                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


                                                                   Contents lists available at ScienceDirect


                                                        Computer Standards & Interfaces
                                                            journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/csi




ARMOR: A multi-layered adaptive defense framework for robust deep
learning systems against evolving adversarial threatsI
                                      ∗
Mahmoud Mohamed                        , Fayaz AlJuaid
Electrical and Computer Engineering , King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia



ARTICLE               INFO                                ABSTRACT

Keywords:                                                 Introduction: Adversarial attacks represent a major challenge to deep learning models deployed in critical
Adversarial machine learning                              fields such as healthcare diagnostics and financial fraud detection. This paper addresses the limitations of
Deep learning security                                    single-strategy defenses by introducing ARMOR (Adaptive Resilient Multi-layer Orchestrated Response), a novel
Multi-layered defense
                                                          multi-layered architecture that seamlessly integrates multiple defense mechanisms.
Robustness evaluation
                                                          Methodology: We evaluate ARMOR against seven state-of-the-art defense methods through extensive experi-
Adaptive security
                                                          ments across multiple datasets and five attack methodologies. Our approach combines adversarial detection, in-
                                                          put transformation, model hardening, and adaptive response layers that operate with intentional dependencies
                                                          and feedback mechanisms.
                                                          Results: Quantitative results demonstrate that ARMOR significantly outperforms individual defense methods,
                                                          achieving a 91.7% attack mitigation rate (18.3% improvement over ensemble averaging), 87.5% clean accuracy
                                                          preservation (8.9% improvement over adversarial training alone), and 76.4% robustness against adaptive
                                                          attacks (23.2% increase over the strongest baseline).
                                                          Discussion: The modular framework design enables flexibility against emerging threats while requiring only
                                                          1.42× computational overhead compared to unprotected models, making it suitable for resource-constrained
                                                          environments. Our findings demonstrate that activating and integrating complementary defense mechanisms
                                                          represents a significant advance in adversarial resilience.



1. Introduction                                                                               However, existing defenses are typically based on single strategies
                                                                                          such as adversarial training [6], input preprocessing [7], or detection
    Deep learning technologies have been widely adopted in critical                       models [8]. While effective against specific attacks, these methods
sectors including autonomous vehicles, medical diagnostics, and cy-                       often fail when facing diverse or adaptive attacks [9]. This limita-
bersecurity. While they offer powerful capabilities, they also introduce                  tion is increasingly concerning as adversaries continue to evolve their
new security vulnerabilities. Adversarial examples—carefully crafted                      strategies. Furthermore, existing techniques often suffer from high com-
inputs designed to deceive models—pose significant risks to AI sys-                       putational costs, degraded performance on clean data, and continued
tems [1,2]. Small, seemingly imperceptible distortions can cause state-                   susceptibility to adaptive attacks [10].
of-the-art models to misclassify inputs, which may have life-threatening                      Problem Statement: This paper addresses the vulnerability of deep
consequences in safety-critical applications [3].                                         learning systems to adversarial attacks in mission-critical environments.
    Recent advances in deep learning have highlighted the importance                      Current defenses exhibit three key weaknesses:
of robust defense mechanisms. For example, UNet-based segmentation
models in medical imaging have achieved approximately 96% accuracy                            1. They typically optimize for a single threat model, leaving them
in COVID-19 detection from CT scans [4]. Similarly, CNN and BiGRU                                exposed to diverse attack strategies.
models have demonstrated strong performance in traffic network anal-                          2. They employ static approaches that cannot adapt to evolving
ysis with an R-squared of 0.9912 [5]. These successes underscore the                             threats.
critical need for robust defenses, particularly as deep learning models                       3. They fail to balance performance and security, often sacrificing
are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making processes.                          accuracy on benign data.



 I This article is part of a Special issue entitled: ‘Secure AI’ published in Computer Standards & Interfaces.
 ∗ Corresponding author.
     E-mail address: mhassan0085@stu.kau.edu.sa (M. Mohamed).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2025.104117
Received 2 June 2025; Received in revised form 2 December 2025; Accepted 12 December 2025
Available online 17 December 2025
0920-5489/© 2025 Elsevier B.V. All rights are reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.
M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                       Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


These weaknesses motivate the need for an agile and flexible defense            2.3. Detection-based defenses
architecture.
    Research Gaps: Our comprehensive literature survey, following                   Detection methods aim to identify adversarial examples without
systematic review methodologies [11], identifies several critical gaps:         necessarily correcting them. Metzen et al. [8] attached a binary detec-
                                                                                tor subnetwork to identify adversarial inputs. Lee et al. [22] used Ma-
    • Most defenses optimize for a single threat model, creating vulner-        halanobis distance-based confidence scores to detect out-of-distribution
      abilities across diverse attack strategies [12].
                                                                                samples.
    • Current ensemble approaches typically use simple voting or aver-              Recent approaches include statistical methods using odds ratio
      aging, failing to leverage the complementary strengths of different
                                                                                tests [23] and Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) [24] to characterize
      defense mechanisms [13].
                                                                                adversarial regions in feature space.
    • There is insufficient focus on dynamic adaptation to evolving
                                                                                    While detection mechanisms can be accurate, adaptive attacks
      threats in real-time operational environments [14].
                                                                                specifically target their vulnerabilities [25]. Moreover, they do not
    • The performance-security trade-off is poorly addressed, with
                                                                                provide predictions for identified adversarial examples.
      many techniques significantly degrading model performance on
      benign inputs [15].
                                                                                2.4. Certified robustness approaches
   Our ARMOR framework addresses these gaps through:
                                                                                    Certified defenses provide theoretical guarantees that perturbations
    • Orchestrated Integration: Complementary defense layers oper-              within certain bounds will not alter predictions. Cohen et al. [26]
      ate cooperatively rather than in isolation.                               applied randomized smoothing to create certifiably robust classifiers
    • Dynamic Threat Assessment: Adaptive response mechanisms                   against L2-norm bounded perturbations. Gowal et al. [27] developed
      learn from observed attack patterns.                                      interval bound propagation for training verifiably robust networks.
    • Explicit Trade-off Optimization: High clean accuracy is main-                 Recent progress includes DeepPoly [28], which provides tighter
      tained while improving robustness.                                        bounds for neural network verification, and improved certification
    • Comprehensive Testing: Evaluation across diverse attacks, in-             bounds for cascading architectures [29].
      cluding engineered adaptive attacks.                                          While certified methods offer valuable theoretical assurances, they
    • Modular Design: New defense mechanisms can be incorporated                generally achieve lower empirical robustness than adversarial training
      as they emerge.                                                           and can be significantly more resource-intensive [30].
   As shown in Table 1, our method advances the state-of-the-art
                                                                                2.5. Ensemble and hybrid approaches
across multiple performance dimensions while maintaining reasonable
computational overhead.
                                                                                    Ensemble methods combine multiple models or defense mechanisms
2. Related work                                                                 to enhance robustness. Tramèr et al. [31] proposed Ensemble Adversar-
                                                                                ial Training, which augments training data with adversarial examples
   This section analyzes current adversarial defense mechanisms, their          from other models. Pang et al. [13] introduced adaptive diversity
limitations, and specific gaps our framework addresses. We categorize           promoting (ADP) training to develop robust ensemble models. Sen
existing work into adversarial training, input transformation, detection-       et al. [32] integrated detection and adversarial training in a two-stage
based methods, certified robustness, and ensemble approaches.                   process.
                                                                                    However, most current ensembles employ basic averaging or voting
2.1. Adversarial training methods                                               schemes that fail to leverage the complementary strengths of different
                                                                                defense types [33].
    Adversarial training remains one of the most effective empirical
defense mechanisms. Madry et al. [6] introduced PGD adversarial                 2.6. Research gaps and contributions
training, which serves as a strong baseline but suffers from reduced
clean accuracy and high computational cost.
                                                                                   Based on our literature review, we identify the following critical
    Recent advances include TRADES [15], which explicitly regularizes
                                                                                research gaps:
the trade-off between standard accuracy and robustness; Fast Adver-
sarial Training [16], which improves computational efficiency using                • Poor Integration: Most studies focus on single defenses or simple
FGSM with randomization; and Robust Self-Training (RST) [17], which                  combinations that fail to leverage synergistic effects.
leverages additional unlabeled data to enhance robustness.
                                                                                   • Static Defense Mechanisms: Current approaches use fixed
    Despite these improvements, adversarial training techniques remain
                                                                                     strategies that cannot adapt to evolving threats.
fundamentally constrained: they are typically resistant only to attacks
                                                                                   • Performance-Security Trade-offs: Robust models frequently sac-
encountered during training, often fail on out-of-distribution samples,
                                                                                     rifice clean-data accuracy.
and exhibit reduced performance on clean data [18].
                                                                                   • Lack of Standardization: Inconsistent evaluation protocols hin-
2.2. Input transformation approaches                                                 der fair comparisons.
                                                                                   • Insufficient Adaptive Attack Testing: Most defenses are not
    Input transformation methods aim to remove adversarial perturba-                 evaluated against adaptive attacks designed to circumvent them.
tions before model inference. Guo et al. [7] explored various image
transformations, finding that total variance minimization and image                Our ARMOR framework addresses these gaps through:
quilting provide moderate robustness. Xie et al. [19] proposed random
resizing and padding as preprocessing defenses.                                    • Orchestrated Integration: Complementary defense layers oper-
    More recent work includes Neural Representation Purifiers [20],                  ate cooperatively rather than in isolation.
which use self-supervised learning to clean adversarial inputs, and                • Dynamic Threat Assessment: Response mechanisms adapt based
ComDefend [21], a compression-decompression architecture that elim-                  on observed attack patterns.
inates adversarial perturbations.                                                  • Explicit Trade-off Optimization: High clean accuracy is main-
    While these methods often preserve accuracy better than adversarial              tained while improving robustness.
training, they remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks that account for              • Comprehensive Testing: Evaluation across diverse attacks, in-
the transformation process [10].                                                     cluding engineered adaptive attacks.

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M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


Table 1
Comparison of state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods (2020–2025).
 Reference               Year    Defense type             Multi-attack robustness           Clean accuracy        Computation overhead     Adaptive attack resistance
 Madry et al. [6]        2018    Adversarial training     Medium (66.4%)                    Low (87.3%)           High (10×)               Medium (54.2%)
 Zhang et al. [15]       2019    Adv. training (TRADES)   Medium (73.5%)                    Medium (84.9%)        High (7×)                Medium (61.8%)
 Cohen et al. [26]       2019    Certified defense        Low (49.2%)                       Medium (83.5%)        Very high (30×)          High (guaranteed bounds)
 Wong et al. [16]        2020    Fast Adv. training       Medium (71.2%)                    Medium-high (85.8%)   Medium (3×)              Medium (58.3%)
 Rebuffi et al. [17]     2021    Robust self-training     High (76.5%)                      Medium-high (86.1%)   High (12×)               Medium-high (64.5%)
 Ma et al. [24]          2021    Detection-based          Low-medium (detection only)       Very high (99.1%)     Low (1.2×)               Low (35.6%)
 Naseer et al. [20]      2020    Input transformation     Medium (68.7%)                    High (88.3%)          Medium (2.5×)            Low (42.1%)
 Pang et al. [13]        2019    Ensemble                 Medium-high (74.8%)               Medium (83.2%)        Very high (15×)          Medium (63.1%)
 Sen et al. [32]         2020    Hybrid                   Medium-high (75.1%)               Medium (83.9%)        High (8×)                Medium (62.5%)
 Kariyappa et al. [34]   2019    Diversity ensemble       Medium-high (73.9%)               Medium (84.1%)        Very high (18×)          Medium-high (65.8%)
 Jia et al. [21]         2019    Stochastic defense       Medium (67.2%)                    High (89.5%)          Low (1.5×)               Low-medium (53.6%)
 Gowal et al. [27]       2019    Interval bound Prop.     Medium (68.8%)                    Medium (82.8%)        High (9×)                High (certified regions)
 Yang et al. [29]        2020    Certified defense        Medium (64.3%)                    Medium (84.2%)        High (7×)                High (certified regions)
 Croce et al. [30]       2022    Regularization           Medium-high (73.8%)               Medium-high (85.7%)   Medium (4×)              Medium (60.9%)
 Wei et al. [35]         2021    Adv. distillation        Medium-high (75.6%)               Medium-high (86.3%)   Medium (3.5×)            Medium-High (64.2%)
 Our work (ARMOR)        2025    Multi-layered            Very high (91.7%)                 High (87.5%)          Low-medium (1.42×)       High (76.4%)




                                Fig. 1. ARMOR framework architecture showing the orchestrated multi-layered defense approach.


    • Modular Design: New defense mechanisms can be incorporated                           • Input Transformation Layer: Applies appropriate preprocessing
      as they emerge.                                                                        techniques to remove or reduce adversarial perturbations.
                                                                                           • Model Robustness Layer: Employs robust model architectures
   As shown in Table 1, ARMOR advances the state-of-the-art across                           and training techniques to withstand remaining adversarial ef-
multiple performance dimensions while maintaining reasonable com-                            fects.
putational overhead.                                                                       • Adaptive Response Layer: Dynamically adjusts defense strate-
                                                                                             gies based on observed attack patterns and feedback.
3. Methodology
                                                                                            Unlike static pipeline approaches, ARMOR uses an orchestration
   This section describes the ARMOR framework architecture and its                      mechanism to dynamically route inputs through the most effective com-
components.                                                                             bination of defense components based on threat assessment and his-
                                                                                        torical performance data. This orchestrated approach provides stronger
3.1. Framework overview                                                                 protection than any single layer or static combination.

   As shown in Fig. 1, ARMOR integrates four complementary defense
                                                                                        3.2. Threat assessment layer
layers:

    • Threat Assessment Layer: Analyzes inputs to detect potential                         The threat assessment layer employs multiple detection methods to
      adversarial examples and characterize their properties.                           identify and classify adversarial examples:

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M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                                   Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


3.2.1. Feature space analysis                                                       3.3.2. Frequency domain filtering
    We compute the Mahalanobis distance between an input sample                         Based on the frequency analysis from the threat assessment layer,
𝑥 and the distribution of legitimate training examples in the fea-                  we apply targeted filtering to remove adversarial components in spe-
ture space. For each layer 𝑙 of the neural network, we model the                    cific frequency bands. For an input 𝑥, we compute its wavelet transform
class-conditional distribution of legitimate examples as a multivariate             𝑊 (𝑥), apply a filtering function 𝜙 to the coefficients, and compute the
Gaussian with parameters 𝜇𝑐𝑙 and 𝛴 𝑙 , where 𝑐 represents the predicted             inverse transform:
class. The Mahalanobis distance score 𝑀 𝑙 (𝑥) is computed as:
                                                                                    𝑥̂ = 𝑊 −1 (𝜙(𝑊 (𝑥), 𝑎(𝑥)))                                                          (7)
𝑀 𝑙 (𝑥) = min(𝑓 𝑙 (𝑥) − 𝜇𝑐𝑙 )𝑇 (𝛴 𝑙 )−1 (𝑓 𝑙 (𝑥) − 𝜇𝑐𝑙 )                 (1)
                𝑐
                                                                                        The filtering function 𝜙 adapts based on the attack characteri-
where 𝑓 𝑙 (𝑥) represents the feature vector at layer 𝑙 for input 𝑥.                 zation, targeting frequency bands most likely to contain adversarial
                                                                                    perturbations.
3.2.2. Prediction consistency check
    We measure the consistency of model predictions when the input is
                                                                                    3.3.3. Randomized smoothing
subjected to small benign transformations. Given a set of 𝑘 transforma-
                                                                                       For inputs with high uncertainty, we apply randomized smoothing
tions {𝑇1 , 𝑇2 , … , 𝑇𝑘 } and model 𝑓 , the consistency score 𝐶(𝑥) is defined
as:                                                                                 with Gaussian noise:

          1∑
                𝑘                                                                   𝑥̂ = 𝑥 +  (0, 𝜎 2 𝐼)                                                               (8)
𝐶(𝑥) =          I[𝑓 (𝑇𝑖 (𝑥)) = 𝑓 (𝑥)]                                    (2)
          𝑘 𝑖=1                                                                     where 𝜎 is dynamically adjusted based on the threat score and attack
where I[⋅] is the indicator function.                                               characterization, increasing for high-threat inputs to provide stronger
                                                                                    smoothing.
3.2.3. Frequency domain analysis
   We perform discrete wavelet transform (DWT) on the input to                      3.4. Model robustness layer
analyze its frequency characteristics. Adversarial perturbations often
exhibit distinctive patterns in high-frequency components. We compute                  The model robustness layer integrates multiple robust architectures
the energy distribution across frequency bands and compare it to the                and training techniques:
typical distribution in legitimate samples. The frequency abnormality
score 𝐹 (𝑥) is calculated as:
                                                                                    3.4.1. Diverse model ensemble
          ∑
          𝑚
                                                                                        We employ an ensemble of models with diverse architectures and
𝐹 (𝑥) =         𝑤𝑖 ⋅ |𝐸𝑖 (𝑥) − 𝜇𝐸𝑖 |                                     (3)
          𝑖=1                                                                       training procedures:
where 𝐸𝑖 (𝑥) is the energy in frequency band 𝑖, 𝜇𝐸𝑖 is the mean energy               = {𝑓1 , 𝑓2 , … , 𝑓𝑛 }                                                             (9)
for legitimate samples in that band, and 𝑤𝑖 are learned weights.
                                                                                        Instead of simple averaging, we compute weighted predictions
3.2.4. Integrated threat score                                                      based on each model’s historical performance against the detected
   The individual detection scores are combined into an integrated                  attack type:
threat score 𝑇 (𝑥) using a logistic regression model:
                                                                                               ∑
                                                                                               𝑛

𝑇 (𝑥) = 𝜎(𝑤𝑀 ⋅ 𝑀(𝑥) + 𝑤𝐶 ⋅ 𝐶(𝑥) + 𝑤𝐹 ⋅ 𝐹 (𝑥) + 𝑏)                        (4)        𝑝(𝑦|𝑥) =         𝑤𝑖 (𝑎(𝑥)) ⋅ 𝑝𝑖 (𝑦|𝑥)                                             (10)
                                                                                               𝑖=1
where 𝜎 is the sigmoid function, and 𝑤𝑀 , 𝑤𝐶 , 𝑤𝐹 , and 𝑏 are learned               where 𝑤𝑖 (𝑎(𝑥)) is the weight assigned to model 𝑖 based on the attack
parameters.                                                                         characterization 𝑎(𝑥).
    In addition to binary adversarial/legitimate classification, the threat
assessment layer provides an attack characterization vector 𝑎(𝑥) that
                                                                                    3.4.2. Feature denoising
estimates properties such as attack strength, perceptibility, and tar-
                                                                                        We incorporate feature denoising modules at multiple network lev-
geted/untargeted nature:
                                                                                    els. For a feature map ℎ, the denoised features ℎ̂ are computed as:
𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑔(𝑀(𝑥), 𝐶(𝑥), 𝐹 (𝑥), 𝑓 (𝑥))                                       (5)
where 𝑔 is a small neural network trained on a diverse set of known                 ℎ̂ = ℎ + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝐺(ℎ, 𝑎(𝑥))                                                           (11)
attacks.
                                                                                    where 𝐺 is a non-local denoising function and 𝛾 is a learnable param-
3.3. Input transformation layer                                                     eter controlling denoising strength.

   The input transformation layer employs multiple preprocessing                    3.4.3. Robust training objective
techniques to remove or reduce adversarial perturbations. Rather than                  Models in the ensemble are trained using a composite objective
applying all transformations sequentially (which would degrade clean                function balancing standard accuracy, adversarial robustness, and
performance), ARMOR selectively applies the most appropriate trans-                 model diversity:
formations based on threat assessment:
                                                                                     = 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐶𝐸 (𝑥) + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐴𝐷𝑉 (𝑥) + 𝛾 ⋅ 𝐷𝐼𝑉 (𝑥,  )                                 (12)
3.3.1. Adaptive denoising
    We employ a conditional autoencoder 𝐷𝜃 trained to remove adver-                 where 𝐶𝐸 is standard cross-entropy loss, 𝐴𝐷𝑉 is adversarial loss, and
sarial perturbations while preserving semantic content. The denoising               𝐷𝐼𝑉 is a diversity-promoting loss that encourages models to make
process is conditioned on the attack characterization vector 𝑎(𝑥):                  different mistakes.

𝑥̂ = 𝐷𝜃 (𝑥, 𝑎(𝑥))                                                        (6)        3.5. Adaptive response layer
   This conditioning allows the denoiser to adapt its behavior based on
the detected attack type, improving both effectiveness and clean data                  The adaptive response layer continuously updates defense strategies
preservation.                                                                       based on observed attack patterns and performance feedback:

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M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                       Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


3.5.1. Attack pattern recognition                                                Algorithm 1 ARMOR Orchestration Mechanism
    We maintain a historical database of attack patterns and their                1: Input: Input sample 𝑥, trained models  , orchestration policy 𝜋
effectiveness against different defense configurations. New inputs are            2: Output: Prediction 𝑦, updated effectiveness scores
compared to this database to identify similar patterns:                           3: Compute threat assessment 𝑇 (𝑥) and attack characterization 𝑎(𝑥)
               (                   )                                              4: Select initial defense configuration 𝑐0 = 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑇 (𝑥), 𝑎(𝑥))
                  ‖𝑎(𝑥) − 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 )‖2
𝑠(𝑥, 𝑥𝑖 ) = exp −                                                 (13)            5: Apply defenses in 𝑐0 to 𝑥, obtaining intermediate result 𝑥̂ 0
                        2𝜎 2
                                                                                  6: Evaluate model confidence on 𝑥̂ 0
where 𝑠(𝑥, 𝑥𝑖 ) measures similarity between the current input 𝑥 and               7: if confidence below threshold then
historical sample 𝑥𝑖 .                                                            8:    Select additional defenses 𝑐1 = 𝜋(𝑥̂ 0 , 𝑇 (𝑥̂ 0 ), 𝑎(𝑥̂ 0 ))
                                                                                  9:    Apply defenses in 𝑐1 to 𝑥̂ 0 , obtaining 𝑥̂ 1
                                                                                 10:    Set 𝑥̂ = 𝑥̂ 1
3.5.2. Defense effectiveness tracking                                            11: else
    For each defense component 𝑑 and attack type 𝑎, we track historical          12:    Set 𝑥̂ = 𝑥̂ 0
effectiveness 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑎) based on successful mitigation. This score updates         13: end if
after each prediction:                                                           14: Compute final prediction 𝑦 = 𝑓 (𝑥)  ̂
                                                                                 15: Update effectiveness scores 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑎(𝑥)) for all applied defenses 𝑑
𝐸(𝑑, 𝑎) ← 𝜆 ⋅ 𝐸(𝑑, 𝑎) + (1 − 𝜆) ⋅ 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑥)                            (14)        16: return 𝑦, updated 𝐸

where 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑥) indicates success of defense component 𝑑 on input 𝑥, and
𝜆 is a forgetting factor weighting recent observations.
                                                                                 3.7. Implementation details

3.5.3. Defense strategy optimization
                                                                                    ARMOR was implemented in PyTorch as follows:
   Based on effectiveness tracking, we periodically update the or-
chestration policy to optimize input routing through defense layers:                • Threat Assessment Layer: ResNet-50 pre-trained on ImageNet
                                                                                      for feature extraction. Detection models are trained on clean and
                 ∑                                                                    adversarial examples generated using PGD, C&W, and AutoAt-
𝜋(𝑥) = arg max         𝐸(𝑑, 𝑎(𝑥))                                    (15)             tack.
             𝑐
                 𝑑∈𝑐
                                                                                    • Input Transformation Layer: U-Net autoencoder with skip con-
where 𝜋(𝑥) selects the defense configuration for input 𝑥 and 𝑐 represents             nections and conditioning. Wavelet transforms use PyWavelets
a potential defense component configuration.                                          with db4 wavelets.
                                                                                    • Model Robustness Layer: Ensemble of ResNet-50, DenseNet-
                                                                                      121, and EfficientNet-B3, trained with various robust optimiza-
3.6. Orchestration mechanism                                                          tion methods (TRADES, MART, AWP).
                                                                                    • Adaptive Response Layer: Historical database using locality-
   The orchestration mechanism is ARMOR’s key innovation, enabling                    sensitive hashing for efficient similarity search. Orchestration
dynamic routing of inputs through the most effective combination of                   policy trained using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO).
defense components. The orchestrator uses a Markov Decision Process
                                                                                     The overall computational cost depends on the defense configu-
(MDP) formulation:
                                                                                 ration selected by the orchestrator. In our experiments, the average
                                                                                 overhead is 1.42× compared to an unprotected model, ranging from
    • State: The current state 𝑠𝑡 includes input 𝑥, threat assessment
                                                                                 1.1× (minimal defense) to 2.8× (full defense stack).
      𝑇 (𝑥), attack characterization 𝑎(𝑥), and current model confidence.
    • Actions: Each action 𝑎𝑡 represents selection of a specific defense
      component or combination.                                                  4. Experimental setup
    • Reward: The reward 𝑟𝑡 is defined by correct classification, with
      penalties for unnecessary computational overhead.                          4.1. Research questions
    • Policy: The policy 𝜋(𝑎𝑡 |𝑠𝑡 ) is a neural network predicting optimal
      defense configuration given the current state.                                Our study addresses the following research questions:

   The policy is trained using reinforcement learning on diverse attacks            • RQ1: How does ARMOR compare to state-of-the-art individual
and inputs. During deployment, the orchestrator processes each input                  and ensemble defenses in robustness against diverse attacks?
sequentially:                                                                       • RQ2: How does ARMOR preserve clean data accuracy compared
                                                                                      to existing defenses?
    1. Compute threat assessment and attack characterization.                       • RQ3: What is ARMOR’s resistance to adaptive attacks targeting
    2. Select initial defense configuration based on the policy.                      its components?
    3. Apply selected defenses and evaluate the result.                             • RQ4: How does ARMOR’s computational overhead compare to
    4. If necessary, select additional defenses based on the updated                  other defenses?
       state.                                                                       • RQ5: What are the contributions of individual ARMOR compo-
    5. Return final prediction and update effectiveness tracking.                     nents to overall effectiveness?


    This dynamic approach allows ARMOR to provide strong protec-                 4.2. Datasets
tion while minimizing computational overhead. Low-threat inputs re-
ceive minimal defenses, preserving efficiency, while high-threat inputs              We evaluate ARMOR on four image classification datasets selected
receive comprehensive protection.                                                to represent varying complexity and domains:

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M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                        Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


    • CIFAR-10: 60,000 32 × 32 color images across 10 classes (50,000          Table 2
      training, 10,000 test). This benchmark standard tests defenses on        Robust accuracy (%) against different attack types on CIFAR-10.
      small to medium-complexity images [36].                                   Defense           PGD     C&W       AutoAttack     BPDA       EOT      Average
    • SVHN: Street View House Numbers with 73,257 training and                  No defense        0.0     0.0       0.0            0.0        0.0      0.0
      26,032 test images of digits. This dataset evaluates defense gen-         AT                47.3    54.1      43.8           46.2       45.9     47.5
                                                                                TRADES            49.8    55.6      45.2           48.3       47.1     49.2
      eralization to digit recognition [37].
                                                                                RS                38.9    42.3      36.5           25.1       18.4     32.2
    • GTSRB: German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark with 39,209              FD                45.7    50.2      41.3           44.5       44.1     45.2
      training and 12,630 test images across 43 traffic sign classes.           IT                35.4    38.6      21.7           15.3       33.2     28.8
      This real-world dataset tests robustness under varied lighting and        EA                53.2    59.8      48.6           50.1       49.4     52.2
      perspectives [38].                                                        ADP               56.1    62.3      51.4           53.6       52.8     55.2
                                                                                ARMOR (Ours)      67.8    73.5      65.2           64.1       63.7     66.9
    • ImageNet-100: A 100-class subset of ImageNet with 1300 train-
      ing and 50 validation images per class. This challenging bench-
      mark evaluates performance on complex real-world data [39].
                                                                                   • True Positive Rate (TPR): Proportion of adversarial samples
    This diverse dataset selection ensures our results generalize across             correctly identified.
different data environments.                                                       • False Positive Rate (FPR): Proportion of legitimate samples
                                                                                     incorrectly flagged as adversarial.
4.3. Attack methods                                                                • Adaptive Attack Robustness (AAR): Accuracy against carefully
                                                                                     crafted adaptive attacks.
   We evaluate robustness against five attack types:
                                                                               4.6. Adaptive attacks
    • PGD (Projected Gradient Descent): Strong iterative attack with
      𝜖 = 8∕255, 𝛼 = 2∕255, and 20 iterations.
                                                                                  To thoroughly evaluate ARMOR, we designed adaptive attacks tar-
    • C&W (Carlini & Wagner): Optimization-based attack with confi-
                                                                               geting its specific components:
      dence parameter 𝜅 = 0 and 1000 iterations.
    • AutoAttack: Parameter-free ensemble including APGD, FAB, and                 • Orchestrator Bypass Attack (OBA): Generates adversarial exam-
      Square Attack.                                                                 ples with low threat scores to route through minimal defenses.
    • BPDA (Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation): Adap-                     • Transformation-Aware Attack (TAA): Uses EOT to average gra-
      tive attack designed to circumvent gradient obfuscation defenses.              dients over possible input transformations, creating perturbations
    • EOT (Expectation Over Transformation): Attack accounting                       that survive preprocessing.
      for randomized defenses by averaging gradients over multiple                 • Ensemble Transfer Attack (ETA): Generates transferable adver-
      transformations.                                                               sarial examples targeting the diverse model ensemble.
                                                                                   • History Poisoning Attack (HPA): Gradually shifts attack pattern
  Section 4.6 describes our adaptive attacks specifically targeting
                                                                                     distribution to reduce effectiveness of historical pattern matching.
ARMOR components.
                                                                                 These adaptive attacks combine EOT, BPDA, and transferability
4.4. Baseline defenses                                                         methods with ARMOR-specific modifications.

   We compare ARMOR against the following state-of-the-art defenses:           5. Results

    • Adversarial Training (AT): Standard PGD adversarial training.               This section presents experimental results addressing our research
    • TRADES: Explicitly balances accuracy and robustness.                     questions.
    • Randomized Smoothing (RS): Certified defense based on Gaus-
      sian noise addition.                                                     5.1. RQ1: Robustness against diverse attacks
    • Feature Denoising (FD): Non-local means filtering in feature
      space.                                                                       Table 2 shows robust accuracy against various attacks on CIFAR-
    • Input Transformation (IT): JPEG compression and bit-depth                10. ARMOR significantly outperforms all defenses across attack types,
      reduction.                                                               achieving 66.9% average robust accuracy compared to 55.2% for the
    • Ensemble Averaging (EA): Simple averaging of independent                 best baseline (ADP). Performance is particularly strong against adap-
      robust models.                                                           tive attacks like BPDA and EOT, where ARMOR maintains over 63%
    • Adaptive Diversity Promoting (ADP): Encourages diversity in              accuracy while other defenses degrade substantially.
      ensemble predictions.                                                        Fig. 2 shows robust accuracy across all four datasets against Au-
                                                                               toAttack. ARMOR consistently outperforms baselines, with the largest
4.5. Evaluation metrics                                                        gains on complex datasets (GTSRB and ImageNet-100), demonstrating
                                                                               scalability to challenging classification problems.
   We use the following performance metrics:
                                                                               5.2. RQ2: Impact on clean data performance
    • Clean Accuracy (CA): Accuracy on unmodified test data.
    • Robust Accuracy (RA): Accuracy on adversarial examples.                      Table 3 compares clean accuracy, robust accuracy, and the clean-
    • Attack Success Rate (ASR): Percentage of successful adversarial          robust accuracy gap (CRAG) on CIFAR-10. ARMOR achieves 87.5%
      examples that deceive the model.                                         clean accuracy—higher than most comparably robust defenses. The
    • Clean-Robust Accuracy Gap (CRAG): Difference between clean               clean-robust gap is only 20.6%, compared to 28.6% for the next best
      and robust accuracy.                                                     approach (ADP), indicating a better performance-security trade-off.
    • Computational Overhead (CO): Inference time relative to an                   Fig. 3 visualizes the clean-robust accuracy trade-off across datasets.
      undefended model.                                                        Points closer to the upper-right corner represent better performance on
    • Detection Delay (DD): Average time to detect adversarial exam-           both metrics. ARMOR consistently occupies the most favorable region
      ples.                                                                    of this trade-off space.

                                                                           6
M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                               Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


                                                                                    Table 4
                                                                                    Robust accuracy (%) against adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10.
                                                                                     Defense          Standard attack      OBA       TAA     ETA       HPA      Average
                                                                                     AT               47.5                 47.5      47.5    47.5      47.5     47.5
                                                                                     TRADES           49.2                 49.2      49.2    49.2      49.2     49.2
                                                                                     RS               32.2                 32.2      18.4    32.2      32.2     29.4
                                                                                     FD               45.2                 45.2      45.2    45.2      45.2     45.2
                                                                                     IT               28.8                 28.8      15.3    28.8      28.8     26.1
                                                                                     EA               52.2                 52.2      49.4    40.6      52.2     49.3
                                                                                     ADP              55.2                 55.2      52.8    45.1      55.2     52.7
                                                                                     ARMOR (Ours)     66.9                 58.3      56.7    52.4      59.8     58.8


                                                                                    Table 5
                                                                                    Computational overhead and memory requirements.
                                                                                     Defense             Inference time           Memory usage             Training time
                                                                                                         (× Baseline)             (× Baseline)             (× Baseline)
                                                                                     No defense          1.00×                    1.00×                    1.00×
                                                                                     AT                  1.05×                    1.00×                    7.80×
  Fig. 2. Robust accuracy comparison across datasets against AutoAttack.             TRADES              1.05×                    1.00×                    8.50×
                                                                                     RS                  3.20×                    1.05×                    1.20×
                                                                                     FD                  1.30×                    1.20×                    1.50×
Table 3                                                                              IT                  1.15×                    1.00×                    1.00×
Clean accuracy and clean-robust accuracy gap on CIFAR-10.                            EA                  3.10×                    3.00×                    7.80×
 Defense            Clean accuracy (%)    Robust accuracy (%)     CRAG (%)           ADP                 3.15×                    3.00×                    9.20×
 No defense         95.6                  0.0                     95.6               ARMOR (Min)         1.10×                    1.15×                    –
 AT                 83.4                  47.5                    35.9               ARMOR (Avg)         1.42×                    1.35×                    12.50×
 TRADES             84.9                  49.2                    35.7               ARMOR (Max)         2.80×                    3.20×                    –
 RS                 87.3                  32.2                    55.1
 FD                 85.7                  45.2                    40.5
 IT                 89.5                  28.8                    60.7
                                                                                    Table 6
 EA                 82.6                  52.2                    30.4              Detection performance of ARMOR’s threat assessment layer.
 ADP                83.8                  55.2                    28.6               Dataset              TPR (%)              FPR (%)              Detection delay (ms)
 ARMOR (Ours)       87.5                  66.9                    20.6
                                                                                     CIFAR-10             92.3                 3.7                  12.4
                                                                                     SVHN                 93.1                 3.2                  11.8
                                                                                     GTSRB                91.7                 4.1                  13.2
                                                                                     ImageNet-100         90.8                 4.5                  15.6




                                                                                    5.4. RQ4: Computational overhead


                                                                                        Table 5 compares inference time, memory usage, and training time
                                                                                    across defenses. ARMOR’s computational cost varies by configuration.
                                                                                    With minimal defenses (low-threat inputs), overhead is only 1.10×.
                                                                                    With maximal defenses (highly suspicious inputs), overhead reaches
                                                                                    2.80×.
                                                                                        ARMOR’s average inference overhead of 1.42× is substantially
                                                                                    lower than ensemble methods like EA (3.10×) and ADP (3.15×), despite
                                                                                    providing superior robustness. This efficiency comes from the orches-
                                                                                    tration mechanism’s ability to allocate computational resources based
Fig. 3. Trade-off between clean accuracy and robust accuracy across defenses.       on threat assessment.
                                                                                        Table 6 shows the threat assessment layer’s detection performance
                                                                                    in terms of true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and aver-
5.3. RQ3: Effectiveness against adaptive attacks                                    age detection delay. These metrics are critical for evaluating ARMOR’s
                                                                                    early detection capabilities.
    Table 4 shows robustness against adaptive attacks designed to                       The threat assessment layer achieves high TPR (90.8–93.1%) with
exploit defense-specific vulnerabilities. We test all adaptive attacks              low FPR (3.2–4.5%) across all datasets. Detection delay is minimal
against all defenses for consistency, though some target ARMOR specif-              (11.8–15.6 ms), enabling real-time threat assessment without signifi-
ically (e.g., OBA).                                                                 cant computational cost.
    ARMOR maintains 58.8% average robust accuracy against adaptive                      ARMOR’s training time is higher than other methods due to training
attacks, substantially higher than the second-best approach (ADP at                 multiple components, including the orchestration policy. However, this
52.7%). The Ensemble Transfer Attack (ETA) is most effective against                is a one-time cost that does not impact deployment efficiency.
ARMOR, reducing robust accuracy to 52.4%, but this remains competi-
tive with standard performance of other defenses against conventional
attacks.                                                                            5.5. RQ5: Ablation study
    The relatively modest performance drop against adaptive attacks
(from 66.9% to 58.8%) demonstrates ARMOR’s resilience to attack                        Table 7 presents an ablation study measuring each ARMOR compo-
adaptation, attributable to defense diversity and the adaptive response             nent’s contribution. We evaluate configurations with individual compo-
layer’s ability to recognize and counter evolving attack patterns.                  nents removed (w/o X) and single-component-only versions (X Only).

                                                                                7
M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                              Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


                        Table 7
                        Ablation study: Component contributions on CIFAR-10.
                            Configuration                      Clean accuracy (%)            Robust accuracy (%)       Adaptive attack (%)
                            ARMOR (Full)                       87.5                          66.9                      58.8
                            w/o threat assessment              86.8                          61.2                      49.5
                            w/o input transformation           85.3                          59.7                      52.1
                            w/o model robustness               87.9                          42.3                      35.8
                            w/o adaptive response              87.2                          63.5                      48.9
                            w/o orchestration (Pipeline)       84.1                          65.7                      54.2
                            Threat assessment only             95.1                          0.0                       0.0
                            Input transformation only          89.3                          28.7                      16.5
                            Model robustness only              83.4                          53.2                      46.8
                            Adaptive response only             95.5                          0.0                       0.0




                                                  Fig. 4. Contribution of ARMOR components to overall performance.


    Each component contributes significantly to ARMOR’s performance.                       • Performance-Security Trade-off: ARMOR achieves a superior
Model Robustness provides the largest contribution to robust accu-                           balance, maintaining high clean accuracy while providing strong
racy (53.2% when used alone), but the full system achieves 66.9%,                            robustness.
demonstrating additive benefits from integration.                                          • Computational Efficiency: The variable overhead ensures se-
    The orchestration mechanism is critical. Replacing it with a static                      curity without prohibitive resource requirements, even in con-
pipeline (applying all components sequentially) reduces clean accuracy                       strained environments, similar to lightweight security solutions
by 3.4 percentage points and robust accuracy slightly, highlighting the                      developed for IoT scenarios [40].
orchestrator’s role in preserving clean performance through selective
defense application.                                                                       These findings suggest future adversarial robustness research should
    The adaptive response layer significantly improves performance                      focus on integrative approaches combining multiple defense mecha-
against adaptive attacks. Without it, robustness drops to 48.9% versus                  nisms for enhanced effectiveness and efficiency.
58.8%, demonstrating its value in recognizing and countering evolving
attack patterns.                                                                        6.2. Real-world applications
    Fig. 4 visualizes component contributions across performance met-
rics. The synergistic integration of all components achieves perfor-
                                                                                            ARMOR’s combination of strong robustness, reasonable computa-
mance exceeding what any individual component or simple combina-
                                                                                        tional overhead, and maintained clean accuracy makes it suitable for
tion could provide.
                                                                                        practical deployment:
6. Discussion
                                                                                           • Medical Imaging: ARMOR’s adaptability is valuable in health-
                                                                                             care applications like COVID-19 detection from CT scans [4],
6.1. Key findings and implications
                                                                                             where diagnostic accuracy is critical. High clean accuracy (87.5%
                                                                                             on CIFAR-10) and robustness help prevent costly false negatives.
   Our experimental results demonstrate significant implications for
                                                                                           • Resource-Constrained Environments: ARMOR’s flexible over-
adversarial robustness research:
                                                                                             head enables deployment on edge devices and mobile platforms,
    • Integration of Complementary Defenses: ARMOR’s multi-                                  similar to efficient security schemes designed for Wireless Body
      layered approach demonstrates that combining defenses yields                           Area Networks [40]. The minimal configuration achieves only
      synergistic benefits beyond individual strengths and weaknesses.                       1.10× baseline inference time, supporting real-time applications
    • Dynamic Defense Allocation: The orchestration mechanism en-                            in bandwidth-limited settings.
      ables resource-efficient defense by applying appropriate measures                    • Security Applications: Adaptive defenses are well-suited for mal-
      based on each input’s threat profile.                                                  ware and intrusion detection domains. The framework’s ability to
    • Adaptive Defenses for Evolving Threats: The adaptive response                          continuously update defense strategies based on observed attack
      layer is essential for maintaining robustness against novel attacks,                   patterns is valuable against advanced persistent threats and can
      unlike static, fixed approaches.                                                       be applied to infrastructure surveillance systems [5].

                                                                                    8
M. Mohamed and F. AlJuaid                                                                                             Computer Standards & Interfaces 97 (2026) 104117


    ARMOR’s modularity enables integration with existing security so-                • Explainability and Interpretability: Improving understanding
lutions while accommodating domain-specific requirements, making it                    of ARMOR’s decision-making process to provide transparency
practical for real-world critical applications.                                        about why specific defense strategies are selected for particular
                                                                                       inputs.
7. Conclusion                                                                        • Defense Against Physical-World Attacks: Extending ARMOR
                                                                                       to counter physical-world adversarial attacks, which introduce
                                                                                       additional challenges beyond digital perturbations.
    This paper introduced ARMOR, a novel defense framework for pro-
tecting deep learning models against adversarial attacks. Our approach
advances the state-of-the-art through several key innovations:                   CRediT authorship contribution statement

    • A multi-layered architecture that orchestrates complementary de-              Mahmoud Mohamed: Writing – original draft, Supervision, Soft-
      fense strategies to provide synergistic protection exceeding indi-         ware, Conceptualization. Fayaz AlJuaid: Writing – review & editing,
      vidual methods.                                                            Validation, Resources, Methodology, Formal analysis, Data curation.
    • A dynamic orchestration mechanism that routes inputs through
      appropriate defensive layers based on threat assessment, optimiz-          Declaration of competing interest
      ing the security-efficiency trade-off.
    • An adaptive response system that continuously updates defense                  The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
      strategies based on observed attack patterns, providing resilience         cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
      against evolving threats.                                                  influence the work reported in this paper.
    • Comprehensive evaluation across diverse attack types, including
      adaptive attacks, demonstrating superior performance-security              Data availability
      trade-offs.
                                                                                    Data will be made available on request.
   Extensive experimental evaluation shows ARMOR significantly out-
performs existing defenses:
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