2004, http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC3853, URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/                    and Information Security, Springer, 2019, pp. 55–71.
      info/rfc3853.




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